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Transnational NGOs: New Wine in an Old Bottle or Old wine in a New Bottle?
Transnational non-governmental organisations (TNGOs), as organisations, often operate, 
recruit membership, and attract funding from multiple sources. The term “transnational” 
refers to activities, organisations, and movements that occur across national boundaries 
with limited or no involvement by national governments (Stearns, 2008). TNGOs have of-
ten two main contradictory roles. On the one hand, such organisations pursue civic mobili-
sation and grass-roots-oriented roles in, for instance, linking to the masses by responding 
to their basic needs (Tarrow, 2005). On the other hand, these organisations contribute to 
organisational strategic calculations by participating in the formulation of organisational 
institutional frameworks. We can thus interpret the activities of these organisations from 
multiple theoretical perspectives/approaches that can help us understand this dualism.
The first is the idea that these non-governmental organisations (NGOs) originate from a 
network of individuals with moral considerations that aim to change certain social injus-
tices, and to mainly by-pass the state in solving transnational challenges (Keck and Sik-
kink, 1998). Their aim is to create new cultural identities, new forms of solidarity emerg-
ing from the grass-roots level. Secondly, these networks may also consist of people with 
cosmopolitan roots and creative structures of leadership, organisation and technology, 
who try to contend in politics and power by strengthening and consolidating the institu-
tional organisational dimension (Tarrow, 2005). Core professional groups often lead such 
organisations, consequently leading to a marginal relationship with the masses. Thirdly, 
these networks might not link to the grass-roots level at all but may concentrate more 
on the institutional and organisational dimension. In this context, TNGOs become part of 
the hierarchical structure and an integrated part of global hegemonic order (Ferguson, 
2009).
Empirically, recent global developments have shown that transnational NGOs operate be-
tween the civic mobilisation dimension and organisational and institutional dimensions, 
depending on the particular contextual event. NGOs have demonstrated the quality of 
moving between civic mobilisation grass-roots orientations, and top-down organisation-
al platforms (Stachursky, 2013). In this regard, the state remains significant in the pro-
cess of NGO activities. Although globalization in the form of mobility and technological 
advancements diminishes state monopolies, NGOs continue to struggle to overcome ba-
sic priorities, not just for acquiring funds, but also for engaging in an increasingly-com-
plex but still state-centric world.
5We can, nonetheless, agree on the point that transnational NGOs as non-state actors 
have the capacity to simultaneously operate locally, globally and transnationally. On one 
hand, these are competent organizations that participate in global politics and govern-
ance. On the other, these are movements that operate between state and society. How 
you see transnational NGOs, therefore, depends on where you are in the world. In Africa, 
depending on whom you ask, NGOs could be either saviours or neo-colonial neo-liber-
al opportunists. In China, NGO work, until recently, mainly remained within the national 
framework. It was seen as either supplementary to state strategies or as providing po-
tential intermediaries between state and society. For many parts of the Middle East, NGOs 
remain controversial as agents of colonial expansion, perpetual elites, and foreign agen-
cies. In the West, NGOs are seen as organisations that more-or-less design and pursue 
projects designed for the South and developing countries.
The paradigm of an international order, based on one-sided nation-state governance 
around the notions of “the end of history”, “democratic peace” and the “new world or-
der” after the end of the Cold War in 1989, was soon replaced by the anti-terrorist global 
wars driven by the beliefs and discourses of “the clashes of civilisation”, “illiberal democ-
racy”, and “global chaos”. Today, the world is struggling to survive the economic crises 
which disseminated from the core countries of the capitalist world system while it is 
also disturbed by global terrorism, civil wars and hegemonic competition at the national, 
regional and international level. Such transformations have shown that the nation-state 
struggles to dealing with global issues, and international institutions have so far been 
ineffective in finding global solutions. Clearly the state seems not to survive in its original 
Westphalian form with the traditional emphasis on nation, boundaries and the monopo-
lisation of coercive power, authority, sovereignty and legitimacy (Sen, 2002).
Instead it can be argued that NGOs and civil societies should perhaps be given a great-
er role in order to create a peaceful and equitable world. Coincidently, “civil society” as 
emancipatory movements, whether national, international or transnational, has influ-
enced global politics. Thus, contemporary transnational civil society organisations, to-
gether with their social movements, are an outcome of the wide-ranging social trans-
formations in tune with the liberalisation, marketisation, and privatisation promoted by 
the Washington Consensus. It is firstly becoming a recognized phenomenon that emerg-
ing transnational corporate NGOs are increasingly part of the globally diverse efforts to 
solve security and sovereignty issues, for example as security contractors and consular 
mangers processing visa applications for example. Secondly, although through diverse 
governmental and non-governmental institutions and organisations, political, econom-
ic, cultural, and social interactions are becoming increasingly transnationalised and glo-
balised, citizenship and nationhood formally remains state-centric. The problem is that 
the world still lacks what we could refer to as global citizenry. Although the interactions 
that take place do resemble global citizenship, democratic processes and socio-econom-
ic and political justice does not project influence across boundaries, nations and states. 
There are elements of disjuncture, where decision-makers at the macro level continue to 
entertain the existence of a national and state platform. In the process such constituents 
often monopolise and might even dictate national socio-economic and political processes 
as well as transnational social, political, and economic realities that demand alternative 
epistemological and ontological configurations.
6Research Questions and Conceptual Discussions
One of the research questions addressed here, in connection with the rise of transnational 
NGOs, is whether the hegemony and counter-hegemony embedded in the convention-
al state-centric system of national capitalism and interstate order is able to transcend 
it to become “transnational hegemony” and “transnational counter-hegemony” in the 
current era of globalisation and transnational capitalism. In other words, the research 
questions this book intends to find some answers to are: 1) whether the resilient passive 
revolution capacity of capitalism (Gramsci, 1975) is able to transfer from a nation-state 
domain to a global one; and 2) whether transnational NGOs in their varieties of organisa-
tions, networks, associations, and interactions represent the organic counter-hegemonic 
social forces, and whether they are able to relate problems at the national level to those 
at global level. These two aspects are two sides of the same coin. Based on the collation of 
the chapters from the authors, who contribute their analyses from a variety of perspec-
tives, the book’s theoretical and analytical contributions are to look for some answers to 
the following broad research questions, among others (some of which are conceptual, 
while others are empirical):
The first question to ask is [to what extent] the foundations 
of hegemony of nation-state capitalism are being challenged 
and being extended to the global level and arenas with the ev-
er-increasing globalization process and the transnationalization 
of global affairs. Meanwhile, it is problematic to discern at the 
current transnational capitalism does not really constitute in 
organic substance a “global state” vis-à-vis a necessary coun-
terpart in the form of a “global civil society” which could repre-
sent the social basis of hegemony (Germain and Kenny, 1998: 
15-16). 
The second question is whether economic globalisation, through the increased functional 
integration of the market, is promoting a tangible historical bloc of global capital/elite 
classes. Or  whether it has also created organically-founded global civil societies? Globali-
sation and transnational capitalism necessitates the increasing role of civil society and 
NGOs, both at the national and global levels, but globalisation and transnational capi-
talism also make it difficult to envisage a genuine Polanyian “double movement” (Po-
lanyi, 1957), i.e. civil societies responding to the alienation and repression of the market 
and capital manipulation. Both nation-states (the “transmission belt” which promotes 
economic globalisation) and transnational civil society/NGOs in their diversified forms, 
are currently being pulled in various directions. On the one hand, nation-states are be-
coming committed to the transnationalisation of economic activities (production, finance 
and services) while, on the other hand, they are organically tied to national structures 
through a wide range of functions and provisions, not least of which is welfare.
The third question is whether the “resistance movements” found in self-proclaimed 
transnational NGOs can be argued to be merely conjunctural responses to the immediate 
effect of the mal-developments of economic globalisation (poverty, environmental prob-
7lems, terrorism, and so on) or to general principles of common concern (democracy and 
human rights, and so on). Could we, for instance, argue that what we are witnessing is a 
genuine transformation of global human relations, where states, at least in their modern 
form, no longer remain the centre of human development? Has humanity overcome na-
tional and institutional barriers to address global issues that risk not just the existence 
and survival of human progress but also the planet Earth itself? The dichotomy of institu-
tions vis-à-vis public mobilisation might have long constrained human beings in unleash-
ing potential resources and commonalities. At least for the time being, in many parts 
of the world a common understanding that environmental problems, health issues and 
trans-boundary criminal activities should be addressed and managed responsibly and, if 
possible, collectively, prevails. In addition, most admit that transnational NGOs seem to 
have the upper hand when it comes to global discourse-generating platforms, in which 
states first come on board after some time, and mostly under pressure. Nonetheless, the 
essence is, to what extent transnational civil society and NGOs are still facing challenges, 
limits, and constraints in playing an organic role in having concrete influence on both 
state politics and market mechanisms.
Since the 1990s, transnational NGOs have grown in number, size and scope. Seen from 
Keane’s point of view, this previously-unfamiliar notion was historically derived from the 
“neologism of the 1990s” and the “revival of the old language of civil society” of the 
1980s, and became increasingly popular not only in domestic socio-political contexts, but 
also in international and regional economic and financial institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (Keane, 2003). 
Rieff also argues that the rise of the transnational civil society is more in tune with the 
post-Cold War dominant ideology of liberal market capitalism, representing “a projection 
of our desires”, than with the ideal roles of civil society in fostering democracy and good 
governance (Rieff, 1999: 11-12).
Furthermore, the rise and struggle of global civil society, in the view of some scholars, 
should be comprehended through analysing global civil society- its movements, organi-
sations, groups, and individuals – as an outcome and effect of global complexity:
These [organizations] are shaped by a number of ideological 
inputs, including liberal constitutionalism (human rights, an-
ti-corporatism, fair trade, democratic representation); socialism 
(trade unions, welfarism, internationalism); anarchism (partic-
ipation, direct democracy, direct action); and, ecologism (envi-
ronment, sustainability, nature) – each of which interacts with 
the others exchanging, assimilating, and adapting concepts, 
slogans, symbols and other cognitive, emotive, and affective re-
sources (Chesters, 2004: 14).
In line with this thinking, the heated debate has concerned the paradox of transnational 
NGOs as counter-hegemonic social forces. A variety of social movements, under the ban-
ner of opposing the polarising inequalities, declining social and environmental conditions, 
economic liberalisation, and unaccountable corporate power, and so on, are coalescing 
8into transnational networks in the process of shaping transnational civil society. They 
are voicing a strong protest against injustice, advocating radical democracy, and pro-
moting the “global public sphere”. They embrace participatory democracy, but without 
a globally-shared narrative or grand ideology (Esteva and Prakash, 1998). They have a 
strong belief in cosmopolitan or transnational citizenship and have a great faith in global 
governance. But the central question remains: are these cross-border interest groups, 
cultural groups, and social networks able to create transnational organic social forces 
that are capable of reshaping the political structure of the global order and governance, 
and bringing about democratic and redistributive justice for the capitalist world system?
Transnational NGOs: Indispensable Relevance and Roles in the Contemporary Era
Nevertheless, global civil societies/NGOs, whose roles are impossible to ignore, are vis-
ually and vocally active today. If one looks carefully at what state-centric politicians and 
others do, it is clear that they incorporate transnational and sometimes globally-debated 
decisions (often generated by transnational actors such NGOs) into national governance. 
Thus, many national decisions originate from places such as the World Economic Forum, 
the World Social Forum, and Rotary international, incorporating powerful individuals and 
groups that operate at transnational and multilateral levels. After annual gatherings, 
many of them return to their respective constituencies/countries with alternative strat-
egies to engage globally. The challenge is that multiple actors exploit such resources for 
particularistic political ends (DeMars, 2005).
One can eternally debate on how much transnational NGOs represent an institutionalised 
organisational platform or how much these organisations constitute a reliable voice of 
the ordinary masses. But one thing is for sure: many of these organisations are locally en-
trenched and they not only address socio-political, economic and cultural issues, but due 
to their closeness to local environments, also generate information, activism and contacts 
more quickly and effectively than state mechanisms, which are often associated with 
reluctant institutions with bureaucratic and systematic requirements and administrative 
procedures. For instance, viruses and infectious diseases such as severe acute respiratory 
syndrome among others which pose a threat have been first detected and documented 
by transnational local NGOs that gathered more reliable global information than that 
of the World Health Organization, which is the organisation formally and institutionally 
responsible for global health data collection. Similarly, transnational NGOs contributed a 
variety of attempts to eliminate polio and malaria in poor developing counties. States are 
also relevant in these important global efforts, but their engagement takes more time 
and co-ordination than that of more informal and direct transnational NGO efforts.
With global attention on WikiLeaks and the Snowden affair, we are entering an era where 
people around the world become suspicious about mass surveillance and the security 
of their personal and private lives. Developed democratic states are thought to ensure 
individual liberty, justice, and freedoms. Transnational NGOs will be the first to provide 
solutions for maintaining global openness and interaction while preserving personal in-
tegrity and trust.
9Transnational human interaction in trade, spirituality, and other forms of cross-boundary 
associations prevailed for centuries, if not for thousands of years. The drivers of such en-
deavours included faith-based organisations, philanthropists and even fundamentalists 
(Weber, 1959; Tarrow, 2005). Interestingly, some of these organisations maintain sig-
nificant influence in our current, partially post-modern globalised world. We say partially 
because it is only some parts of the world that might experience post-modern tendencies. 
Although modernisation and post-modern socio-political and economic processes trans-
formed societies, traditional structures such as kinship relations, and those inspired by re-
ligiosity maintain significant power and leverage in the world. Some of the most powerful 
transnational and global movements, such as World Vision and Jama-Al-Islamia belong 
to these traditional socio-mechanisms. With the establishment of post-World War Two 
multilateral economic, political, social and developmental organisations, transnationalism 
and the role of NGOs have been taken to a higher institutional, formalised, macro level.
This process had an impact on the formation of NGOs, where states influenced multi-
lateral institutions and created international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) 
to operate in an increasingly open and dynamic socio-economic world, where coercive 
state power no longer maintains an exclusive monopoly. NGOs and INGOs were already 
diverse, but with complex multilateral and transnational engagements, these organisa-
tions become more complex and diverse, depending on the priorities of alliance building 
and fund-raising opportunities.
Later, multilateralism was seen as beneficial, but due to the principles of geographical 
distance and closeness, organisations begin to create regional structures and branches 
in accordance with the ones formed by national states, establishing regional economic 
co-operation. In recent years, scholars have suggested that non-governmental organi-
sations become significant parts of even micro- and meso-networks within cities, states 
and beyond (Castells, 2011). For instance, the different actors that exist in a city, a coun-
try, or in different nations, such as the business sector, universities and think tanks, es-
tablish joint NGO networks to pursue particular focused transnational plans with the aim 
of advancing strategies and interests in an increasingly-changing global world.
In addition, small, wealthier states, such as Denmark and Qatar, which comparatively con-
front challenges to exercise hard power, like the Chinese, Russians and Americans, have in 
recent years, also allied with diverse civil society groups and funded transnational NGOs 
in order to assert soft power and in pursuing global strategic interests. The Danish have 
created strategies which mix transnational business and development, while the Qataris 
have the notorious Qatar Foundation, an NGO that, due to the economic resources it can 
project, has greater power than many countries (Stig et al, 2013). Transnational NGOs 
also co-operate with these small and wealthier states, as they provide resources without 
attracting global attention.
In contrast to these increasingly-powerful small states, you have small states which, in 
the political science literature, are popularly called fragile and failed states. Most of these 
countries are in Africa and the Middle East and are in Asia. Apart from sharing governance 
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challenges in terms of consolidating internal and external legitimacy, these countries are 
almost governed – at least externally – by multilateral and transnational institutions and 
NGOs. Powerful states such as the USA have failed to stabilise countries like Somalia. It 
seems that small, wealthier states like Denmark, Qatar and Norway, by using multilat-
erals and transnational NGOs, have, in co-operation with hegemonic states, established 
themselves as development and security agents in regard to minimising challenges from 
so-called peripheral societies.
Furthermore, in the past decade, a number of countries in the South, like Brazil and South 
Korea have shifted from being donation recipients to being donors (Mawdsley, 2012). 
This process impacted the dynamics of transnational NGOs. Not only would transnational 
NGOs have to change their strategies in relation to emerging economies, but the new 
economies would become targets for transnational interest.
Finally, with the roles and varieties of capitalism in these processes, capitalism itself as a 
dominant economic model struggles and adapts to complex developments. For instance, 
major transnational companies have, in recent years, established transnational and re-
gional NGOs. The strategy aims to combine running profitable businesses and profits with 
morally-appealing multilateral companies with an emphasis on corporate social responsi-
bility. Time will tell whether transnational critical NGO activists and associated networks 
will accept global oil and gas exploration companies, such as Shell, when they establish 
organisations for sustainable environmental protection and development, as well as the 
recent activities of McDonalds and Coca-Cola sponsoring transnational NGOs which pro-
mote healthier eating.
The Book’s Background and Contribution
In order to find clarification for such puzzles, our research group on Development and In-
ternational Relations at Aalborg University, hosted a May 2013 seminar on the theme of 
“The Transnational and Development: NGOs and global governance”. Prominent scholars 
from Europe, the USA, China, Qatar, and Ghana attended the gathering. The seminar re-
flected on and discussed the general theoretical debate and rationale on the emergence, 
role, and activities of transnational NGOs. NGOs, due to their capability of mobilising and 
organising, have a significant impact on our increasingly-globalised world. This influence 
remains particularly relevant on contributions to development. Increased transnational 
networking, mobility, and interaction provide civil society groups and NGOs with oppor-
tunities to actively and positively contribute to global development. Today, NGOs are 
partially integrated in global governance when it comes to developmental, health, tech-
nological, and developmental issues. States and international organisations interact and 
use NGOs for global activities.
Apart from the insightful and inspiring papers presented at the seminar, the aim was to 
establish a transnational research exchange and relationship, advancing research strat-
egies for the topic of transnational NGOs and governance. So far, the transnational NGO 
research areas remain under-researched, especially in relation to development and in-
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ternational relations. Furthermore, the seminar introduced selected transnational NGO 
empirical cases, and examined their impact on development, particularly on their comple-
mentary and occasionally-conflicting roles with international and multinational develop-
ment aid agencies.
The seminar firstly highlighted that we live in a world that is gradually shifting from in-
ternationalism (interstate relations) towards transnationalism (inter-society relations). 
Secondly, transnational social and political activities have profound implications for re-
gional and global development. Nonetheless, the term seems all-encompassing, calling 
for critical and creative theoretical and methodological reflections on the movement, as 
well as the organisational aspects of such enterprises. Thirdly, in Africa, transnational 
NGOs contribute to numerous developmental sectors, but so far a gap between expec-
tations and outcomes in an increasingly-complex world system exists. This might lead 
to new forms of society-centred dependence and underdevelopment. Fourthly, in China, 
NGOs contribute to the transformation of the internal and the external dynamics of Chi-
nese society, by undertaking greater social, technical, advocacy, and policy tasks. Fifthly, 
in the Middle East and Africa, Islamic movements and NGOs have been more-or-less suc-
cessfully filling the welfare gap fragile, weak and authoritarian states leave behind for 
increasingly and consciously strong and mobilised societies.
In recent years, national donor agencies such as the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development and the Danish International Development Agency, and other inter-
governmental organisations (IGOs) such as the World Bank, have increasingly recognised 
the significance of transnational NGOs and the need to co-ordinate developmental efforts 
with them. States and related IGOs admit that, in certain areas, non-governmental actors 
have performed better in achieving development strategies, faster and more efficiently. 
For their part, transnational NGOs consider themselves as real bottom up agents for so-
cial empowerment and justice. Such organisations, though partially dependant on state 
funding, provide direct relief and support for a wide range of areas with social, political, 
and economic consequences.
The conclusions from the contributions to this book conceptualise NGOs – whether na-
tional or transnational – as organisations confronting significant conundrums to deal 
with and balance society-state dialectics. This is the case, whether we allude to the more 
historically-transnational Caribbean, China (a sizeably strong, centralised state system) 
or to countries with lesser organisational capabilities and relatively weaker states – most 
of them on the African continent. On one hand, contributions stress the significance of 
the institutionalisation dimensions under which NGOs, more-or-less voluntarily, appar-
ently operate under national and possibly state-centric platforms. On the other hand, 
NGOs often portray themselves as aiming at living up to the expectations and wishes of 
ordinary people at the movement and grass-roots bottom-up levels. This dual charac-
ter firstly requires civil society groups and NGOs to circumspectly balance the dynamics 
between the society and the state, and in the process determine whether to selectively 
co-operate with one side or to bridge the gap between the society and the state. Whether 
such an intermediate meditative role exists – and eventually prevails – depends on the 
different structures in the society, nation or state concerned. Secondly, in recent years, 
NGOs increasingly aimed at and expanded into balancing national and transnational lev-
12
els. These are two parallel processes that neither generate nor foster cohesive demands 
and objectives.
Chapter Contributions
In the following chapters, contributors present theoretical and empirical reflections on 
transnational NGOs, with an emphasis on the relations and dynamics within the contex-
tual frame of consolidated state and weak state conditions.
In Chapter 1, Timothy Shaw analyses Caribbean transnationalism and argues that the 
Caribbean pattern follows multiple transnationalism in which people experience simulta-
neous positive and negative transnational processes. In addition, Caribbean transnation-
alism emanates both from the top as well as from the bottom. The first follows a formal 
organisational pattern, while the latter concentrates on informal community approaches. 
The chapter argues that we could interpret Caribbean transnationalism – both in its more 
positive civic approaches as well as its more negative components – as responding to the 
hegemonic global governance mainly dominated by established governmental, non-gov-
ernmental and marked transnationalism. In this regard, diverse Caribbean transnation-
alisms are embedded in dialectical relations with regional and global transnationalism. 
Timothy Shaw expands the framework for the classification and activities of transnation-
al NGOs. His position is that transnational NGOs are a significant factor in development 
and will remain so. We should include an analysis of transnational civil society, diasporas, 
multinational corporations, think tanks and media. The reason is that these are increas-
ingly influential in policy debates and directions from the local to global, especially varie-
ties of old and new regionalisms. The case of the Caribbean(s) generates myriad heuristic 
transnational governance, families, civil societies, supply chains, crime networks, and old 
and new security patterns. This leads to the proposition of citizen rather than national or 
human or private security, with profound implications for development policy/practice/
outcomes in the post-2015 world.
Empirically, in China, we have a country with a relatively strong state, with a somewhat 
co-opted civil society that often provides public services and contributes to mobilisation 
efforts. Nonetheless, prevailing state restrictions on independent expression and mobili-
sation tendencies prevents civic communities from pursuing and achieving their national 
and transnational potentials.
In Chapter 2, Chen Hongbing, Li Xing and Zhou Chunfang contend that Chinese NGOs 
undertake numerous civic empowerment approaches and provide services dealing with 
human rights, social, and developmental issues. But these civic processes seem not to 
be properly consolidated, as NGO initiatives confront challenges from both the state and 
society. The NGOs confront the dilemma of operating within the institutionalised frame 
versus accommodating grass-roots organisational demands. It will, therefore, take time 
before this gap is fully reduced. Chen, Li and Zhou’s chapter shows that this paradox and 
dilemma is not just a dilemma in transnational NGOs is not just restricted to Africa, but 
it could also exist in Asia and elsewhere. The chapter aims to provide a framework for 
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conceptualising the development dilemma of grass-roots NGOs in China and to explore 
the factors behind this dilemma. The chapter posits that the development of grass-roots 
NGOs has played a significant role in promoting social development in China, in which they 
carry out a number of functions in the areas of social assistance, social justice, rights pro-
tection, environmental protection, and the neutralisation of social contradictions. Being 
organisations close to populations at the grass-roots level, these NGOs contribute to the 
emergence of a new social phenomenon in China – an active civil society. In recent years, 
they have been constantly expanding their social influence and actively participating in 
discussions of public policy. With the deepening of the reforms in Chinese society, on the 
one hand, grass-roots NGOs are facing a wide variety of roles that they are requested 
to play, but on the other hand they are confronting many development dilemmas. The 
chapter proposes to examine their challenges from a number of perspectives, such as 
the questions of legality, the low public awareness of volunteer services, the shortage of 
funds, irregular internal management, as well as the contradictory attitude of the Chinese 
government towards grassroots NGOs.
In response to the limitation of the liberal political public sphere in China, Chinese people, 
particularly cyber-activists, devise alternative national and transnational public spheres 
with the aim of subverting state-sanctioned public sphere limitations.
In Chapter 3, Ane Bislev discusses Chinese NGOs confronting state restrictions through 
the utilisation of the internet as a “space for salvage”. This could be a space where move-
ments and organisations can express and exchange public opinions.  NGOs have, nonethe-
less, often managed to bypass state restrictions through transnationally-created internet 
mechanisms. This means that restrictions of the normal public sphere lead to the creation 
of a digital sphere that, nonetheless, demands a higher cost. Under such circumstances, 
transnational NGOs working in China also create public spheres with bilingual capabilities. 
In this regard, Chinese NGOs share similar characteristics with other NGOs that also con-
front challenges in balancing the institutional and activist approaches. The difference in 
China is the expanded state control of the public sphere. The presence of transnational 
NGOs and the increasing application of the internet as a transnational public space results 
in the emergence of an “associational sphere”. But the proper emergence of a vibrant 
national and transnational civil society depends on the extent of state funds, as well as 
the prevailing restrictions to curb independent civic mobilisation. Ane Bislev recognis-
es the dynamics of Chinese civil society and NGOs and their transnational and probably 
global implications. In this regard, Bislev reviews the explosive internet use in China. This 
will certainly have enormous impact on social and community organisations not just for 
national development, but also for transnational development.
The introduction of Chinese labour legislation reform in 2008 does not just demonstrate 
the existence of a strong, centralised state, but the robustness of national civic mobili-
sation as well as transnational NGO-involvement in the formulation of national laws in 
China. In addition, the labour legislation reform case shows that, although NGO demands 
within and outside China might occasionally converge, national patriotic sentiments of-
ten lead local NGOs to stick to state priorities, rather than transnational relations.
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In Chapter 4, Peer Christensen suggests that China’s integration into the global economic 
system has implications both for China itself and for the wider world. One obvious im-
plication is the emergence of transnational NGOs’ interest in the development of China, 
particularly the transnational interest of the consequences of labour legislation reforms 
in China – and the subsequent responses from NGOs within and beyond the country. 
Obviously, despite some legislative reforms, transnational and national NGOs seem to be 
dissatisfied because, in China, civic mobilisation – whether non-profit or profit oriented 
– exerts limited transformational influence (in comparison with other more-democratic 
systems where transnational civic mobilisations occasionally leads to concrete reforms 
and policy changes). Another challenge or deficiency of reforms relates to the tension 
between Western transnational NGOs and Chinese NGOs – a clash which the Chinese state 
exploits. Moreover, transnational NGOs are far from homogeneous. There are those with 
profit-orientation and those with humanitarian- and justice-orientation, each of which 
express opinions on Chinese legislative reforms.
While in China NGOs do engage in debate – whether it is dealing with national or trans-
national activities – NGOs continue to operate within the framework of the state which 
remains powerful. In Africa the weakness of the state provides the top-down imposition 
of both positive and negative transnational mechanisms- that often attempt to operate 
beyond the state. Egypt is an exception in this regard. Here there is a well-organised 
military – that claims to dominate and represent the state. National NGOs, together with 
transnational human advocates, try to balance the authoritarianism of the military re-
gime, with grass-roots demands for fairness and inclusion.
In Chapter 5, Osman Farah presents the Egyptian case, illustrating the mobilisation am-
bivalence of TNGOs. The cases of engagement by Human Rights Watch’s and the Carter 
Center in Egypt following successive public uprisings in the country shows that civil socie-
ty transnationalism and mobilisation has limitations. Because of the need to balance pub-
lic mobilisation needs and the structural realities of dealing with the still state-dominated 
international system, TNGOs adhere to more institutional frames of subordinating state 
hegemony. Osman Farah argues that the current scholarly debate on the so-called “Arab 
Spring” considers the mobilisation of disempowered youth, intense media-tech applica-
tions, and sustained international pressure as crucial to ousting authoritarian regimes in 
North Africa. Delineating the role of TNGOs complements such findings. TNGO activities 
and responses to the Egyptian uprising in 2011 and to the ensuing coup in 2013 reveal 
the capability of such organisations to balance civic transformational-oriented mobilisa-
tions with state-centred institutional considerations. Furthermore, though TNGOs cannot 
directly change the current political stalemate in Egypt, the power elite might misinter-
pret the changing, and sometimes contradictory, positions of these organisations to have 
encouraged the return of authoritarianism to Egypt.
There is the obvious ambivalence of the NGOs – whether national or transnational – on 
whether to maintain support for the democratic aspirations and demands for justice from 
the people - or to maintain some kind of acceptance of the prevailing international order. 
Transnational relations opened certain opportunities for African civil society and NGOs, 
but there is a paradox in this process. Although transnational NGOs bring certain develop-
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ments, these organisations – especially Western or Northern NGOs, seem to have the up-
per hand in transnational relations. One of the reasons for this is that these organisation 
link to their states, while Africa still struggles to institutionalise the relationship between 
state and society. Therefore, transnational NGOs’ efforts – due to the lack of proper state 
institutions – end up with elite manipulation. In addition, projects planned for civic and 
bottom-up implementation do not reach their stated objectives.
In Chapter, 6 Paul Mensah contends that, in Africa, established transnationalism prevailed 
– as these transnational NGOs, instead of supporting grass-roots communities, fail to 
confront the need to change politics in their countries. The role of transnational NGOs 
in Africa remains normatively more institutionalised, and less transformational, in civic 
terms. Transnational NGOs do not transform, but maintain the status quo increasingly 
favouring established transnationalism (in the North and in the capital cities of poor Af-
rican countries) through a DOSTANGO – a closer donor-state-NGO co-operation system 
– and other neo-liberal mechanisms. Paul Mensah argues that since the 1980s – the 
“NGO Decade” in African development discourse – transnational NGOs have become ma-
jor actors in African development, with the capacity and resources to match UN agencies 
and, in some instances, dwarf governmental ministries in African countries. Indeed, from 
service delivery to advocacy, transnational NGOs, such as World Vision, Save the Chil-
dren, Oxfam, Plan and Action Aid, Paul adds, have become household names engaged in 
cross-cutting development issues in a number of African countries. Their role in African 
development is “premised on normative expectations of their ability to serve as agents 
for social empowerment, transformation and justice”. He, therefore, questions this nor-
mative expectation of the transformational roles of transnational NGOs, arguing that 
the role of transnational NGOs in African development presents a paradox. While they 
play critical developmental roles, their activities also undermine the long-term structural 
changes that are necessary for transformational development on the continent. Evidence 
from the case of the African Commission for Human Rights, with a progressive history of 
engaging NGOs, provides good examples.
In fragile post-conflict states, transnational NGOs, both from the West and from the East, 
compete for consolidation in countries where the state has less say. Though these trans-
national NGOs provide certain services and benefits, they seem to link and adjust to the 
interests of their original states and not those of the countries where these organisations 
operate as development NGOs. This can, in the long term, create structural transforma-
tion. The lack of a strong state also provides opportunities for profiles and activists as 
well transnational communities (diasporas) to step in and take leadership and organisa-
tional-providing services for vulnerable constituents in the society.
The situation is much different in a situation where the state is weak or absent.
In Chapter 7, Olivia Zank shows that transnational NGOs plan development initiatives 
strategically – but this creates challenges at the micro-implementation level. Initially, 
transnational NGO-generated projects start as rational and well-prepared, but over the 
course of implementation they encounter distortion by various actors, transforming the 
original developmental strategy that was assumed technically and rationally to be im-
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plantable – leading to project plans that are unachievable or sustainable. This is also 
the case with the paradox of normative commitment to predesigned developmental pro-
jects   versus organisational restrictions NGOs often confront within and around state 
institutions. Therefore, it would be suitable to take more human relations and empower-
ment-oriented approaches rather than those with a more institutional and organisational 
focus. There is a need for transnational NGOs to be more realistic and incorporate local 
agency. 
Navigating between warlords and transnational NGOs and intergovernmental agencies, 
Somali civil society plays a pivotal role in reconstructing and contributing to peace – 
but the process confronts challenges from within and from outside. Transnational NGOs 
and UN agencies fail to take these civic groups seriously. But they have, in recent years, 
become more transnational through links to the diaspora, and thereby also have the 
opportunity to operate globally. This is, nonetheless, not enough to confront the hegem-
onic power of the transitional establishment (the state, the UN system, the market, and 
TNGOs).
In Chapter 8, Osman Farah and Shukria Dina suggest that Somali women mobilise nation-
ally – through NGOs and civic movements. They succeeded in overcoming challenges, and 
confront warlordism and violence. This dimension is well documented and well known 
by the international community. Lesser-known Somali is the transnational dimension of 
Somali women’s mobilisation. Osman Farah and Shukria Dini contend that Somali Wom-
en’s transnational efforts for justice and social empowerment, and their efforts of co-op-
erating with transnational NGOs and transnational communities, play a central role in 
peace and reconciliation processes in Somalia. The two authors argue that the collapse 
of the Somali state in the 1990s led to the total disintegration of the national security 
sector institutions, including the national police, the army, and the correctional services. 
The disintegration of security, combined with the absence of state protection, ushered 
in violence and human rights abuses, including gender-based violence, that have largely 
been perpetuated by armed groups who have turned against unarmed civilians for over 
two decades. As survivors of militarised violence, Somali women and men possess rele-
vant information, knowledge that is essential in designing and implementing activities 
that are intended to improve security in their communities. This chapter argues that the 
insecurities faced by members of both genders in Somalia are amalgamations of a num-
ber of factors that Somalia, as a nation, has gone through. Some of these factors include 
bad governance, military regimes, and human rights violations that occurred in different 
periods of Somalia’s history and political stages
In Chapter 9, Ladan Affi proposes that Somali civic mobilisation mainly takes place within 
the diaspora’s transnational framework. Here Somali women find a transnational context 
where they have to attend not just transnational development activities towards the 
homeland, but also maintain a decent life within challenging diaspora circumstances in 
the host country. The diaspora – though challenging – has provided Somali women with 
opportunities to pursue transnational activities within and beyond Somalia. Depending 
on the context, Somali women have found spaces for expression. Consequently, Somali 
women and their worldwide transnational communities fund and actively contribute to 
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numerous national and transnational NGOs – and thereby to the overall development of 
the country. Ladan Affi, in her chapter, proposes that, although certain positive develop-
ments are taking place, African women seem to struggle not just for political power and 
recognition, but also to establish NGOs and access resources provided by international 
donors. Referring to the case of the Horn of Africa, Affi argues that women have organ-
ised transnational NGOs that are more accountable and progressive than other organisa-
tions which suffer from accessibility, legitimacy and credibility challenges in local organic 
communities.
In Chapter 10, Afyare Elmi agrees with the existence of a more transnationalised Somalia, 
due to the collapse of the centralised authority. He contends that the number of TNGOs 
in stateless Somalia has increased since the collapse. There are now twenty-three trans-
national NGOs from the West and the Middle East and Islamic countries. Islamic NGOs 
focus on the health and education sectors, while Western NGOs provide humanitarian 
assistance. There is, however, a lack of connection between the macro- and micro-plans 
and strategies. Islamic transnational NGOs operate more at the grass-roots level, as they 
have created job opportunities for unemployed educators following the state collapse – 
thereby influencing overall economic opportunities. The NGOs have also mobilised civil 
society, leading to Islamic movements that, in recent years, have become dominant in 
the political arena. It seems that the national and transnational NGOs from Islamic and 
Arab countries have more roots and impact in the country than transnational NGOs from 
the West, which still have to establish themselves at the grass-roots level. Elmi further 
suggests that not all civil society organisations contribute equally to social emancipation 
and empowerment. He argues that, since the Somalia state collapsed in 1991, non-gov-
ernmental organisations have taken the liberty of filling the vacuum, particularly in the 
area of service delivery. NGOs operate schools and health centres. They also provide relief 
to the needy and respond to natural and manmade disasters in Somalia. Elmi examines 
the role that Islamic NGOs play in the relief and development sectors. Based on interviews 
with some of the leaders of a number of the Islamic NGOs collected during the 2011 
famine, he insists that NGOs (all of them) have replaced state institutions, and Islamic or-
ganisations have shown that they are more effective and efficient than their competitors.
In Chapter 11, Mammo Muchie and Hailemichael Teshome Demissie recognise the failure 
of post-colonial state consolidation due to the lack of an indigenous ideological plat-
form for African development. Muchie and Hailemichael Teshome Demissie contend that, 
in order to make African transnational NGOs more efficient and progressive, there has 
to be a solid ideological platform. For the African continent, this could come from they 
call “Ethiopianism”. In order to overcome the paradox and the continuing liberal West-
ern hegemony, Africa needs an indigenous ideology and philosophical frame. Ethiopian-
ism would help Africa to refrain from imitating external instructions and instead pursue 
transnational African Renaissance platforms, where Africans mobilise through organic 
socio-political mechanisms, rather than a colonial one. This process could help Africans 
not just to overcome the paradox of neo-liberalism and TNGOs, but could also make them 
innovative in confronting the current aggressive globalisation. Ethiopianism could inform 
the way Africa and the pan-African transnational civic movements, in particular, should 
approach globalisation issues, Western technological and ideological dominance, and the 
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dominance of knowledge production as a whole.
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The Transnational, Development and Caribbean Insights:
Five Sets of Transnational Relations
Timothy M. Shaw
Transnational relations…are contacts, coalitions and interac-
tions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the 
central foreign policy organs of government (Keohane and Nye, 
1971: 331). 
Governance refers to theories and issues of social coordination 
and the nature of all patterns of rule…(that) place less empha-
sis than did their predecessors on hierarchy and the state, and 
more on markets and networks  (Bevir, 2011: 1). 
Private transnational governance (PTG) schemes constitute by 
now fairly solid third pillar of global governance that comple-
ments intergovernmental regimes and transnational networks 
(Dingwerth, 2008: 608). 
Introduction 
Myriad and proliferating transnational relations increasingly define and determine de-
velopment, not just familiar and ubiquitous Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and In-
ternational Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs), but also diasporas, certification, 
compacts, initiatives, regulation and so on. In the late-1960s, Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye (1971) suggested that the transnational framework advanced analysis of global 
economy, science, security and so on, beyond MNCs. Their collection included foundations, 
religions and revolutionary movements. Since then, digital technologies, migration/dias-
poras, social media, and transnational organised crime have reinforced the perspective. 
And as the global South has become ever more central (UNDP, 2013), so the claim of 
Klaus Dingwerth (2008: 609) becomes more plausible, even an understatement:
Contrary to common assumptions, private transnational gover-
nance schemes exert a significant influence on southern stake-
holders. 
Dingwerth (2008) focussed on a trio of cases which we could now multiply, as indicated 
by the more than fifty in Thomas Hale and David Held (2011) such as the extractive in-
dustry transparency initiative (EITI), the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation, 
Chapter 1
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the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, and the United Nations Global 
Compact and so on. These include the World Commission on Dams, the Global Reporting 
Initiative and the Forestry Stewardship Council (see list of websites at the end of this 
chapter). He also highlighted such transnational relations in the environmental, financial, 
social, labour and telecommunications sectors. These and many others extend well be-
yond the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
And the burgeoning field has been reinforced in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century by a series of collections in addition to Bevir (2011) and Hale and Held (2011) – 
e.g. Sophie Harman and David Williams (eds.) (2013) and Tom Weiss and Rorden Wilkin-
son (eds.) (2013) – along with Weiss’ 2013 monograph. These collections highlight a 
finite number of “governance” cases and sectors, including communications, corruption, 
ecology, finance, human rights, labour, migration, poverty, security, trade and so on. They, 
nonetheless, tended to overlook the informal and illegal sectors as well as focussing on 
the global rather than on the regional level. I will return to issues around generic, compar-
ative transnational governance in (f) below, the penultimate section.
To inform the debate about approaches to the transnational and civil society dimensions 
of development, with an emphasis on one region – the Caribbean(s), however defined, in-
cluding diasporas – I focus here on five sets of overlapping but not necessarily compatible 
“transnational” relationships (Held and Hale, 2011; Khagram and Levitt, 2007). These in-
clude transnational families, civil societies, supply chains, crime networks and governance 
nexuses. Transnational studies can be conceived of as heterogeneous relations among 
the trans- and inter- and intra-national, given changes in state-civil society and private 
sector relations everywhere, leading towards innovative forms of transnational, hybrid 
governance (Shaw, 2010b). And I see the regional and transnational as being quite com-
patible, especially the new regionalisms’ perspective, which privileges the non-state and 
informal.
To so conceive, several analytic traditions need to be identified and employed; not just in-
ternational relations/international political economy/international development studies, 
but also anthropology, criminology, economics, history, sociology and so on, and especial-
ly notions of “new regionalisms” (Shaw, Grant and Cornelissen, 2012). Together these 
can inform the analysis and advocacy of several alternative definitions of and directions 
for the Caribbeans and other regions in the global South. I return to them at the end of 
this chapter in the final part (g).
To advance comparative analysis of transnational relations in a variety of regions, sectors, 
genres and so on, this paper juxtaposes a set of transnational relations – families, civil 
societies, supply chains, crime networks and governance nexuses – with fluid definitions 
of “regionalisms”. Together these seem to fit or resonate in the case of today’s Caribbe-
an(s) after their first five decades, as both perspectives develop their own genres such as 
“transnational studies” (Khagram and Levitt, 2007) and new regionalisms (Shaw, Grant 
and Cornelissen, 2012). Both approaches include economic, ecological, social and state 
relations, both informal and informal. 
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Such perspectives are particularly fitting as the Caribbeans’ first half-century coincided 
with the continuing global crisis, one in which the established neoliberal trans-Atlantic 
and the European Union (EU) are in a difficulty situation. Global rebalancing or divergence 
poses further challenges to the development prospects and policies of the Caribbeans. 
Hence we see the imperative of links, such as those of with the five BRICS countries (Bra-
zil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), along with the resilience of varieties of new re-
gionalisms and transnationalisms. Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2011: 22) recently captured 
the potential of such reordering with its regional and transnational dimensions:
The rise of emerging societies is a major turn in globalization 
and holds significant emancipatory potential. North-South rela-
tions have been dominant for 200 years and now an East-South 
turn is taking shape.   
Given the contemporary variety of regional visions on offer at the start of the second 
decade of the twenty-first century, the adoption of a new regionalisms perspective on 
today’s Caribbean would seem to be quite sensible and compatible with transnational 
approaches (Shaw et al., 2012). Orthodox frameworks cannot capture the diversity and 
dynamism of current regional connections: not just on micro-, meso- or macro-levels or 
that of inter-/non-state relations, but also increasingly the informal and illegal at all lev-
els and in all sectors. And enquiring into the interconnections among these three or four 
distinct yet interrelated “regions” also challenges traditional disciplinary approaches as 
indicated in g) below. 
And the distinctive, divergent character of regions has intensified as the current “glob-
al” financial crisis has impacted them differently – i.e. Asia has been less affected than 
the EU, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries, or the North Atlantic 
(Shaw, 2010a) – with implications for the salience and variety of transnational relations 
in 2015 and beyond.
a. Many Regionalisms, many Caribbeans?
What constitutes the Caribbean…it…may be extended to in-
clude the Caribbean Diaspora overseas. As one scholar observes, 
there are many Caribbeans… In short, the definition of the Ca-
ribbean might be based on language and identity, geography, 
shorty and culture, geopolitics, geoeconomics, or organization 
(Girvan, 2005:304). 
Globalization has not just happened to the Caribbean, the Ca-
ribbean has participated in the making of globalization…four 
things circulate: people, capital, drugs and information (Bron-
fman, 2007: 5-6). 
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The “Caribbean” can be more narrowly and broadly defined, from all/some of the heter-
ogeneous islands to islands and mainland Central America – el Gran Caribe – and myriad 
diasporas. In formal intergovernmental institutional terms, this means progressing from 
the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States through the Caribbean Community (CARI-
COM) and Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee (CDCC) to the Association 
of Caribbean States (ACS). But in terms of heterogeneous non-state, transnational actor 
definitions, it means progressing from the Caribbean Policy Development Centre to the 
Regional Coordination of Economic and Social Research think tank; the Caribbean Stud-
ies Association for civil society; and for the private sector, progressing from Unilever to 
Nestle, from Republic Bank to the Royal Bank of Canada or Scotiabank, from Caribbean 
Airlines to Copa, and from B-Mobile and Flow to Digicel (Shaw, 2012). Certainly, spill-over 
from the current crisis in the form of the demise of the Colonial Life Insurance Company 
(CLICO) and Stanford corporate empires has had a continuing negative impact (ECLAC 
2009). And cutting across such geospatial and economic networks are linguistic commu-
nities: Anglophone, Francophone, Dutch and Spanish, along with several creoles. 
However, while a few analysts have recognised such diversity in the formal political econ-
omy extending to the diasporic, few have extended their analysis to the informal and 
illegal. Thus, arguably, just two chapters out of the thirty seven in the encyclopaedic 
reader on the Caribbean Economy by Dennis Pantin (2005) treat levels of interaction/in-
tegration (#14 by Norman Girvan) or diasporas/remittances (#29 by Wendell Samuel). 
This chapter seeks to go beyond such orthodoxies, given the spill-over from the informal 
and illegal especially in a period of global economic turmoil and divergence, and given 
the transnational role of such “Caribbean” cities as Miami, Montreal, New York City and 
Toronto.
The new regionalism(s) perspective (Shaw, Grant and Cornelissen, 2012) has itself gen-
erated a debate about the informal and illegal, with earlier and more formal analyses at 
the end of the last century tending to exclude these even in its framework of new region-
alism (singular!) (Hettne and Inotai, 1994; Hettne, et al., 1999). Here, however, I take the 
informal and illegal to be inseparable from the formal and legal in terms of definitions 
and implications of Caribbean relations in the second decade of the twenty-first century 
(Shaw, 2011).  
Symbolic of the contrast between the formal and informal, the legal and illegal is the iro-
ny of de facto free trade in drugs and guns by contrast to myriad de jure restrictions on 
trade in legitimate goods. So the CARICOM Single Market and Economy has been largely 
stillborn whereas, despite the efforts of the uniformed services, organised crime flourish-
es.  Similarly, informal-sector traders – ubiquitous “higglers” – circumvent myriad obsta-
cles even when regular supply chains cannot. And private security companies (local and 
global, legal and otherwise) are increasingly substituting for ineffective official police.  
The borderline between legal and illegal, formal and informal, is of great importance in 
the Caribbean, given the fine line that link between, say, offshore banking and mon-
ey laundering (Vlcek,  2008), jewellery and property development. This has resulted in 
Hence the evolution of international efforts at regulation, from the OECD Harmful Tax 
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Competition Report, to the establishment of the Financial Action Task Force (www.fatf-
gafi.org) including its Caribbean office (CFATF) established in Trinidad and Tobago in the 
early-1990s (www.cfatf-gafic.org), and the creation of Tax Information Exchange Agree-
ments. And now the Obama Administration and global financial crisis have led to the es-
tablishment of a Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information to monitor 
or peer review these processes. Moreover, there is a rich variety of island jurisdictions, 
both independent and otherwise, from Jersey and Mauritius to Barbados, Bermuda, the 
British and American Virgin Islands, the Caymans, and Trinidad and Tobago (Cooper and 
Shaw, 2013). Due to the monitoring governmental and non-governmental systems as 
well as the multiple procedures  we have the imperative of forms of compliance by the 
end of the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Non-independent overseas territories (OTs), like other small island developing states 
(SIDS), seek to minimise vulnerability and maximise resilience (Bishop, 2013) to reinforce 
their transnational identities and roles. In parallel to small states in Central Asia and Cen-
tral Europe, they have continued to proliferate in numbers, most recently  the Dutch An-
tilles splitting into three: two “autonomous countries” in the Netherlands – Curacao and 
St Maarten – and a trio remaining “special municipalities” of the Netherlands: Bonaire, 
Saba and St Eustatius on 10 October 2010. The diplomatic status of old and new OTs – 
formal intergovernmental rather than informal transnational – is problematic, but some 
of them do have associate status in regional or hemispheric networks like the ACS and/
or the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), as well as 
in some Anglophone Commonwealth institutions like the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association and the Commonwealth Games (Shaw, 2013).   
Some of the diversity of the Caribbean can be captured in several sets of contemporary 
regional indicators, from GDP per capita and the Human Development Index (HDI), to 
competitiveness and homicide rates, all impacted by transnational relationships. Here 
I concentrate on the seven most developed countries identified by the CDCC of ECLAC 
(www.eclac.org/portofspain): the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname 
and Trinidad and Tobago; this sub-branch of ECLAC includes nine “associated states” from 
among which the overseas countries and territories are drawn from the British, Dutch and 
US islands, several of which play important communications and financial roles, both legal 
and otherwise. 
Per capita purchasing power parity incomes in the Caribbean strand at USD 23 507 for 
Trinidad and Tobago, to USD 1 155 for Haiti, through Barbados at USD 17 966, Suriname 
at USD 7 813, Cuba at USD 6 876, the Dominican Republic at USD 6 706, Jamaica at USD 
6 079 and for Guyana at USD 2 782.  The region likewise is mid-rank along the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (out of 133 countries ranked) (www.
weforum.org): Puerto Rico at #42 and Barbados at #44 lead, with Suriname (#102) and 
Guyana (#104) trailing; in midfield, Trinidad and Tobago is #86, Jamaica #91 and the 
Dominican Republic is #95. The region scores quite well in terms of the UNDP HDI in 2009, 
being concentrated in the high and medium human development categories: from Barba-
dos being the only one categorised as very high at #37 out of 182; otherwise the range 
is Antigua and Barbuda at #47 to Haiti at #149, with Cuba at #51, Trinidad and Tobago 
#64, Suriname at #97, Jamaica at #100 and Guyana at #114 (http://hdr.undp.org).         
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In terms of homicide rates, however, the region presents impressive statistics, with Ja-
maica’s 59.5 per 100 000 in 2008 (Harriott, 2003) being just below the highest one from 
Honduras at 60.9, while Trinidad and Tobago at 39.7 (UNODC 2010b: 27 and 237) beats 
out Columbia at 38.8; St Kitts at 35.32 just trails South Africa’s 36.5. Other high rates are 
reported for Anguilla at 27.6, the Dominican Republic at 21.5 and Puerto Rico at 20.4, 
with the lowest levels coming from the Bahamas at 13.7 and Barbados at 8.7; the US’ rate 
is 5.2 per 100 000 population (www.unodc.org).
Symptomatic of the transnational Caribbean in the North was a major police raid in To-
ronto in May 2010 by a thousand police officers, leading to the arrest of some eighty 
alleged members of the Jamaican “Shower Posse” gang or network, ahead of the month-
long “battle” around Tivoli Gardens in West Kingston for the arrest and extradition of 
Christopher “Dudus” Coke. He was eventually captured and extradited to the US before 
the end of June 2010.
b. Transnational Families
The creation of Caribbean transnational networks rests on the 
foundation of a transnational family, in which migrants and 
their families have multiple home bases with ongoing commit-
ments and loyalties that straddle territorial boundaries (Wilt-
shire, 2006: 175). 
Contemporary historical migration has been very uneven throughout the Caribbean (Reis, 
2004; Thomas-Hope, 2009). Most significant recent outflows came from Guyana and Ja-
maica to North America, and from Suriname to the Netherlands (some 200 000-250 000 
are now in the Dutch diaspora, versus 450 000 at home). Such transnational communi-
ties/cultures are captured in “Forward Home”, a 2011 research-informed film produced 
by Keith Nurse (www.shridathramphalcentre.org) facilitated by the International Devel-
opment Research Centre  in Canada (www.idrc.ca) and premiered at the Toronto Interna-
tional Film Festival in September 2011. Both nexuses of transnational families/cultures, 
and remittances/crime constitutes relatively novel sets of relationships, which analysts 
have only recently discovered; hence the dynamic of Caribbean and development studies 
at the turn of the decade.
 There are estimated to be as many Guyanese people in the US – especially in New York 
City – and Canada, particularly Scarborough, Ontario, as there are at home: approximately 
700 000 each. Their presence, along with technological changes, has led to a dramat-
ic rise in communications, such as phone conversations – especially using mobiles and 
phone cards – and airline flights, with remittances growing from USD 20 million in 2000 
to USD 200 million mid-decade. Guyana’s reliance on remittances is highest in the Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries, even higher than Haiti a quarter of GDP. Sim-
ilarly for Jamaica: some one million abroad and less than three million at home, with re-
mittances totalling two billion dollars in the mid-2000s, some 20 per cent of GDP (World 
Bank, 2008). For example, in 2007, per capita remittance flows were highest to Jamaica 
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(USD 790) and lowest to Trinidad and Tobago (USD 69); Grenada received USD 524 per 
person; Guyana USD 377; and Suriname USD 305 (UNDP 2009: 160). Thus Western Un-
ion, MoneyGram and Grace Kennedy have become ubiquitous in diasporic communities 
in the North and in capital cities in the South, even if remittance flows have been under 
pressure particularly from the US because of the financial crisis at the turn of the decade.
Remittances to LAC grew throughout almost all of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, but peaked in 2006-2008, declining in 2009 back to 2005 levels as a reflection 
of the knock-on effects of the global financial crisis, particularly in the trans-Atlantic 
centres of the US and the UK. However, when inflation is factored in, remittances in local 
currencies may have actually increased in 2009. 
Transnational Caribbean families can be considered symptomatic of the evolution of 
transnational civil society focussed on the region, facilitating the flows of communica-
tions, ideas, events, fashions, technologies and so on (Scher, 2009).
c. Transnational Civil Society
The Caribbean is a unique and complex concatenation of virtu-
ally every ethnic group in the world … Far more interesting than 
the individual contributions of the various groups constituting 
the contemporary Caribbean is the process whereby their socio-
political traits have been amalgamated and Eurocentric domi-
nance has been mitigated. The region has truly been a crucible 
of various cultures. This blending, not only of institutions but 
also of ethnicity, has produced the uniquely Caribbean Creoles 
(Hillman, 2009: 11 and 12). 
The digital revolution has transformed both the political economy and social culture of 
the Caribbean, especially a trio of “transformative processes: the introduction of cellu-
lar telephones, the adoption of the Internet, and the proliferation of offshore gambling 
sites” (Bronfman 2007: 12); on the latter, see Andrew Cooper (2011) on the rise and 
fall of Internet gambling offshore in Antigua, which the WTO has been unable to contain, 
under bilateral US pressure.
Given contemporary communications, especially the mobile phone revolution, diasporas 
can make powerful demands about development and democracy back home: ‘’This may 
lead to a foreign policy impact in the North (see section (f) below) An aspect of “double” 
“public diplomacy”: both inside and about the Caribbean (see also (f) below), is symbol-
ised by the last months in office of Michaëlle Jean (who was a celebrity diplomat for her 
native Haiti after its early-2010 earthquake) as Governor General in Canada, leading to 
her post-retirement appointment as a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization Ambassador. Note also the proliferation of hometown associations, most 
active when natural disasters hit home, as in diasporic responses to the earthquake in 
Haiti in early 2010.
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Without being too parochial or sentimental, we should recognise, even as we debate, the 
centrality of the federal University of the West Indies (UWI) in keeping the foundation of 
CARICOM intact and reinforced, even if increasingly virtually, via the Open Campus and so 
on (www.uwi.edu). This is apparent in numerous UWI-CARICOM functional relations, sym-
bolised by the CARICOM-UWI project on regional development (Hall and Chuck-A-Sang 
2010) which built on established Caribbean intellectual accomplishments and histories 
(Girvan, 2006; Meeks and Girvan, 2010). There are also myriad art forms and carnivals 
over centuries (Mohammed,   2009) now circulated through the digital revolution. Just as 
transnational Caribbean civil society has well-established historical roots, so too the re-
gion’s supply chains go back centuries, including the flow of forced as well as free people.
d. Transnational Supply Chains
The circulation of commodities is one of the unifying aspects of 
Caribbean history. All islands are shaped by things that circu-
late, and more so in the recent past, when aspects of globaliza-
tion have made it easier for things to circulate at greater quan-
tities and greater speed (Bronfman, 2007: 5). 
Supply chains around the region have evolved from barrels to containers and airfreight/
couriers using cell phones and tracking devices, so each brands’ hubs apparent, plus per-
sonal post-boxes, are bought in Miami to be used as offshore addresses; i.e. from banana 
boats and cable and wireless, to Flow and B-Mobile Internet provision, DHL/FedEx/UPS 
courier services and so on. And Copa Airlines is now a member of the Star Alliance, so 
Panama is an Alliance as well as Copa hub.
Regional and global hubs rise and fall around older and newer supply chains (Gibbon et 
al., 2010), impacted by technological, infrastructural as well as security developments 
(e.g. the expansion of the Panama Canal and container ports or Copa as well as Caribbean 
Airlines): these include emerging economies versus emerging powers as well as emerging 
cities.
As Bronfman (2007) and others indicate, the region has “advanced” from spices to drugs, 
cutlasses to guns, pirates to gangs, and gunpowder to AK47s, depending on supply and 
demand, regulations and enforcement, and onto novel forms of supply chains given the 
“other” side of globalisation, including intellectual property violations via pirated CDs 
and apps and so on (Naim, 2006). Conversely, extra-territorial EU and US rules tend to 
impact goods and services (Gibbon et al., 2010), compounded by diasporic demands/
expectations in the North. But the current global crisis has also exposed the challenges 
of economic/corporate governance in the region, given the pressures of liberalisation 
and competition new forms of effective transnational governance are needed to restore 
financial confidence, as treated in (f) below.
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e. Transnational Crime Networks
Illicit flows of all kinds have been part of the Caribbean’s his-
tory. Goods have circulated to the region, from the region, and 
through the region (Bronfman 2007: 8). 
Jamaica occupies a unique place in the history of illicit flows be-
cause both marijuana and cocaine move in and out of the island 
(Bronfman, 2007: 12). 
As already noted, Caribbean crime has evolved from spices to drugs, cutlasses to guns, 
gunpowder to AK47s, and from pirates to drug lords (UNODC, 2010b). In turn, it has en-
couraged the parallel, albeit belated, development of analysis and policy at the turn of 
the century (Barley and Walker, 1994; Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1997; Friman and Andre-
as, 1999; Friman, 2009; Madsen, 2009). In response, policy discussions have generated 
intergovernmental institutions like the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and 
Security  (www.caricomimpacs.org), and professional networks like the Association of 
Caribbean Commissioners of Police (www.accpolice.org) and the Caribbean Association of 
Judicial Officers (www.thecajo.org).
Given the failures, even counter-productiveness, of the so-called “war on drugs”, emi-
nent Latin Americans established and advocated a Commission on Drugs and Democra-
cy which called for a “paradigm shift” in February 2009 (www.drogasedemocracia.org); 
this escalated into a Global Commission on Drug Policy with the Igarape Foundation, the 
Open Society Foundations, the Transnational Institute and other civil society/think tank 
partners (www.globalcommissionondrugs.com) In turn, as supply routes migrated from 
Central America and the Caribbean to West Africa, the Kofi Annan Foundation created a 
West African Commission (www.wacommissionondrugs.com).
The value of drugs increases the further they are away from production, where their 
value is low; their value multiplies two hundred times between production and retail lev-
els, especially when they move from South to North. So, although the Caribbean may be 
of decreasing importance in global supply chains, the value of the global drugs trade is 
still greater than 90 per cent of the word’s national GDP (UNODC, 2010a and b), hence 
the spread of narco-states or shadow states into the Caribbean with their distinctive 
state-economy balances (Friman and Andreas, 1999; Naim,  2006; Naylor, 2005); among 
the region’s political economies so identified recently are the Eastern Caribbean, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica and Puerto Rico. Legal remittances and illegal money laundering (Naylor, 
2005) have together attracted G8 and OECD attention, leading to the Caribbean Financial 
Action Task Force (UNODC, 2010a; Vlcek, 2008).
Meanwhile, as confidence in state security organisations declines, the private security 
sector has expanded and diversified, both nationally (e.g. guardsman in Jamaica and 
the northern Caribbean (www.guardsmangroup.com), and globally (e.g. G4S (www.g4s.
com): but by whom or how are they regulated? The early-2011 Montreux Document, 
which proposes a code of conduct for private security companies, offers one such frame-
work, and many agencies have signed up (www.eda.admin.ch/psc). 
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Interestingly, the UNDP (2009b and 2012) has begun to advocate the notion of “citizen 
security”, possibly to advance freedom from fear in region. This was adopted and de-
veloped at the global level by the World Bank (2011) in its annual World Development 
Report 2011 on conflict, security and development (www.wdr2011.worldbank.org). And 
the early-2012 regional Human Development Report on citizen security, (UNDP, 2012) 
based on an end-2010 survey, advocates going beyond generic notions of human securi-
ty/development, given threats in the region, especially the Caribbean and Central Amer-
ica. 
Together, these underline the imperative of informed, flexible transnational and/or glob-
al governance responses to burgeoning transnational relations (Harman and Williams, 
2013; Weiss and Wilkinson, 2013), formal/legal as well as informal/illegal.
f. Transnational Governance
While private authority beyond the state has become a popu-
lar theme of academic writing, the role of stakeholders in the 
Southern hemisphere as objects and subjects of private trans-
national governance has rarely been addressed in the literature 
(Dingwerth, 2008: 607). 
“Transnational studies” (Khagram and Levitt, 2007) have begun to juxtapose or situ-
ate several disciplines, genres or strands: capital, civil society, class, consumption, cul-
ture, informal sectors including drugs/guns, logistics, migration/diasporas/remittances, 
sports, supply chains, and so on. A central subfield can be identified as “transnational 
governance” (Held and Hale, 2011) which can be considered a generic set of responses 
to novel and emerging “global” issues. Given its characteristic inclusion of non-state ac-
tors, it is also referred to as “private transnational governance” (Dingwerth, 2008), “non-
state transnational transfers” (Brown, 2009 and 2012) or “non-state market-driven” 
governance (Bernstein and Cashore, 2008). It is usually “hybrid” in character, typically 
involving a changing range of heterogeneous actors, non-state as well as state, acting 
in partnerships as in the classic International Campaign to Ban Landmines leading to the 
“Ottawa Process” on landmines. The rich variety of such alliances, campaigns, certifica-
tion schemes, codes, commissions, councils, initiatives, networks, partnerships and pro-
cesses and so on are captured in tables in Dingwerth (2008: 628-630) and Bernstein and 
Cashore (2008: 281-283). 
Such transnational or “global governance” can be treated as an extension or contempo-
rary form of established international law/organisation, which remains primarily, even 
exclusively, intergovernmental. These have evolved from the Ottawa and Kimberley Pro-
cesses through Forestry and Fisheries Certification Schemes to Ethical Trade and EITI “ini-
tiatives” (Bernstein and Cashore 2008, Dingwerth, 2008). Thus, the rather traditional Law 
of the Sea (LoS) /SIDS the Alliance of Small Island States at independence in the 1970s 
have been superseded by myriad Caribbean/global concerns, including climate change in 
twenty-first century: will these lead to forestry and fisheries certification schemes along 
with EITIs in the second decade of the new century? 
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Contemporary public or network diplomacy (cf. part (c) above) has been adopted by SIDS 
to maximise leverage internationally using non-state partners such as private sectors 
and civil society, media and culture. Thus, diasporas can impact both home and host pol-
icies; hence their transnational leverage. As already noted, SIDS were very active around 
independence in LoS negotiations, albeit largely inter-state in character, but then went 
quiet as the bipolar context yielded to multipolarity, until the contemporary era of cli-
mate change when again engaged, but this time with non-state allies from INGOs to 
diasporas (www.acs-aec.org, Shaw, 2010a).
New governance networks are being developed in service sectors like finance, telecommu-
nications and tourisms. The Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce advances 
such private innovation (cf. Iheduru, 2012, on the private sector in the Economic Commu-
nity Of West African States). But tourisms and other services are also very transnational: 
such varieties include business, diasporic, ecological, medical, sports activities. 
And Hale and Held (2011: 25), reflecting on their fifty-plus case studies, echo Dingwerth 
by noting the “governance gap” between North and South:
While many of the programmes rely on Southern participation 
and serve the interests of Southern stakeholders, almost none 
of the innovations in transnational governance gathered here 
have been led by Southern actors. Instead, institutional inno-
vation has been led by Northern states, NGOs, corporations and 
international organizations.
Moreover, the Caribbean is also active in inter-regionalisms, often as the “junior” partner, 
such as the not-uncontroversial CARIFORUM- Economic Partnership Agreement, but also 
in links with Mercosur, the Organization of American States (Herz, 2010), and now the 
Union of South American Nations in the hemisphere (Mace, et al., 2010) and with the 
African Union and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Gaens, 2008) outside the 
hemisphere (De Lombaerde and Schulz, 2009).
 
The Transnational and Development: beyond the Caribbean
World politics is changing but our conceptual paradigms have 
not kept pace (Keohane and Nye, 1971).  
This lament of Keohane and Nye of four decades ago is ever truer today, about the de-
ficiencies in approaches to development, as well as to the regional and transnational, as 
has been reinforced by Dingwerth (2008) and Hale and Held (2011). Hopefully, nov-
el comparative case studies assembled by Harman and Williams (2013) and Weiss and 
Wilkinson (2013) will serve as correctives?
So, in conclusion, lessons may be derived from, as well as for, the transnational – i.e. 
heterogeneous relations among the trans-/inter-/intra-national. Given the changes in 
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state-civil society/private sector relations – leading towards innovative forms of hybrid 
governance via a variety of analytic perspectives, along with their policy implications, 
we will see complex new forms of governance. In addition to new regionalisms such as: 
development studies – the proliferation of issues and actors, especially around “Asian 
drivers” like China and India; environmental studies – especially climate change, ocean 
rise and species depletion, plus the challenges of complexities; global governance/multi-
lateralisms, we might see varieties of actors and interests, especially in “soft” law arenas 
like fisheries and forest certification; global studies – going beyond inter- and non-gov-
ernmental, even the transnational, towards global structures (www.theglobalsite.ac.uk). 
This is reflected increasingly in academic programmes, publications, appointments and 
associations (www.globalstudiesassociation.org; www.globalstudiesfoundation.org), in-
cluding the new global governance PhD at the University of Massachusetts; migration/di-
asporas/remittances nexus – looking beyond the movement of people to diasporic com-
munities and cultures, especially remittance flows and novel forms of communications, 
from phone cards and texting (Bronfman, 2007: 86-107) to financial and technological 
flows and FDI along with drugs and guns; regionalisms, old and new. These are  evolving 
balance between old and new given post-neoliberal world and proliferating micro-, meso- 
and macro-level responses to uneven globalisation and so on; security studies – threats 
to national, human and now citizen security from “old” and “new” factors such as climate 
change and gang culture (Bronfman 2007: 63-85). The kaleidoscope of Caribbeans, both 
contemporary and historical, that advance and reinforce notions of varieties of capital-
isms and civil societies, as well as the plurality of regionalisms. It continues to inform 
debates about the compatibility or competitiveness of such formal and informal, more 
macro- and more micro-regionalisms: what will the futures for the Caribbean and for the 
transnational be by the end of this decade?
Just as we may identify several Caribbeans, so we may abstract several futures over their 
second half-century, particularly along the vulnerable and resilient divide (Cooper and 
Shaw, 2013). But this dialectic becomes more problematic or complicated when more 
informal and illegal transnational relations are incorporated, with diasporas and remit-
tances becoming increasingly salient. Nevertheless, clearly only a minority of political 
economies are likely to achieve “developmental” status. And the majority will have their 
prospects largely determined by a mix of regional, global and transnational fortunes, in-
creasingly impacted by climate change. 
So, what are the regional balances among macro-, meso- and/or micro-levels, in part a 
function of the balance between the more transnational versus the more trans- or in-
ter-governmental, and the more formal versus more informal? And whither cycles in the 
global economy, including balances among sectors, are exacerbated by continuing global 
crises and rebalancing?
Developmental and democratic deficits will persist through post-2015, moderated by 
ubiquitous connectivity facilitating continuous transnational communication. And by 
2020, if not before, Caribbean relations with the BRICS will come to balance, if not exceed, 
those with the North Atlantic rim, accelerated by the current crisis, which is advancing 
divergence. And for much of the Caribbean, will such relations be more formal with China 
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and Russia, and more informal/diasporic with Brazil, India and South Africa? I conclude by 
echoing Girvan (2005: 315):
If the Caribbean was an invention of the 20th century, it seems 
certain to be reinterpreted and perhaps transcended in the 21st. 
The Caribbean of tomorrow will not be an exclusively Anglo-
phone or Hispanic conception; and it will not be tied exclusively 
to geographic space or definition. If it survives at all, it will be a 
community of shared economic, social and political interests and 
strategies that encompasses different languages and cultures 
and the Caribbean Diaspora.
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The Development of Grassroots NGOs in China:
Progress, Challenges and Dilemmas
Hongbing Chen, Xing Li, Chunfang Zhou
Introduction
Building and nurturing the development of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) is an 
important issue in social governance. To recognise and analyse the problems related to 
the construction and development of NGOs in China, one needs to particularly consider 
both the practical and the theoretical contexts behind the national project of “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics”.
Because of different cultural traditions and language expressions, the term “nongovern-
mental organisation” connotes a variety of expressions, such as “social organisations”, 
“non-enterprise units”, “civil organisations”, “non-profit organisations”, and the “third 
sector”, among others. These terminologies have been discussed in both formal and infor-
mal contexts in many previous studies. There is no Chinese term that is able to accurately 
express the meaning of the internationally-applied term “NGOs”. Since China’s reform 
and opening-up, the term “civil organisation” is put forward and is used in connection 
with the reform of the administrative system. This is a unique term which is embedded 
with Chinese characteristics.
The New China, which was established in 1949, implemented a system of planned econo-
my, and developed a highly-centralised administrative system. However, since 1978, Chi-
na has begun to practice a policy of reform and opening-up, and to gradually reform its 
centralised administrative system.
In 1988, China’s State Council approved some reforms within the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
in which the Bureau of Civil Organisation was translated into English as the “Bureau of 
NGO Management”. This implies that the “civil organisation” in the name was, in China, 
interpreted to be the equivalent of the internationally-applied term “NGOs” (Wang and 
Liu, 2004). After the 17th Chinese Communist Party (CCP’s) National Congress, the Min-
istry of Civil Affairs, which governs the affairs of civil organisations, began to employ the 
term “social organisation” to replace that of “civil organisation” (Huang and Cai, 2008).
In the past three decades, China has conducted six reforms of its centralised administra-
tive system. These reforms were implemented in 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 
2008. Among them, the Second Plenary Session of 17th CCP National Congress held in 
February in 2008 discussed and approved the “Opinions1 on the Deepening the Reform 
1 The “Opinion” is one kind of policy document issued by China’s central and local governments at various 
levels.
Chapter 2
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of Administrative System” and the “Program of the State Council’s Institutional Reform” 
(Translation, Chinese government document). The latter document clearly stated that 
one of three priorities of the institutional reform was to focus on protecting and im-
proving people’s livelihoods, and strengthening social governance and public services. 
Through the six administrative system reforms, the government has increased their abil-
ity to fulfilling such functions as social governance and public service (Wang，2009).
In February 2011, former Chinese President Hu Jintao pointed out that China needed to 
“improve the social governance pattern characterised by the leadership of Party Commit-
tee, the government’s responsibility, social coordination, and public participation” (Trans-
lation, his address to provincial officials, February 19, 2011). The political thoughts of Hu 
Jintao facilitated a new style of social governance and management in China. With the 
gradual deepening of the administrative system’s reform, the role of the government has 
been changing from a management type of government to a service one. On 14 March 
2013, the Chinese State Council issued an important plan – the “Program of Institutional 
Reform and the Functional Transformation of Agencies of the State Council” (Translation, 
Chinese government document). This reform programme has brought about a historic 
opportunity for the development of social organisations. As the ruling paradigm shifted 
the main body of government administration from a single mode to a diversified mode of 
public governance, the management concepts and patterns of civil society organisations 
were faced with many adjustments and changes. In order to analyse and understand the 
issues of the construction and development of grassroots NGOs in China, the premise of 
the macroscopic characteristics of Chinese contemporary society cannot be ignored.
In order to keep consistent with the thematic terminology of this book, the authors apply 
the term “NGO”, rather than “civil organisation” or “social organisation” in this chapter.
The Objectives of the Chapter
What is a grassroots organisation? And how do we conceptualise this emerging social 
phenomenon? According to Wang, Ming and Liu (2004), NGOs in China can be catego-
rized by different classification standards. Among the different standards, legal status is 
the most important classification basis for NGOs. Taking this as the basis of classification, 
NGOs in China can be divided into legal NGOs, grassroots NGOs, and quasi-NGOs.
Grassroots NGOs is a category of NGOs which does not have a legal status in line with 
current laws and regulations, but they possess several basic characteristics of NGOs in 
terms of autonomy, voluntary work, non-profit status, and a lack of government involve-
ment. Most of them were spontaneously established from the bottom, and they cannot 
get permission to be registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and therefore they do 
not qualify according to the core characteristics of legal NGOs（Wang and Liu, 2004）.
Grassroots NGOs have a variety of organisational forms, and the most common one is 
that they are a kind of social organisation or second tier organisation that is affiliated 
to public institutions, and that they still need to perform the necessary registration pro-
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cedures. Therefore, they attain the status of legitimacy but, strictly speaking, they are 
not independent legal bodies and do not have the legal right to carry out activities as 
independent legal entities.
Another of their forms is that of a kind of organisation registered as having an affiliation 
with Industrial and Commercial Administrative Departments, and is therefore able to at-
tain an independent legal status. They carry out various charitable activities, and need 
to be registered with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce in order to apply for tax 
deductions. In addition, there are many non-registered NGOs, such as community public 
welfare organisations, rural grassroots mutual-beneficial non-profit organisations, etc. 
These various grassroots NGOs are not under the protection of current laws, regulations, 
and policies when they accept donations and carry out activities.
Because Chinese society is in a transition period, the actual data of grassroots NGOs are 
not in complete conformity with the data registered at the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Due 
to the lack of statistical data in the existing literature, this chapter is not able to provide 
the exact number of grassroots organisations in China.
With the encouragement of the Chinese government in the past decade, NGOs have been 
developing rapidly. The sharply increasing number of NGOs has brought both positive and 
negative impacts to both state and society. Meanwhile, the number has also drawn more 
and more public concern.
In the nexus between internal modernisation and external globalisation, grassroots NGOs 
have more opportunities to enlarge their manoeuvring space, while at the same time 
their roles need to be further developed. In line with the rapid emergence of social issues 
brought about by China’s reform and marketisation process, the development of grass-
roots NGOs has important significance and relevance in current China. These social issues 
cover a whole range of areas: aging society, the needs for social assistance of vulnera-
ble groups caused by inequality as a result of the marketisation process, environmental 
protection, social emergency rescue from natural disasters, and the transformation of 
government functions in the process of adapting to the market economy and market 
society, etc.
At present, China is in a period of social transition in which the 
reform is moving into “deep water” areas. Grassroots NGOs have 
played many significant roles in promoting social development, 
and they have carried out a number of functions in a number 
of areas, such as social assistance, social justice, human rights 
protection, environmental protection, and the neutralisation of 
social contradictions, etc. Therefore, grassroots NGOs are an in-
dispensable social force in contemporary China. However, the 
development of grassroots NGOs in China is facing challenges 
and dilemmas.
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The Legitimacy and Identity Dilemma of Grassroots NGOs
As well as sharing the usual meaning of the English word “legitimacy”, in Chinese the 
word also has the connotation of legality. This implies that Chinese grassroots NGOs suf-
fer legitimacy problems that are associated with the issues of legality. 
 Whether grassroots NGOs are legal or not is directly related to their survival and devel-
opment. If NGOs want to obtain legal status, they need to apply for official registration 
and get the official approval of the government. The relevant laws issued by the state 
include the Social Organization Registers Management Regulations (SORMR), the Civil-
ian-run Non-enterprise Units of the Interim Regulations on Registration and Management 
(CNUIRRM), and the Fund Management Regulations (FMR). The Chinese government has 
implemented a dual management system of NGOs since China’s State Council issued and 
implemented the laws, statutes and illustrations on their development and management 
(SORMR and CNUIRRM) on 25 October 1998. This kind of dual management system of 
NGOs in China is changing, due to the programme of institutional reform and functional 
transformation of agencies that China’s State Council issued last year. This document 
stipulates that NGOs (“social organisations” are usually used as the conception of NGOS 
in Chinese official document) can apply for registration directly to departments of Civil 
Affair in accordance with the law.
According to the current regulations (such as the SORMR, CNUIRRM, and FMR), the NGO 
management system in China can be divided into three categories 1) “under centralised 
registration” 2) “dual responsibility”, and 3) hierarchical management. Under centralised 
registration refers to the fact that, besides the specific cases stipulated explicitly by the 
laws and regulations, under normal circumstances NGOs should be registered with the 
state’s Civil Affairs Department. If any of them are registered by other departments, the 
registration will be considered to be invalid. Dual accountability means that NGOs are 
managed and supervise by both the registration administration organs and the compe-
tent authorities for the business. Hierarchical management refers to the different levels 
of NGOs which are managed by different levels of government in China. The registration 
administration organs of the State Council and the competent authorities for the busi-
ness are responsible for the management and supervision of NGOs at the national level; 
the local registration authorities at various levels and the corresponding business units 
are responsible for the management and supervision of NGOs at the local level.
In other words, the NGO management system in China indicates that law enforcement 
is involved in nearly all aspects of NGOs, including the setting up of organisations, or-
ganising daily activities and as well as clamping down on illegal NGOs. Theoretically, this 
management system should be able to hold back or effectively resolve the legality prob-
lems of NGOs. However, the practical situation is a different case. If the national laws 
and regulations were strictly implemented, this would require a very large management 
system, together with a budget, in order to truly realise the effective supervision and 
management of NGOs.
In addition, the shortage of manpower is one of the important problems in the manage-
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ment of NGOs. According to a survey on development of NGOs in China (Huang and Cai, 
2008), there are a lot of issues about management of NGOs, such as the low efficiency of 
the registration administration organs, the strict requirements for registration, and the 
difficulties in cooperating with business units, etc. The dual management system causes 
many grassroots NGOs without government backgrounds to fail to register with the Civil 
Affairs Department, because they cannot find the business units. Some of them have to 
choose industrial and commercial registration.
Meanwhile, the high threshold for registration nearly deprives grassroots NGOs from 
most of the possibilities of gaining legal status. For example, according to the SORMR, if 
NGOs (social organisations) are to be granted legal status, they must have a fixed resi-
dence, a number of full-time staff, and plenty of activity capital (at least CNY 30,000 for 
local level NGOs, or more than CNY 100,000 for national-level ones). These conditions are 
part of the barriers for NGOs to obtain legal status. For example, in spite of much effort, 
Shenyang Youth Volunteers failed to get their official registration in the early years of 
its attempts. Due to its illegal status, this organisation had difficulty in getting the ap-
proval of the government when it undertook some projects (Li, 2009). Li (2009) carried 
out an investigation of thirty-five AIDS grassroots NGOs. The results demonstrated some 
common characteristics of grassroots NGOs, including most of the AIDS organisations are 
not registered legally and officially, and some of them choose industrial and commercial 
registration as their identity, while others choose civil registration.
Moreover, the lack of human resources in registration and management spurred the ille-
gal survival of NGOs. For example, in the registration management agency within nine-
teen districts in Shanghai, there are only just over sixty members of staff who are respon-
sible for the management of 6,279 NGOs, so each staff member would have to deal with 
the management of more than a hundred nongovernmental organisations. As a result, 
the management authority engages in fostering NGOs’ development, but fails to take 
care of the supervision and administration of NGOs. It is beyond its capacity to cover both 
the development/enlargement and the management of NGOs simultaneously (Wang and 
Liu, 2004).
The lack of human resources causes the problem that the ability of government manag-
ing  NGOs cannot meet the needs of development of NGOs in China. This causes situation 
of laissez-faire in relation to problems such as registration, management and supervision. 
And this further causes the illegal survival of the NGOs. Due to the limitation of man-
power, material, and financial resources, the registration administration authority has 
to allow the existence of lots of illegal NGOs. Those NGOs which have not been officially 
registered cannot be supervised or managed in accordance with the requirements of the 
regulations (Bai, 2005).
The establishment and existence of grassroots NGOs is a product that intends to meet 
the needs of society, especially in an era of great social and economic transformations. 
They are the result of social necessities that have been accepted by society. Thus, from 
this sense, they have the basis for social legitimacy. As some grassroots NGOs are illegal 
due to a lack of having gone through the legal registration procedure, they have no le-
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gal status to operate activities as independent legal entities in accordance with official 
regulations. As a consequence, grassroots NGOs often fall into the dichotomy of standing 
between legality and illegality.
The illegal status of grassroots NGOs results in the predicament in which they cannot be 
controlled or be protected by the regulations in the course of their operation. Neither can 
they receive various forms of donations and financial support. For that reason, grassroots 
NGOs often face the dilemma between for-profit and non-profit. Grassroots NGOs are 
autotrophic organisations and finance is the key to their existence and development. 
Because of their illegal status, it is often hard for them to get formal social donations and 
government financial support; they can only rely on the market when seeking resources. 
Thus, some of them are forced to turn themselves into virtually economic organisations 
with the purpose of profitability and marketability, leading to a deviation from the origi-
nal purposes of their establishment.
The illegal status of some grassroots NGOs also leads to further problems. Their illegal 
status isolates them from taking advantage of opportunities for equal competition for 
resources. This is one of the barriers to free, fair, and open competition between NGOs.
Another problem caused by the issue of illegality is the contradiction between the current 
registration system and the spirit of the civil right of association. The nature of the current 
regulations that requires restrictive licensing and professional certification could be inter-
preted as a restriction of citizens’ freedom and civil rights of association, which deviates 
from the principles and spirit of the Chinese constitution, and weakens the foundation of 
developing China into a law-based society. The system of dual management in China is a 
typical license registration that is based on the excuse that the applicant is seen as too 
immature to carry out the project. There are close relationships between the law environ-
ment of generation of NGOs and the practice of development of NGOs in China. This can 
be clearly indicated by the changes of numbers of NGOs influenced by several times of 
changes of laws in relation to management of NGOs. The point that the regulatory model 
of the management system is a barrier to the good development of NGOs has been well 
evidenced by the coincidences between the change of numbers of NGOs and the ad-
justment of regulations. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, there 
were three significant adjustments of the regulations for NGOs (1951，1989，1998) 
(Wang, 2007). It is clear that, after each new regulation was issued, the number of NGOs 
that were legally registered decreased rapidly in a short time. Therefore, the development 
of grassroots NGOs requires the future improvement of the current regulatory model of 
the management system that has impeded the healthy development of NGOs.
The Financial Dilemmas of Grassroots NGOs
Financial support is one of the basic conditions for grassroots NGOs to operate their ac-
tivities. According to the results of three large-scale surveys carried out by Tsinghua Uni-
versity (1999, 2001 and 2004), the most prominent problem for almost all NGOs is the 
funding shortage. In other words, the funding shortage is seen as a bottleneck, restricting 
the development of NGOs in China (Huang and Cai, 2008).
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Even taking the example of grassroots NGOs in Shanghai which have relatively good fi-
nancial statuses, there are still about one-third of the organisations that are only able 
to pay the salaries of their staff and cover office rental and related expenses, but which 
have little money to develop programmes or carry out projects. Moreover, for those il-
legal organisations, the shortage of fund becomes more serious and leads to a lack of 
office space, making them incapable of carrying out daily activities. Because of the lack of 
funds, many grassroots NGOs suffer from a survival dilemma.
However, there are many reasons for the lack of funds of grassroots NGOs. Firstly, NGOs’ 
source of income relies on few channels; most NGOs have no access to diversified funding 
channels. Some NGOs’ revenue sources mainly rely on the very limited fiscal appropriation 
and the allowance provided by the government. And some other NGOs which are civil-
ian-based non-enterprises mainly depend on their own business income and the fiscal 
appropriation provided by the government. External donations are also quite limited. 
Secondly, the capability of NGOs to provide services and earn income themselves is rela-
tively low. Thirdly, there is not a strong social charity ethos and tradition in current China, 
so revenue from social donations is relatively limited. Moreover, most social donations 
mainly centre on a small number of foundations.
Furthermore, one of the consequences directly caused by illegality is that grassroots 
NGOs have no access to official support from tax policies, financial policies, and other 
benefits. Due to the little amount of attention paid to, and little effort made to promoting 
grassroots NGOs by public and mass media, the lack of understanding of grassroots NGOs 
further leads to a lack of public credibility, voluntary assistance, channels of funds, and 
social donations. In fact, society is not reluctant to contribute donations to grassroots 
organisations. However, the problem of illegality has increased general concerns and re-
duced confidence in or passion for social donations.
Consequently, grassroots NGOs have to seek foreign donations to improve the situation 
of their lacking funds. Once grassroots NGOs excessively rely on foreign capital, they will 
likely lose their independence and become an instrument for foreign powers, which can 
be seen as a threat to national security by the Chinese state. It means that if more and 
more grassroots NGOs prefer overseas funds and keep close relationships with NGOs from 
other countries, it can be calculated that external forces will attempt to penetrate their 
interventions via these NGOs. This will further endangers the security of the state and the 
healthy development of Chinese society and leads to the loss of interest of the state in 
the sphere of NGOs (Wu, 2010).
Thus, for most NGOs in China, a lack of funding is the barrier to the development of “pub-
lic space” in China, i.e. the ability to participate in social management and the provision 
of social services. Such status quo has been directly exemplified by the small scale of 
revenue for social services to meet the needs of society.
The emergence of NGOs is an outcome of societal development, and their ability to par-
ticipate in social management and to provide social services are the keys to gaining social 
acceptance, social funding, and social status. Due to the shortage of funding, NGOs are 
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confronted with constraints to providing social services at a high level, and thereby this 
may further weaken their livelihood from social funding support, without which it is diffi-
cult to launch projects or activities. Facing the dilemma of a vicious circle, grassroots NGOs 
have more and more difficulties in meeting increasing social needs. Such a vicious circle 
will lead grassroots NGOs into the dilemma between the shortage of economic resources 
and the objective of their sustainable development.
 
The Internal Weakness Dilemmas of Grassroots NGOs
Compared with NGOs in Western countries, NGOs in China have weaknesses, such as a lack 
of funding, the quality of staff, operational ideas, information sources, mobilisation abil-
ities, and so on. Their internal weaknesses are also a main component of the dilemmas.
Firstly, the low quality of human resources is a general phenomenon in most grassroots 
NGOs in China. According to A Report on Civil Organizations in Shanghai (Zheng, 2008), 
the overall situation of NGOs in Shanghai has the following hurdles: aging staff and a lack 
of attractiveness to highly-educated and high-quality talents. Regarding the age condi-
tion, more than 50% of staff (both full-time and part-time) are older than fifty years of 
age. At present, the main workforce of NGOs is the elderly retiree, and this indicates the 
problems of an aging staff. Regarding the education level of staff, the top three levels are 
college degrees (22.33%), high school and technical secondary school degrees (30.68%), 
and bachelor’s degrees (22.33%). Staff with master’s degrees or those of higher levels 
only account for 2.02%.
The low education level of staff is closely connected with the weak capability of grass-
roots NGOs. This has also led to weaknesses in the selection of projects, the operation of 
ideas, and the mobilisation of resources. Thus, NGOs are unable to provide the expected 
quality of service and to effectively contribute to society, due to their low credibility con-
nected with human resources. In turn, these kinds of conditions are able to restrict the 
further development of nongovernmental organisations that lead to the low attractive-
ness of grassroots NGOs to high-quality talents.
The reasons for the low qualitative level of the workforce in grassroots NGOs are quite 
complicated in China. They are partly related to social and economic development and the 
levels of social cognition, and are partly influenced by policies and the attractiveness of 
grassroots NGOs.
Secondly, grassroots NGOs in China have weaknesses in operation mechanisms. These 
factors, such as the insufficient financial resources and the lack of high-quality talents, 
have directly affected the organic development of NGOs in China. The constraints in 
their organic development are primarily embedded in the weakness of their operating 
mechanisms. According to a report on a nationwide survey of NGOs by Tsinghua Uni-
versity, 46.6% of NGOs make decisions on strategies and activity plans through formal 
decision-making organs such as a board of directors or plenary meeting, 47.4% do not 
have formal decision-making organs; in 10.7% decisions are made by all personnel, in 
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17.8% decisions are made by two or more heads, and in 18.9% the head of organisation 
makes the decisions. The above data indicates that nearly half of NGOs lack formal deci-
sion-making structures (Huang and Cai, 2008).
For grassroots NGOs, one of the manifestations of their weak operating mechanisms is 
that decision-making often reflects the personal will of managers. The significant deci-
sions are basically made by a few leaders. Such kinds of NGOs are more likely to be utilised 
by some Western NGOs. Another manifestation of their weak operating mechanisms is 
the fact that some grassroots organisations gradually suffer from a lack of organisation 
and purpose. Because grassroots NGOs are, per definition, built from bottom to up, they 
do not have perfect organisational systems. Leaders of NGOs are not qualified enough to 
exercise authority. Therefore, in the course of their operation, such organisations are not 
able to form a unified idea and approach in an efficient manner.
The third manifestation of a weak operating mechanism is the lack of cooperation be-
tween NGOs. Activities by similar types of grassroots organisations tend to coincide with 
those of one another. If they could cooperate with each other, the goals of these similar 
types of grassroots organisations would be conducive to better achievements. However, 
there are quite a few conflicts and competitions among similar types of grassroots organ-
isations. The main reason that causes their competitive relationship is the fight for funds 
through organising interesting activities, which leads to a competitive relationship rather 
than cooperative one. Generally, grassroots NGOs take applications for funding as the 
premise in promoting their activities. However, a large number of grassroots NGOs focus 
on those funding areas that get high levels of social attention. It is hard to avoid clashes 
within NGOs or with other funding applicants from domestic and overseas relevant or-
ganisations. Competition for funding applications makes the relationship among them 
antagonistic, full of slander and mutual distrust, and leads to situations in which they 
even compete to provide additional services to foreign organisations in order to show 
their competitiveness.
Thirdly, an irregular structure in internal management is found in grassroots NGOs. Strong 
institutional governance with professional management standards is an essential condi-
tion for an organisation to efficiently achieve its goals. Domestic grassroots NGOs have 
a lot of work to do in the area of institutional development and standards management.
At the present, some of problems characterised by the above two aspects can be ana-
lysed as follows:
In terms of personnel systems, the first problem is that recruitment and the selection of 
personnel is too simplistic. The second problem is that there is a lack of effective man-
agement of volunteers and in providing scientific training to them. The third problem 
is that these organisations are weak in incentive mechanisms (incentive mechanisms 
means that grassroots NGOs, through reforming the system and regulations within the 
organisations, adopt new measures and methods to mobilise and inspire employees’ in-
centives, initiatives, and creativity). In terms of accounting systems, revenue operation in 
grassroots NGOs is lack of transparency. It means the public cannot get clear information 
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about financing management such as the income of donation and the expenditure of 
different kinds of activities. However, the transparency of financing management is the 
lifeline for charitable organisations. The vast majority of grassroots NGOs do not have 
financial transparency, and the main reasons are as the follows:
(1) In the context of current China, some social expenses cannot be inscribed as items in 
official accounts,
(2) The goals and purposes for the establishment of partial grassroots NGOs are not well 
defined,
(3) The state supervises part of capital movement (mainly foreign capital),
(4) Some projects of grassroots NGOs cannot be implemented to society in general.
Currently in China, the grassroots NGOs also have the following problems including the 
internal economic corruption, becoming organizations as instruments of gaining person-
al benefits, appearance of raising money illegally and making money illegally, etc. Some 
grassroots NGOs even carry out feudatorial and superstitious activities or biking money 
activities. Such existing problems seriously influence the social reputation of grassroots 
NGOs. Some of the problems caused by grassroots NGOs even threaten the social stability 
of the whole nation. So due to the poor management of some NGOs, economic frauds 
and the personalisation of public wealth by some individuals or some leaders often takes 
place. This has also alarmed the authorities in the government that some grassroots 
NGOs in China can become possible elements of social unrest.
At present, affected by historical reasons together with the social environment and their 
own positions, the quality of grassroots NGOs in China is uneven. Functional alienation 
exists in some NGOs. For example, the establishment of some grassroots NGOs has not 
met the basic requirements of NGOs. They are redundant organisations or are the means 
of some individuals for making profits. After their establishment, the organisations breed 
internal corruption, management chaos, illegal fund-raising, and illegal profits. Some of 
them engage in feudal superstition or swindling activities, and even terrorist activities.
Problems such as internal mismanagement, financial chaos, and even crimes can happen 
in grassroots NGOs, regardless of whether they are legally registered or not. These factors 
can be explained from the perspectives in connection with irregular internal management:
First, grassroots NGOs are not involved in civil organisation regulations. They have nei-
ther civil rights nor obligations, and neither interests nor responsibility. In practice, the 
government basically holds laissez-faire attitudes to them, while mass media supervision 
of them is limited. Ideally, grassroots NGOs should exist in a state of growing or dying 
without outside interference. There is no real sense of legal responsibility. The restriction 
mechanisms of the regulation system do not work. Their actual operation basically relies 
on the self-discipline and supervision of individual members in these organisations. How-
ever, self-discipline is not completely reliable and the strength of individual supervision 
is very weak.
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The lack of responsibility causes unchecked activities in grassroots NGOs. This makes 
them vulnerable to anomie, even resulting in the corruption of leaders which hinders 
healthy development.
Second, as in the problem of voluntary failure proposed by Salamon (1987), such a phe-
nomenon also exists in NGOs in China. The phenomenon refers to the fact that the per-
sonal and organisational voluntary spirit is demotivated, due to various organisational 
and operational problems. In summary, the voluntary failure in China often manifests in 
the following characteristics: commercial operation, a lack of independence, and a lack of 
volunteers, and inefficiency. There are deep causes behind the phenomenon of the vol-
untary failure of NGOs in China. During the transformation period, economic changes and 
social transformations bring the anomie of ethical and moral constraints.
Conclusion
In the above analysis, we recognise that the different development dilemmas of grass-
roots NGOs are closely interconnected. These dilemmas have deep roots in many factors, 
such as politics, economic, and social-culture ones.
From a political point of view, the attitudes of the government towards grassroots NGOs 
are contradictory. On one hand, the development of society requires a larger role for 
grassroots NGOs in maintaining social stability, promoting social harmony, eliminating 
poverty, protecting the environment, and taking care of disadvantaged groups. On the 
other hand, grassroots NGOs may be utilised by hostile foreign forces aiming to under-
mine China’s social stability, destroy social unity, and even threaten its national security.
From an economic point of view, in the process of consolidating the market economy 
in China, and due to the dual failures of the market and the government, the important 
position of NGOs has been highlighted in the course of economic and social development. 
However, some negative impacts on values, ethics, and morality brought by the marke-
tisation process are understood as the factors causing the phenomenon of “voluntary 
failure”.
From the social-cultural point of view, factors such as the rise of China’s economy and the 
general improvement of living standards provide a strong social demand and lay a solid 
economic foundation and social conditions for the existence and development of NGOs. 
However, a question that has to be asked here is: Are enterprises, the mass media, and 
the public ready for the emergence of a new culture of charity and donations?
Therefore, by being actively involved in resolving the development dilemmas of grass-
roots NGOs, the Chinese government is able to demonstrate its capacity in realising its 
transition from management to service, especially while China is in the process of pro-
moting the innovation of social management. The mass media’s coverage and reports 
on charity need to give society and people a correct picture of what doing charity is. At 
present, there are still some people think that doing charity is exactly “Following the 
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Examples of Comrade Lei Feng,”2, i.e. making a personal choice rather than general social 
awareness. The mass media plays an important role in raising the public’s awareness of 
the value of charity. Enterprises can increase their “social responsibility” stake and go 
beyond the profit-first and market logic. Thus, they can better publicize their enterprise 
images. Their support to NGOs is a good and effective way to publicise their social respon-
sibility. The development of NGOs also indicates how Chinese society is able to transcend 
individual personal Love to social Love beyond family and ethnic bond.
Meanwhile, when the whole society is constantly improving living conditions of grassroots 
NGOs, grassroots NGOs need to critically reflect how to improve their service capacity, and 
provide more services to society by continuously strengthening their self-cultivation,. All 
of the above points in this chapter will provide researchers and policy-makers references 
to improve grassroots organisations in China in the future.
2  “Following the Example of Comrade of Lei Feng” was a slogan during the Cultural Revolution period 
in China. Lei Feng was a People’s Liberation Army soldier who became a national hero due to his life’s 
devotion to supposedly “serving the people”, i.e. helping others and doing good things for society. After 
his death, he was praised by Chairman Mao, who called Chinese people to “Follow the Examples of Com-
rade Lei Feng”.
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Interactive NGOs:
Bridging Civil Society and the Public Sphere in China
 
Ane Bislev
            
Introduction 
Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) play a crucial role in the building of civil society 
in China. Yet the restrictive political climate means that the degree of autonomy these 
organisations enjoy is relatively low – especially when dealing with politically-sensitive 
subjects. Successful NGOs have found ways of carving out a sphere of action for them-
selves within complex state-society relations in China, becoming, in Peter Ho’s words, 
embedded in Chinese state corporatism. However, an added challenge for these NGOs is 
how to negotiate the complicated political sphere while, at the same time, maintaining 
a degree of legitimacy through their link with the general public, engaging with their 
members as well as the rest of the population in the public sphere. This chapter explores 
how Chinese NGOs attempt to negotiate two interlinked challenges: dealing with Chinese 
government bureaucracy and the restrictions placed on them, while seeking to create 
civic engagement in the transnational public sphere through their Internet presence. 
The link between technological advancement and political development is not a new sub-
ject of study. About thirty years ago, Benedict Anderson posited that an invention, mov-
able type, ultimately helped bring about the birth of one of the strongest political forces 
in the modern world: nationalism (Anderson, 1991). Some twenty years earlier, Marshall 
McLuhan had argued that it is technology in itself, and not the content it carries, that has 
the potential to bring about social change (McLuhan, 1964). Today, there is an enormous 
interest in the transformative potential of the Internet, and developments such as the 
Arab Spring are seen as a direct result of the strength of social media platforms. How-
ever, expecting the Internet to automatically create an transnational public sphere and 
bring about societal changes towards a more open and democratic political structure is 
an expression of what has been called “black box thinking” (Kalathil and Boas, 2003) or 
“technological determinism” (Yang, 2011) as the impact of technological developments 
depend very much on the local context, actual usage, and political restrictions. Internet 
usage in China is a case in point. Today, China has the world’s largest Internet popula-
tion and, despite Western social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook being 
banned in China, the home-grown Sina Weibo (a Twitter-like social media platform) and 
most recently WeChat (Weixin in Chinese) have become immensely popular in the Chi-
nese-speaking world, thereby creating hopes for the development of an actual public 
sphere in China. However, it is still an ongoing subject for debate to what extent the 
growing Internet penetration in China will contribute to the development of an actual 
civil society or public sphere, as government control over the Internet and the ubiquitous 
Chapter 3
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self-censorship leads to a continued cat-and-mouse game between the Chinese censors 
and netizens. The efficiency of Chinese censors means that, though the Internet is popu-
lar and Internet penetration has risen rapidly in recent years, the actual nature of Internet 
usage perhaps points more to what has been called an “online carnival” (Cockain, 2012) 
than a true public sphere/civil society.
The potential for the development of civil society in China has become a major topic for 
discussion, since China’s successful economic reform process has led to the emergence of 
a relatively-affluent middle class that could become politically active as their newfound 
material security leaves room for interest in matters beyond daily survival (for a discus-
sion of the political interests of China’s middle class, see for instance, Cai, 2005 and Ung-
er, 2006). However, as is the case with so many other developments in modern China, the 
civil society that is slowly emerging in China does not quite fit the Western definitions of 
the phenomenon, but seems to be a civil society with Chinese characteristics, due to the 
overwhelming domination of the Chinese state. This, of course, also influences the role of 
one of the primary forces of Western civil society, the NGOs, who often cooperate quite 
closely with the state in China.
Much attention has been paid to the difficult working conditions of NGOs in China in re-
cent years (see for instance Sima, 2011; Yang, 2009; Ho, 2008; or Shieh and Deng, 2011). 
While there has been a significant increase in the number of NGOs and a growth of new 
forms of civic association, for instance, student voluntary groups, the restrictive political 
climate in China ensures a very special relationship between NGOs and the government, 
as NGOs are subject to strict rules and government control both in order to register as 
a civic association and in order to operate legally. The largest associations in China, for 
instance, the All China Women’s Federation, belong to the self-contradictory category 
of GONGOs (Government Organised NGOs) who, despite some degree of autonomy, are 
often perceived as an integrated part of the state bureaucracy by the general population 
(Chen, 2006; Bislev, 2012). Larger, well-organised associations have found ways to max-
imise their influence in the current situation by acting in accordance with government 
regulations in the political system (Ho, 2008). Finally, some organisations stay below the 
radar by avoiding registration altogether or by registering as a privately-owned business 
rather than a social organisation.
While much attention has been paid to the relationship between NGOs and the govern-
ment in China, this has perhaps overshadowed another crucial factor in the development 
of a civil society, the link between these associations and the general population in an 
emerging public sphere. The public sphere as represented by the Internet and the civil 
society realm of the NGOs together form a contested reality between state and socie-
ty in China. As Sabine Lang (2013) argues, this is not only the case in China. There has 
been a tendency to forget the importance of actual public engagement and take the very 
presence of civic associations as an indicator of the creation of social capital, and there-
by in itself considered a desirable outcome. However, the public sphere is an important 
component of civil society. Only by combining organisational density and public debate 
culture can we explain all aspects of civil society formation. Lang argues that NGOs often 
face a choice between institutional advocacy and public advocacy, where the institutional 
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approach is often perceived as yielding more immediate/efficient results but can, in her 
opinion, lead to a loss of legitimacy as the organisations lose their direct link to public en-
gagement (Lang, 2013). Whether we consider the public sphere as an integral part of civ-
il society, as Lang does, or as a bridge between the state and civil society (Bhaduri, 2004), 
what is important in our context is the fact that a vibrant public sphere is an important 
component of a functioning civil society. In other words, in order to increase the scope 
of a civil society based on more or less autonomous civic organisations, it is necessary to 
focus on the link between these associations and the possibility of participating in public 
debates for the general public. 
The analysis of this chapter focuses on the area where the potential public sphere in China 
(the Internet) meets the backbone of civil society (NGOs), in order to identify the diffi-
culties encountered by the NGOs in gaining and retaining public legitimacy through their 
Internet presence. This will be done through a discussion of the conceptualisation of civil 
society and the public sphere in a Chinese context, followed by an overview of Internet 
usage in China and a review of the literature on NGOs operating in China, as well as a quick 
survey of the websites of some of the major Chinese NGOs. Finally, the challenges Chinese 
NGOs face when trying to engage with the emerging transnational NGO networks will be 
discussed.
State-Society Relations in China: Civil Society and the Public Sphere
The discussion of the development of a civil society with Chinese characteristics has occu-
pied scholars for the last couple of decades, as observers speculate on to what extent the 
economic reforms in China will be accompanied by political reforms. The typical dichoto-
my between a Republican-liberal-democratic model of civil society – where civil society is 
seen as an independent third sector – and the Gramscian hegemonic model – where civil 
society is seen as extension of the ruling hegemony that reproduces the existing political 
and economic system (Goetze, 2008) – does not quite capture the current situation for 
civic associations in China. While the state still plays a dominant role in all spheres of 
society in China, there is room for non-state actors to manoeuvre in various ways vis-à-
vis the state. This has led to an ongoing academic debate on the precise nature of the 
Chinese version of a civil society. Some scholars debate how a concept rooted in Western 
political traditions can be made to fit the political reality that is China today. Others (for 
instance Sima , 2011) question whether the term is at all relevant in a Chinese context 
with a political history significantly-different from the West and a state sector that is 
as dominant as the Chinese party-state is today, leading at best to a quasi/semi-civil 
society. Yet, others have suggested that it might be necessary to coin a new term to de-
scribe the area between the state and the private sphere when discussing state-society 
relations in China, as Western terminology is too firmly-rooted in local political traditions 
(Huang, 1993). This has led some China scholars to coin their own theoretical concepts 
in regard to civil society, beginning with Philip Huang’s Third Realm (Huang, 1993) and 
Tong Yanqi’s (1994) Non-critical Realm, describing the sphere between the state and 
society as a possible precursor of a critical realm/civil society. 
Reflecting the difficulty of accurately classifying the Chinese version of civil society, Pe-
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ter Ho describes the present possibilities for change as embedded within the existing 
political system, as relatively widespread opportunities for pushing for change without 
challenging the current order exist, despite limitations on freedom of speech and so on 
(Ho, 2008).  Yang Guobin, on the other hand, looks at the co-development of widespread 
Internet usage and civil society in China and simply defines civil society as the intermedi-
ate public realm between state and society (Yang, 2003: 406). Ernest Gellner’s similarly 
rather-broad definition clarifies the role of civic associations in this sphere as “that set 
of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the 
state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role as keeper of the peace 
and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and 
atomising the rest of society” (Gellner, 1994: 5). This definition, though very inclusive, 
clarifies an important point: the state checks individual interests, whereas civil society 
checks the state. This is done partially through the formation of public opinion, as in 
Habermas’ classical definition of the public sphere:
By “the public sphere” we mean first of all a realm of our so-
cial life in which something approaching public opinion can be 
formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the 
public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which 
private individuals assemble to form a public body […] Citizens 
behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted 
fashion--that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and 
association and the freedom to express and publish their opin-
ions-about matters of general interest (Habermas 1974, p. 49). 
These broad definitions will be the point of departure for the discussion of the role of 
NGOs in bridging civil society and the public sphere, as the question of to what extent 
NGOs are able to fulfil the role as a counterbalance to the state is a central part of the civil 
society discussion in China. 
The above debate on the nature of civil society in China and the role of the most important 
component of this civil society – civic associations/NGOs – has been mainly concerned 
with the interplay between the Chinese state at various levels and the civic associations 
themselves. However, the very reason that NGOs are seen as paramount in the devel-
opment of a functioning civil society is that they represent the public, the population at 
large. This further complicates the already-delicate balancing act required to function as 
an autonomous NGO in China. As Sabine Lang points out, NGOs have to function between 
civil society and the public sphere, gaining legitimacy from public engagement and finan-
cial support from the state (Lang, 2013). 
 
NGOs in China
Whether we choose to use Western concepts such as civil society or public sphere, or in-
sist on seeing the Chinese reality as too fundamentally-different from the Western devel-
opment of civil society to be covered by these terms, what is important for the purposes 
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of the argument in this chapter is how NGOs can manoeuvre in the grey zone between 
government control and the interests of their target groups. This dilemma is not limited 
to Chinese NGOs.  In her study of European NGOs, Sabine Lang (2013) finds that main-
taining a balance between engaging the public and receiving government funding leads 
many NGOs to restrict themselves to more-peaceful and less-confrontational activities, as 
NGOs perceived as unruly are ignored by the state and therefore find it near impossible 
to raise funds for their causes. Though this is a less direct type of control over NGO ac-
tivities than the Chinese bureaucratic control system, it still has an important impact on 
the scope of action of NGOs in Europe. As Sabine Lang demonstrates, obtaining a balance 
between the interests of the state and the public can be a challenge even in democratic 
states with a long tradition of the engagement of civic associations in the public sphere. 
Before discussing the activities of NGOs in China, a short overview of the current status of 
civic association in China is needed.
Providing an adequate description of the NGO landscape in China is complicated by a 
number of factors, not least the government restrictions on registering civic associations. 
Formally, these associations are required to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs as 
either social organisations, private non-enterprise units, or foundations, but as the re-
quirements for being allowed to register are quite strict, only a fraction of the current 
number of grassroots organisations are formally registered with the Ministry of Civil Af-
fairs (Shieh & Deng, 2011). Some choose to register as private businesses with the Indus-
trial and Commercial bureau instead, or simply remain unregistered. Currently, there are 
more than 400 000 organisations registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but a large 
number of these are actually so-called GONGOs, such as the China Foundation for Poverty 
Alleviation. In addition to these registered associations, estimates suggest that there are 
anywhere from a few hundred thousand to one-and-a-half million unregistered NGOs, if 
rural associations are included (Deng, 2010).
The rapid growth in civic associations began in China in 1980s, but accelerated in the 
early 1990s which saw the birth of a number Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) e.g. Friends 
of Nature – still one of the most influential NGOs in China – as well as other groups cam-
paigning for issues like rural women, poverty alleviation, HIV victims, and so on.  This was 
made possible by changes in the political atmosphere, as well as marketisation and pri-
vatisation, which created a space for NGOs to manoeuvre in, as the state withdrew from 
some areas of the increasingly-complex social fabric and allowed NGOs to play a role in, 
for instance, monitoring the environment (Sima, 2011). Also, globalisation opened the 
door for international contacts which provided inspiration as well as funding opportu-
nities for the newly-established NGOs. These ENGOs are characterised by having more 
independence than GONGOs and resembling Western ENGOs more, but they are most 
often dependent on a few dedicated individuals for their survival and do not depend on 
membership contributions to survive (Sima, 2011). Another important milestone in the 
development of the NGO landscape in China was the 2008 Earthquake in Sichuan. The ex-
tensive media coverage led to a widespread desire to help, which again resulted in a new 
upsurge of voluntary organisations all over China. 2008 has even been called the Year of 
Civil Society in China (Shieh and Deng, 2011), as the newfound interest in volunteering 
created an upsurge in civic engagement.   
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For the purposes of this chapter, it is especially important to look at what possibilities 
NGOs have for manoeuvring in the space between state and society – whether we choose 
to speak of it in terms of a non-critical sphere, a third realm, a semi-civil society, or some-
thing else entirely. Behind all these various designations we can sketch out some impor-
tant observations as regards the role of civic associations in Chinese society today. First 
of all, even though the state is still very dominant in China, there is room for manoeuvring 
for non-state actors in the Chinese version of civil society. Most civic associations/NGOs 
have carved out a niche for themselves where they know the limits of their actual powers. 
They have the necessary expertise to determine which subjects are deemed politically-in-
nocent and therefore safe to engage in, and which causes require a lighter touch and 
more consideration before being put on the agenda. Secondly, the Chinese state is, by no 
means, an unmovable monolith. Organisations have to deal with state bureaucracy from 
different levels of the state system, as well as various ministries/administrative enti-
ties that may have conflicting interests on, for instance, environmental protection (Yang, 
2009; Spires, 2011). By manoeuvring wisely within this complicated system, associations 
can carve out a room for action for themselves, creating what Spires (2011) has called a 
contingent symbiosis where ostensibly illegal (that is to say, unregistered) associations 
fulfil certain roles that are perceived as helpful by local governments. 
Finally, connections matter. In the delicate balancing act performed by NGOs in China, 
it is quite important to have the right connections within the government bureaucracy 
(Tsang and Pak, 2013). This sometimes takes the shape of having an influential person 
as a chairman or as one of the founding fathers, as in the case of the China Disabled Per-
son’s Federation, where Deng Pufang, the son of Deng Xiaoping, was the president from 
its inception in 1988 until 2008. In other cases, it can be a friendly official in the tax office 
who helps NGOs registered as private companies to avoid paying the taxes to which they 
would otherwise be liable. In the case of the many new associations created as part of the 
relief effort after the 2008 earthquake, connections to local official enabled organisations 
to access the disaster area (Shieh and Deng, 2011). There are also examples of NGOs 
founded by government officials, or even NGO leaders, joining the state administration in 
order to further their cause (Spires, 2011). Chinese NGOs are also quite adept at creating 
international linkages to transnational NGOs, relying on them for funding and inspiration 
(Morton, 2005).
2008 was seen as a watershed in the creation of civic associations in China – not least 
due to the organisational capacity of the Internet. The growing Internet penetration has 
also become the centre-point in the discussion of the possibility of an autonomous public 
sphere in China but, as will be shown in the next section, even here there are many limi-
tations for Chinese netizens. 
 
The Internet in China
The ongoing discussion on the actual nature of the Internet in China and its potential 
political impact has become central to the discussion of the development of civil society 
in China (see for instance Yang, 2009 & 2011; Tai 2006; Sun, 2010). Young people’s on-
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line activities have been described as everything from an online carnival (Cockain, 2012: 
147-151) to a cat-and-mouse game with local governments (Sun, 2010: 6). Contrary to 
McLuhan’s classic argument that the media is the message, Yang Guobin argues that the 
Internet is “contentful” and that technological determinism – assuming that the media 
in itself can influence the surrounding world – is wrong. In his opinion, it is necessary to 
understand the actual content in order to understand the Chinese Internet (Yang, 2011), 
and therefore necessary to understand how Internet culture in China is developing.  
China has the largest Internet population in the world, with more than 590 million users 
in June 2013 and an Internet penetration rate of forty-four per cent, well above the av-
erage twenty-seven and one-half per cent for Asia, but below, for instance, the European 
average of 63.2 per cent (CINIC 2013). If you look at the age composition of China’s 
Internet users, it is primarily the young who are active Internet users, with only sixteen 
per cent of Internet users aged forty and above, and this is, to some extent, reflected 
in the preferred online activities for Chinese Internet users, where social media, online 
gaming, music downloads, and so on are among the most popular (CINIC, 2013; Sun, 
2012). The new star in China’s social media firmament is WeChat, a semi-private network 
service which allows you to chat with people both within and outside your own immedi-
ate network. Sina Weibo, the Chinese micro-blogging giant, has more than 500 million 
registered users and, even though more than half of these accounts are actually passive, 
social media has become a very influential source of news,1 influential enough that there 
are regularly exhortations in the traditional media not to believe every rumour on the 
Internet (for an example, see China Youth Daily on May 3rd 2013: “Do not misread China 
based on exaggerated Internet rumours” (别在被放大的网络舆情中误读中国))2. There 
is also an ongoing debate on the actual nature of Internet users in China, with state me-
dia claiming that Internet users are actually less well-educated than the average Chinese 
person, while research shows that Chinese netizens are both critical and well-informed. 
They tend to get their information from other sources than traditional state-controlled 
media, and they are actually more politically interested than the average Chinese citizen 
(Lei, 2011).  
Chinese Internet users are also very adept at acting within the strict boundaries set by 
censorship. In a study of more than two hundred popular posts on Sina Weibo regarding 
politically-sensitive issues in the spring of 2012, Johan Lagerkvist found that about sixty 
per cent of these posts express what he terms loyal dissent (Lagerkvist, 2013), thereby 
voicing criticism against certain government actions or policies, but never questioning 
the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Only five per cent express open criticism 
of the CCP, while a slightly larger percentage express their support of the CCP. These num-
bers do not necessarily reflect the actual situation as regards political interest in China, as 
they only reflect the attitudes of people interested enough in politics to post on political 
issues, and only include posts that made it past the Sina Weibo censors, thereby leaving 
out posts that were deleted immediately. What they do tell us, however, is the nature of 
1 http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/03/12/how-many-people-really-use-sina-weibo/ (Accessed 
May 20th 2014) 
2 http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2013-05/03/nw.D110000zgqnb_20130503_1-02.htm (Accessed May 20th 
2014) 
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political discussion on the popular social media platforms, where direct criticism of the 
political system is avoided, but criticism of concrete issues is tolerated. This reflects the 
delicate balancing act that any Internet user has to perform in China.
Despite the popularity of Weibo and the initial interest in this platform as the foundation 
of a public sphere in China, at the moment the increased harshness of government control 
has led to a large degree of self-censorship, as well as the forced closing of accounts and 
so on. In August 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that a libellous post viewed more than 
five thousand times or reposted more than five hundred times can lead to a jail sentence. 
This has landed so-called Big-Vs (owners of popular Weibo accounts) in detention, and 
led others such as He Weifang, law professor at Beijing University and Charter 08 signa-
tory, to close their accounts despite his having a following of more than 1.1 million fans 
on Sina Weibo (Boehler and Zhou, 2013). 
As can be seen from the above discussion, there are certain limitations to considering 
the Internet a public sphere in China. First of all, the young and the well-educated are 
overrepresented among Chinese netizens which, to a certain extent, means that the pub-
lic opinion generated on the Internet is not representative of the population at large. 
Secondly, though there is certainly greater scope of expression online than in traditional 
print and broadcast media, the ubiquitous self-censorship, as well as direct censorship by 
the government and private Internet hosts alike, means that open political discussions 
are mostly focused on loyal dissent or take place in veiled terms that makes them difficult 
to find and understand for the average Internet user. 
NGO 2.0
The growth in the number of Internet users in China has been remarkable and the Inter-
net has become an important source of news and entertainment in China, as well as pro-
viding an alternative social space for Chinese youngsters, thereby penetrating deeply into 
daily life in urban China (Sun 2010; Cockain, 2012). However, maintaining an Internet 
presence is a challenge to many NGOs in China for several reasons. First of all, there are 
the simple practical difficulties involved in developing and running an efficient website. 
Using the web as a communication strategy is expensive, since the skills involved in doing 
so are relatively specialised and the salaries are therefore high. Also, keeping a website 
up-to-date and monitoring online discussions are costly expenditures for organisations 
that often lack resources for this kind of administrative expense. As Chinese NGOs often 
do not rely on direct private donations, the economic gains from maintaining a website 
are very limited. Secondly, many NGOs use mailing lists rather than discussion boards to 
communicate with their members, since public discussions need to be monitored quite 
closely in order to stay clear of sensitive topics. And finally, even though many NGOs are 
very dependent on funding from international NGOs, there is a continued challenge in 
maintaining a truly bilingual website, as this demands a high level of language skills as 
well as the abovementioned technical skills. 
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In a survey of about four hundred Chinese NGOs3, MIT New Media Lab found that one of 
the main barriers for Chinese NGOs in using the Internet are actually a lack of funding 
and trained personnel, especially for NGOs located in inland/Western China. The NGOs 
from the survey represented grassroots NGOs from all regions in China, and showed a 
clear geographical difference in their Internet skills. NGOs from Western China report-
ed significantly-lower computer skills, and they generally had lower levels of funding, 
and therefore fewer resources to dedicate to communication purposes. In general, only 
twelve per cent of the NGOs reported having full-time technical or communication staff, 
which matches the reported expenditure on communication, where fifty-seven per cent 
of NGOs spent between nought and five per cent of their overall budget on communica-
tion purposes (NGO 2.0, 2010). When asked about their primary purpose in communica-
tion, about a third of the NGOs answered that this was for maintaining contact with other 
NGOs, while another third found that being known by the public was most important.
Below we will look at a selection of NGO websites to show how these various challenges 
affect the actual Internet presence of some of the major Chinese NGOs. The websites 
studied here have been selected to represent some of the well-established Chinese NGOs, 
in the expectation that they have more resources at their disposal compared to more-re-
cently established organisations. 
Global Village Beijing  (北京地球村) is a large ENGO, at least in the Chinese context, but 
still struggles to maintain its website (Sima 2011). A quick visit to their website shows 
that they have apparently given up on maintaining an English version of the site. Their 
current Chinese website has no English version – there is a link called “English” on the site, 
but there is no actual English content.4 The only English version of their website, found 
through Google, is apparently an older website that is currently flooded by commercials 
masked as articles from dating companies and travel agencies.5 The website proper con-
tains no discussion board, but does contain traditional contact information and informa-
tion on how to donate. They do, however, link to a Weibo account6 where they currently 
have four hundred and ninety-three “fans” – a small number in the Chinese context. 
A glance at other Chinese NGOs reveals similar challenges. The Beijing-based NGO Rural 
Women (农家女) has a comprehensive Chinese language website with plenty of infor-
mation on different projects, personal stories from rural women and information on how 
to donate and get involved, and of course a link to a Weibo account, but the link to the 
English version of their website takes you to an old version that has not been updated 
since 2009.7 Friends of Nature (自然之友), one of the first ENGOs established in China, 
has both an English and a Chinese version of their website, though the Chinese version 
3 The NGOs included in this survey represent many different types of NGOs, but generally the largest and 
most well-established NGOs were excluded as well as very small NGOs without sufficient organisation-
al backing to participate in the training courses offered. Also, as this survey was conducted online, it 
excluded NGOs with absolutely no Internet capabilities. (NGO 2.0, 2010)
4  (http://www.gvbchina.org.cn/ Accessed January 15th 2014)
5  (http://www.gvbchina.org/ Accessed January 15th 2013)
6  (http://e.weibo.com/gvbbeijing accessed January 15th 2014)
7  The Chinese version of their website can be found here: http://www.nongjianv.org/index.html while 
the obsolete English website is here: http://old.nongjianv.org/web/english/index.html. Both accessed 
January 16th 2014)
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contains significantly more information.8 There are links to Weibo as well as other social 
media platforms on the Chinese version, and a (defunct) link to a Facebook page as well 
as a Twitter account (containing 100+ tweets, but none later than April 2013 on the 
English version). 
If we turn to international NGOs and their websites in China, the situation is different, but 
apparently the task of maintaining both Chinese and English language websites is still 
quite burdensome. Planet Finance, an international NGO supporting the development of 
microfinance, has a truly bilingual website where the Chinese and the English content is 
almost completely the same.9 Oxfam Hong Kong has a Hong Kong based website which 
is completely bilingual,10while their site based in Mainland China only has a Chinese ver-
sion.11 The Ford Foundation has a bilingual website but with a more comprehensive Eng-
lish version and links to their profiles on various Western social media, but not to Weibo. 
As the above tour of Chinese NGO websites demonstrates, significant resources are spent 
on constructing and updating websites with information about the organisations, but the 
task of maintaining an updated English version and hosting online discussions remains 
beyond the scope of these organisations. Discussions are relegated to their Weibo ac-
counts, which allow interaction with the general public, but mainly contain organisational 
news or re-posts of items relevant to the causes supported by the NGOs. The Internet 
has proven an extremely-important tool in organising events, and in garnering support 
for causes that has made it into the news, such as the 2008 Earthquake or various local 
environmental causes (Weber, 2011), but constructing public opinion in the public sphere 
on a lasting basis has proven much more difficult, due to both the restraints on NGO reg-
istration and activities and the nature of Chinese Internet culture. 
 
Conclusion
NGOs in China lead a contested existence. They are subject to strict regulation from the 
Chinese state but, through various strategies, many NGOs succeed in carving out a niche 
for themselves where they are able to pursue their stated goals with support from, or at 
least without interference from, the Chinese government. As the Internet has become 
the major source of communication and news for a large part of the Chinese population, 
the presence of these organisations on the Internet becomes of increasing importance. 
There are certain barriers to this, not least the high cost associated with maintaining an 
efficient Internet presence and the importance of keeping strict control over the actu-
al content of discussion groups and forums. Many NGOs have consequently relegated 
the interactive component of their websites to social media platforms. Their websites 
are primarily sources of information about the organisation and their activities, as well 
as important signifiers in placing themselves within a web of Chinese and international 
NGOs through links to the homepages of partners and supporting organisations. As for 
8   (http://www.fon.org.cn/ Accessed January 15th 2014)
9  http://www.planetfinancechina.org/ (Accessed January 15th 2014) 
10  http://www.oxfam.org.hk/en/default.aspx (Accessed January 15th 2014)
11  http://www.oxfam.org.cn/
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the potential for international/transnational contact, the language barrier is quite signif-
icant. Several of the organisations surveyed here have only a minimal English language 
web presence, and only international NGOs operating in China seem to have the necessary 
funding to maintain truly bilingual websites. Even though Chinese NGOs are quite adept 
at maintaining contact with the transnational NGO community, this is done through other 
less-public channels than their websites.
Some of these difficulties are not unique to China. NGOs in many parts of the world will 
struggle to find enough funding to maintain their websites and hire qualified staff, and 
the balance between what Sabine Lang (2013, p.6) calls institutional and public advoca-
cy is an omnipresent challenge to NGOs. However, the efficient censorship of the Internet 
and the special demography of Chinese netizens add an extra dimension to the attempts 
to engage with the public through interactive web tools.
What does this tell us about the potential of NGOs integrating the budding civil society 
and public sphere in China? First of all, NGOs do recognise the importance of maintaining 
an Internet presence, but are hampered in this by the high cost of hiring skilled staff to do 
so. Secondly, the same restrictions that govern NGOs’ actions in real life also apply to their 
Internet presence – perhaps to an even larger extent, as activities on their websites are 
public and are therefore subject to tighter control than private lobbying or networking. 
This is matched by the survey quoted above (NGO 2.0, 2010), where only a third of NGOs 
found that their most important purpose in communication was to be known by the pub-
lic. If we take the classical definition of the public sphere as a place where public opinion 
can be formed and which is available to all citizens (Habermas, 1974), then there are se-
vere limitations to seeing the Internet and social media in China as a public sphere. But, as 
Habermas himself argues, his definition of the public sphere and civil society is, to a large 
extent, grounded in specific historical developments in Europe, not least the development 
of democracy. Instead of using the definition of public sphere as a Weberian ideal type, it 
is therefore more productive to look at to what extent the Chinese NGOs discussed in this 
chapter are actually engaged in forming public opinion online. Even though the number 
of organisations discussed in this chapter is quite limited, the picture emerging here still 
provides an indication of one of the existing dilemmas for Chinese NGOs: balancing the 
importance of engaging the general public and harnessing public opinion, while at the 
same time husbanding limited resources and maintaining the “embedded” relationship 
with the Chinese state. Therefore, NGOs in China certainly struggle to be present in the 
online public sphere, but what seems to be emerging so far resembles an associational 
sphere linking Chinese and international/transnational NGOs, rather than a forum for the 
creation of public opinion through engagement with the general public. While Chinese 
NGOs are important stakeholders in the creation of a transnational public sphere, they are 
also severely limited in this role by the level of government control over the Internet, the 
language barrier, and the symbiotic nature of Chinese civil society.
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Transnational Business NGOs  
and the Chinese Labour Contract Law
 
Peer Møller Christensen
 
 
Introduction
Post-Cold War globalisation has led to the emergence of theories of international politics 
dealing with the development of a global civil society based on moral and ethical values, 
and where the actors, among others, are transnational nongovernmental organisations 
(NGOs). This may be seen as a development towards an international system governed 
more by moral principles, and less by power; a kind of replacement of Cold War realist and 
neorealist interpretations of international relations, where power and national interests 
are seen as the main factors of motivation. Instead, it is assumed that a big but modest 
idea with fresh potency – global civil society – is today on the rise. …it [the idea] champi-
ons the political vision of a world founded on non-violent, legally sanctioned power-shar-
ing arrangements among many different and interconnected forms of socio-economic life 
that are distinct from governmental institutions” (Keane, 2003: xi-xii). Empirically, the 
interference from transnational business NGOs in the political process in China of drafting, 
passing and implementing the Chinese Labour Contract Law seems to paint a more-com-
plicated picture of the nature of the so-called global civil society, and the role of transna-
tional NGOs. The efforts by transnational business NGOs seem to have been specifically 
aimed at preventing the improvements of Chinese labour standards prescribed by the 
new law. It thus seems that the emerging global civil society is still the battlefield of 
global power struggles between labour and capital, where nation states also play a role.
In 2008, the Chinese government implemented a new labour contract law. Before its im-
plementation, the drafting of the law had been followed by heated discussions in China 
and abroad about the consequences of the law. In China, the discussion took place among 
legal experts from the academic world, and between representatives from the business 
community and the official trade union. Outside of China, lobbyism, directed against the 
improvements in working conditions for Chinese workers to be provided by the law, was 
undertaken by transnational business NGOs and countered by international trade unions 
and labour rights- and human rights NGOs.
The following chapter will present the history behind the development of the Chinese 
Labour Contract Law and a theoretical explanation of the policies of the Chinese gov-
ernment and transnational NGOs – business- and labour rights NGOs alike – behind this 
development.
Chapter 4
66
The Chinese Labour Contract Law of 2008
On 1 January 2008, the new Labour Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China was 
implemented by the Chinese government. Before the final passing and implementation of 
the law, the world had seen a long period of comments, suggestions and lobbying efforts 
which were directed against the Draft Law and the improvements in labour standards it 
would bring to Chinese workers and migrant workers, called nongmingong.1
 The new Labour Contract Law, alongside a number of other Chinese labour laws, had 
been made necessary by the restructuring of the Chinese economy which took place from 
1979 onwards. Before 1979, China was a socialist planned economy with state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) as the main industrial production units, and collective ownership was 
dominant in agriculture and among smaller industrial enterprises. Within both industry 
and agriculture, the production units also formed the basic framework of the welfare sys-
tem. In industry, the economic unit, the so-called danwei, was responsible for supplying 
the employees with lifelong employment, pensions, health service, childcare and educa-
tion and, in the rural areas, the People’s Communes had the same obligations towards 
their members. This system was based on what has been described as a socialist social 
contract (Lee, 2007). In the industrial sector in China, the basis of this social contract was 
the acceptance by the workers of not having the right to establish independent trade 
unions to struggle for improvements in their labour conditions and wages. The only trade 
union allowed by the party-state was the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 
which was, and still is, closely connected to the Communist Party and in accordance with 
the above-mentioned socialist social contract, was actively involved in the management 
of enterprises in different ways, with the aim of raising production. Growth in production 
was perceived as being in the common interest of Chinese society and the people, and 
was something workers willingly sacrificed their organisational freedom for.
From 1979, this system was fundamentally-changed through a process described by the 
double concepts of reform and opening up. Reform meant the gradual transformation of 
the planned economy towards a market economy – a so-called socialist market economy. 
As the first step in this process, the collective rural production system which centered 
on the People’s Communes was broken up, and agricultural land was divided among the 
households of the commune; the households then becoming the actual production units 
in rural areas. During the 1980s and 1990s, the SOEs in the industrial and service sec-
tors were first granted wider autonomy and independence from state planning, allowing 
them to decide themselves about production, surplus and manpower, and gradually the 
SOEs were privatised and a large number of workers fired. In 2001, eighty-six per cent 
of all SOEs had thus been partially or fully privatised, and during the years from 1998 to 
2005, thirty million SOE employees were laid off (Lee, 2007).
In this way, the socialist social contract was broken; lifelong labour security was abolished 
together with the social security network provided by the industrial danweis and the 
People’s Communes, and a new labour market was introduced with a flexible labour force 
responsive to the demands of the market (So, 2010).
1  Nongmingong are peasants migrating from China’s rural districts to the newly-established special 
economic zones (SEZs: export processing zones) in the southern part of China. 
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Opening up meant the gradual integration of China’s economy into the international 
economy. The disintegration of Communist China from the world market has often been 
described as a decision made by the government of the People’s Republic of China itself. 
Susan L. Shirk describes the opening up of China as an act by the Chinese government: 
“to end China’s two-decade-long self-imposed isolation” (Shirk, 2008: 14). To call China’s 
economic isolation “self-imposed” is, however, not correct. In 1949, at the end of the 
civil war in China between the armies of China’s Communist Party and the US-supported 
Guomindang (Nationalist) rulers, the US government imposed a trade embargo against 
China. The embargo lasted until the beginning of the 1970s, when the US government 
decided to lift it and allow American companies to trade with China. The American gov-
ernment thus played an important role in establishing the preconditions for the new 
integration of the Chinese economy into the world market, a development which took 
place from the 1970s onwards, culminating with China being accepted as a member of 
the World Trade Organisation in 2000. The main rationale behind this change in US-China 
policy was the desire to include China in the global encircling of the Soviet Union of that 
time. The strategic alliance between the Chinese and the US government was further 
consolidated when China, in 1979, alongside the introduction of the reform and opening 
up, started a proxy war on behalf of the US against Vietnam.
Apart from gradually making it possible for Chinese enterprises to trade directly with for-
eign companies, the most important change made during the process of opening up was 
the establishing of export processing zones (EPZs) in South China, the so-called Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs). In these zones, foreign companies were invited to invest in pro-
duction facilities, at first mainly in the form of joint ventures with Chinese companies, but 
gradually also as Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) without a Chinese partner. The Chi-
nese government created the necessary infrastructural environment and tax exemptions, 
and allowed a large number of peasants to migrate from the Chinese countryside to work 
in these SEZs. The SEZs were first concentrated in four localities in South China but, grad-
ually, EPZs or industrial development zones as they were often labelled, emerged along 
the Chinese East Coast. It has been estimated that, in 2008, up to two hundred million 
peasants had migrated to work in China’s industrial centres, and that more than sixty per 
cent of workers in industry and service in China were migrants (Global Labor Strategies, 
2008). “In the garment, textile, and construction industries, these migrant workers con-
stitute 70-80 per cent of the total workforce” (Lee, 2007: 6). In 2010, around two-thirds 
of the increase in Chinese exports since the late 1980s was estimated to stem from for-
eign global companies and joint ventures. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
foreign-owned global corporations accounted for sixty per cent of Chinese export to the 
USA, and more than eighty per cent of the toys sold in the US were made in China (So, 
2010). Of the sixty-six million workers employed in EPZs spread all over the globe, forty 
million were Chinese people working in Chinese EPZs (Madeley, 2008: 154).
The privatisation of SOEs caused a landslide growth in unemployment in China; in the 
period from 1996 to 2001, around thirty-six million workers in SOEs were laid off and, in 
the same period, collective firms sacked seventeen million workers (So, 2010). As a result 
of the abolition of the socialist social contract, working conditions in China deteriorated 
immensely. In 2008, the International Labour Organization (ILO) reported that China had 
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more deaths per capita from work-related illnesses each year than any other country, and 
the number of Chinese workers who died of occupational illnesses in 2005 was as high as 
386 645 (Global Labor Strategies, 2008). The migrant workers employed in the FIEs or 
joint ventures in the Chinese SEZs experienced extremely-harsh working conditions, and 
often received their wages too late or not at all.
Of course, this development led to an immense growth of popular protests. According to 
China’s Ministry of Public Security, the number of riots and demonstrations in China rose 
from 15 000 in 1990 to 74 000 in 2007. The bulk of these were caused by labour strife 
(Leung and So, 2013). Laid off SOE workers protested against losing their jobs, social se-
curity, pensions and so on; migrant workers’ protests were mainly caused by the lack of 
the payment of their wages, and inhuman working conditions. Added to this labour strife 
were demonstrations by the youth “sent down to the countryside” during the Cultural 
Revolution who, in the latter part of the 1970s, were allowed to return to the cities, only 
to realise that it was impossible for them to find employment.
The growth of public protests forced the Chinese government to develop an alternative 
to the socialist social contract in the form of a system of labour standards based on the 
“rule of law”. In the last decade of the twentieth century, a number of labour laws and 
regulations were drafted, and among these was also the Labour Contract Law. Labour 
contracts had already been introduced in the late 1970s for two reasons: first, to make 
it easier for the youth returning from the countryside to find employment and, second, 
in order to create a system for employing migrant workers in the FIEs and joint ventures 
in the SEZs. Provisions for contracts were promulgated in enterprises involving foreign 
capital, alongside the Joint Venture Law of 1979 (Lee, 2007). The labour contract system 
was later extended nationally to all joint ventures throughout China (Wei, Yan and Ye, 
2013), and in 1986 the labour contract system was introduced nationwide in the SOEs 
(Harris and Luo, 2008). This process mainly favoured the employers who were now able 
to replace ordinary lifelong employed workers with contract workers on fixed-term con-
tracts and with no universally-accepted rules for contract employment. In order to place 
labour relations inside the confines of the “rule of law”, the Chinese government had to 
create a system of labour legislation, and the first step was taken with the Labour Law 
of 1995. The Labour Law, among other provisions, formally required that all employees 
sign labour contracts with their employers and established a system of minimum wages. 
Prior to the Labour Law of 1994, workplace rules had to be decided upon in a democratic 
process with participation of workers’ representatives and the trade union. The 1995 
Labour Law changed this, stating that workplace rules should be in accordance with law, 
and that the opinion from the trade union should be heard during this process. This actu-
ally diminished workers’ influence on their working conditions, but this rule of democratic 
participation was later reintroduced with the new Labour Contract Law of 2008 (Qian et 
al., 2013). When passing the 1995 Labour Law, Chinese legislators had planned follow-up 
legislation, including the Labour Contract Law, the Employment Improvement Law, the 
Labour Disputes Resolution Law, and the Social Insurance Law (Wei, Yan and Ye, 2013).
The Labour Law of 1995, however, was not a success. Despite the fact that long term or 
open-ended contracts were encouraged under the law, labour contracts in China contin-
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ued to be non-existent or short-term, and informal. Approximately eighty per cent of all 
enterprises did not sign contracts with their employees, even though the Labour Law had 
made it mandatory to do so, and by 1999 most labour contracts for workers in FIEs were 
one-year contracts with renewal depending upon the agreement of both sides (Leung, 
2012). Minimum wage laws were not enforced and enterprises often did not pay wag-
es on time; some did not pay wages at all. “In 2005, 7.8 per cent of employees did not 
receive payments on time or at all. Overwork and overtime rule violations are rampant” 
(Global Labor Strategies, 2008: 35).
 
The Drafting of the Contract Labour Law
In 1996, the drafting of a labour contract law was put on the agenda of the Chinese 
State Council, but work on the draft did not start until 2004. Actively participating in the 
drafting were personnel from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS) and the 
ACFTU (Karindi, 2008) Also involved in the drafting was the Institute of Labour Relations 
at the Renmin University in Beijing. The institute was founded on 8 October 2004, and 
was given the task of doing “Research on Drafting the Labour Contract Law” by the Leg-
islative Office of the State Council. The director of the institute was Professor Chang Kai, 
who would later play a central role in academic discussions in China on the Draft Labour 
Contract Law (Karindi, 2008). Apart from this involvement by Chinese legal experts, the 
drafting of the Labour Contract Law was also supported by communications and cooper-
ation with international organisations like the ILO, and with the US and German govern-
ments.
The cooperation with the ILO took the form of a Memorandum of Understanding, signed 
in May 2001, which stipulated that the ILO should “assist in improving labour contracts 
and collective contract practice (in China)” (Karindi, 2008:10). Communication with US 
governmental institutions was also quite intensive. On 10 April 2003, the MOLSS and 
the US Department of Labor signed a letter of understanding on technical cooperation 
on labour legislation, with the aim of cooperating on the drafting and the enforcing of 
Chinese labour laws, including the Labour Contract Law, and in 2004 four letters of under-
standing were signed, to broaden cooperation between China and the US in the areas of 
labour, employment and workplace-safety. There was also cooperation between the Chi-
nese government and the German government on these issues. Since 1994, the MOLSS 
has cooperated with the German government on the reform of China’s labour and social 
security laws, and this was further developed in 2006 with a programme to promote the 
rule of law in China. In 2005, a seminar on labour contract law was organised in China, 
during which Chinese and international experts discussed the Draft Labour Contract Law, 
and in 2006, this seminar was followed by a labour contract law study tour to Germany 
and Italy (Karindi, 2008).
This international cooperation on developing labour laws in general and a labour contract 
law in particular, must have given the Chinese government the impression that what they 
were drafting was in accordance with ideas about labour standards universally agreed 
upon in the international community. The very aggressive reactions from the transna-
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tional business NGOs following the publication of the draft must, therefore, have come as 
a big surprise to the Chinese government and legislators.
 
The Publication of the Draft Law
On 20 March 2006, the Legal Affairs Committee of the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People’s Congress in China published the Draft Labour Contract Law, and invited 
public comments on the draft. As a consequence of the close cooperation between the 
Chinese government and Western organisations and governmental institutions described 
above, many of the provisions in the draft were parallel to those found in the legislation 
of Western countries, such as enforceable labour contracts, severance pay regulations, 
and negotiations over workplace policies and procedures (Global Labor Strategies 2006). 
The basic provisions of the Draft Labour Contract Law were (Leung and So, 2013):
 · All employment in China had to be based on a valid written labour contract that 
should be signed and agreed upon by the employer and employee before the em-
ployee started working;
 · If no contract was signed, the existence of a contract was to be presupposed by 
the authorities, and the worker would thus be guaranteed the protection pro-
scribed by contract regulations anyway;
 · Open-ended contracts were mandatory for workers who had completed two 
fixed-term contracts, or who had worked more than ten years in a firm;
 · Employers must give severance payments to all workers at the end of their em-
ployment;
 · Employers must contribute to their employees’ social security accounts;
 · Company policies and work rules must be negotiated between employers and 
representatives of the employees, including issues from compensation to health 
and safety issues, vacations, and days off. This provision would reintroduce the 
system with democratic discussion removed by the 1995 Labour Law;
 · The draft expanded the role of the ACFTU by allowing a broader scope for col-
lective bargaining at the enterprise level. For instance all enterprises have to 
negotiate with the local trade union or representatives of the employees before 
firing twenty employees or ten per cent of the total number of employees;
The law would indeed have strengthened the position of workers by making written 
contracts mandatory in all kinds of enterprises, discouraging short-term contracts, and 
expanding the participatory rights of trade unions. Within a few months after the publi-
cation of the draft, the Legal Affairs Committee had received almost 200 000 comments 
and suggestions for revisions of the draft; the majority of comments were positive, origi-
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nating from what was called “ordinary workers” (Karindi, 2008). Some critical comments, 
however, expressed by Chinese legal experts and transnational business NGOs also ar-
rived at the office of the Legal Affairs Committee. The publication of the draft, further-
more, gave impetus to academic discussions in China and a lively discussion between 
transnational business and labour rights NGOs, and even caused reactions from a group 
of members of the American Congress.
The discussion among Chinese legal experts about the draft started on 3 April, when an 
academic seminar on the subject was organised at Beijing University’s School of Law. Le-
gal experts from different academic institutions from all over China had come to Beijing 
to participate in the meeting, and the discussions soon concentrated around two differ-
ent approaches to the draft – one supportive, and one more critical. The main represent-
ative of the supporters was Professor Chang Kai, Director of the Institute of Labour Rela-
tions at Renmin University in Beijing. As mentioned above, he had actively participated in 
the drafting of the Labour Contract Law and naturally supported the draft, emphasising 
that the purpose of the coming Labour Contract Law was to protect the interests of the 
workers who were the weaker parties in labour conflicts and therefore needed a legal 
framework of protection. The critics of the draft among the Chinese legal scholars present 
centered  themselves around Dong Baohua, Professor of Labour Law at East China Univer-
sity of Politics and Law in Shanghai. Dong Baohua stated that the draft put too much em-
phasis on the protection of workers’ rights and neglected the interest of the employers; 
the provisions of the draft would, therefore, make it much more difficult for the employ-
ers in China to conduct their business. The two groups continued their discussions after 
the meeting at Beijing University in a public debate which was described by the media as 
a discussion between a Beijing-camp around Professor Chang Kai, and a Shanghai-camp 
led by Professor Dong Baohua (China Labour Bulletin, 2006) Academic disagreements in 
China thus seemed to be expressed in two different viewpoints, each representing one 
side of the contradiction between the interests of workers and business interests.
 
International Reactions to the Draft
The publication of Chinese Draft Labour Contract Law also started global discussions 
about labour rights and the business climate in China. Immediately after the publication 
of the Draft Law, transnational business NGOs reacted by sending very critical comments 
and suggestions for revisions of the draft to the Legal Affairs Committee. Some of these 
critical comments and suggestions were accompanied by concealed threats to withdraw 
investments from China. The transnational business NGOs most prominent in this intense 
lobbying campaign were the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai (AmCham), the 
US-China Business Council (USCBC), and the EU Chamber of Commerce in China (EUCCC). 
These transnational business NGOs represented a number of multinational corporations: 
AmCham more than 1300, the USCBC 250, and the EUCCC more than 860.
In March 2006, AmCham forwarded the document: Comments and Suggestions on Revi-
sions to Labor Contract Law (Draft) (American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, 2006) 
to Chinese legislators. The document was divided into two sections, one in Chinese and 
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one in English, and was addressed to the Law Committee, the Financial and Economic 
Committee, and the Legislative Affairs Committee of the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People’s Congress. It started with some introductory remarks, where the AmCham 
emphasised that they “believe American companies are leaders in creating a safe, fair, 
and fulfilling workplace” (American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai ,2006: 1), but 
soon started criticising the draft:
While AmCham Shanghai welcomes the intent of the new draft 
labor contract law, our member companies have expressed res-
ervations about the draft in its current form…. it is a step back-
wards for Chinese economic reforms – away from global trends 
of flexible labor markets needed to ensure continued economic 
growth (Ibid.).
The comments and suggestions state that “the Draft has certain defects”, and offer sug-
gestions for revisions. The AmCham document questions whether it was necessary at all 
to carry out such significant changes as the draft represents, and recommends that the 
Labour Law of 1995 is maintained instead. AmCham criticises the automatic establishing 
of labour relationships and the strict regulation of dismissal of employees, which, accord-
ing to AmCham, “may disable enterprises from optimising and integrating human re-
sources in a normal way… provisions under the Draft make people feel that it is a product 
of the planning economy and the old way of thinking, which conflicts with the interna-
tionally accepted human resources management concepts and impacts on all aspects of 
the normal recruitment, dismissal, performance management system and employees re-
taining scheme of enterprises” (Ibid :22). The comments also included an implicit threat 
of the withdrawal of investments: “provisions under this Draft are not consistent with the 
persistent position of Chinese government, and may exert negative influence on China’s 
investment environment” (Ibid.).
On 18 April 2006, EUCCC sent the document Re: Comments of the European Chamber of 
Commerce in China on the Draft Labour Contract Law (EU Chamber of Commerce in China, 
2006), including critical comments, and the advice not to let the Chinese Labour Contract 
Law be too influenced by the existing “overprotective” Labour Laws in Europe:
The European Chamber acknowledges that many of the articles 
presented in this draft stem from labour laws in Europe. How-
ever, we would like to take this opportunity to stress that the 
current labour regulations in several European countries pose 
a number of challenges to respective governments. Due to em-
ployee overprotection and rigid obligations for employers, many 
European companies have decreased their hiring rates, increas-
ing the burden on the state social systems … Indeed, the current 
labour laws in several European countries have resulted in in-
creased labour costs leading a number of European companies 
to relocate their production lines to countries outside Europe or 
to countries with more liberal labour legislation within Europe. 
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As it stands, if China chooses to implement the changes sug-
gested in this draft, such challenges will undoubtedly be experi-
enced here as well” (Ibid.).
The threat by the EUCCC that companies might withdraw their investments should the 
draft be passed is even more explicitly stated than those of the AmCham:
The strict regulations of the draft will limit employers’ flexibility 
and will finally result in an increase of production costs in China 
An increase of production costs will force foreign companies to 
reconsider new investment or continuing their activities in China 
(Ibid.).
Following these general comments, the document presents a number of more detailed 
suggestions which all have the aim of increasing employers’ managerial powers.
On 19 April 2006, Chinese legislators received the document Comments on the Draft La-
bor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft of March 20, 2006) authored 
by the USCBC (The US-China Business Council, 2006), also including an implicit threat of 
withdrawal of investments, and which contained the following remarks:
US companies generally bring world class employment practices 
to their China operations … We applaud the National People’s 
Congress for working to create a more uniform legal structure 
for the protection of rights that employees and employers have. 
In practice, however, several provisions would result in the loss 
of rights rather than the gaining of rights, as the draft law in-
tends. The Draft Law may also reduce employment opportuni-
ties for PRC [People’s Republic of China] workers and negatively 
impact the PRC’s competitiveness and appeal as a destination 
for foreign investment (Ibid.).
When the criticism against the Chinese Draft Labour Contract Law expressed by the trans-
national business NGOs became publicly known, they were broadly interpreted as lobby-
ing efforts by the Western business community aimed at preventing the improvement 
of the employment and working conditions of Chinese workers, and a number of organ-
isations reacted. The transnational business NGOs were criticised for their lobbying by 
international trade unions, transnational labour rights and human rights NGOs and even 
by a group of American congressmen.
Soon after the lobbyism had been publicly known, the International Textile, Garment, and 
Leather Workers Federation issued a statement demanding that EU and US corporations 
stopped their lobbying campaigns, and this was followed by The International Union of 
Food, Agricultural, Hotel Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations 
also calling for action by European trade unions to fight against the lobbyism performed 
by the EUCCC. In June 2006, the European Trade Union Confederation complained to the 
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European Commission about the threats by the EUCCC to withdraw investments or recon-
sider new investments in China. The European Commission communicated the concerns 
of the trade unions to the EUCCC, and on 8 December 2006 it issued a “clarification” on 
its attitude to the problem stating that,
In light of recent media attention concerning the European 
Chamber’s position on the Draft Labour Contract Law, the Cham-
ber would like to take this opportunity to clarify its position on 
this important piece of legislation. The Chamber believes that 
there is a serious need to improve working conditions in China 
and stands firmly behind the Chinese government’s efforts to 
improve working conditions (Quoted from Global Labor Strate-
gies, 2008: 39).
Many human rights groups and other NGOs have also been involved in the fight to protect 
the workers’ rights included in the new law. Most impressive was the action taken by The 
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, chaired by former UN Human Rights Com-
missioner Mary Robinson, and affiliated with Amnesty International. The Business and 
Human Rights Resource Centre contacted leading member companies of the NGOs and 
asked them about their role in opposing the law; the answers from responding companies 
were then posted on its website (http://www.business-humanrights.org). Among them, 
Ericsson and Nike explicitly distanced themselves from the lobbyism (So, 2010). In the 
response from Ericsson, the company stated:
Ericson supports the Chinese government’s legislative efforts to 
improve the labor law and relations for working standards in a 
variety of labor contexts… Ericsson is in no way actively lobby-
ing against the proposed legislation by the Chinese government. 
Nor has Ericsson threatened to pull out of China if the new labor 
laws were to be passed…..just because we are a member of the 
European Chamber of Commerce does not necessarily mean we 
endorse every lobbying initiative (Ericsson, 2007).
Members of the US Congress also reacted. 31 October 2006, a group of congressmen sent 
a letter to President Bush “protesting the efforts of US corporations to undermine the 
most basic human rights of Chinese workers and block proposed new worker rights and 
labor standards protections in the proposed new Chinese labor law” (Quoted from Global 
Labor Strategies, 2007: 29).
 
Revision of the Draft Law and New Comment Process
The many reactions, in particular the critical remarks from Chinese academics and trans-
national business NGOs caused the Chinese government to reconsider the draft and final-
ly revise it. On 11 December, the Legal Affairs Committee of the Chinese National People’s 
Congress held a meeting to debate the many comments and suggestions. The Committee 
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met again on 19 December and, soon after, a revised draft was issued. In contrast to 
the first public comment period, the government invited only select parties, such as the 
transnational business NGOs, to submit comments on the second draft and provided cop-
ies of the legislation only to these invitees (Global Labor Strategies, 2008).
According to Global Labor Strategy, the revised draft was a proof that US and European 
lobbying efforts through transnational business NGOs had been effective in diminishing 
the various provisions in the original draft protecting workers’ rights. The new draft had, 
for instance, watered down the role of the trade union in collective bargaining. It was 
now stated that the employer only needed to listen to the advice (but need not seek the 
approval) of the local trade union or meeting of employees’ representatives, before the 
company made any lay off of more than twenty employees or ten per cent of the total 
number of employees (Leung and So, 2013).
Still, the transnational business NGOs continued their criticism of the (now revised) Draft 
Labour Contract Law. AmCham secretly sent new detailed comments to the Chinese gov-
ernment demanding changes in the worker protection provisions, and the USCBC issued a 
commentary, “insisting that elements of the revised draft are overly ‘burdensome’, ‘pro-
hibitively expensive’, and will have ‘an adverse impact on the productivity and economic 
viability of employers’” (Global Labor Strategies, 2007: 4).
 
The Final law
The final Labour Contract Law implemented on 1 January 2008 had, in several aspects, 
been softened by the criticism by the transnational business NGOs. Where the earlier 
draft had given the trade union the right to “approve or reject” layoffs of more than 
twenty employees or ten per cent of the total labour force of the company, companies 
now only need to “consult” the trade union. But, on the other hand, the final law limits the 
use of “probationary contracts” used by many employers to avoid fulltime employment. 
Furthermore, the law widens the power of company-based branches of the ACFTU or em-
ployees’ representative committees to engage in collective bargaining with the company 
about salaries, bonuses, training and other work-related matters (Leung and So, 2013). 
The Outcome of the Law
It is difficult to evaluate the consequences of the Labour Contract Law because the im-
plementation of the law coincided with the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Some 
companies which closed down at this time may blame the Labour Contract Law for caus-
ing their costs to rise, while the true cause of their economic problems may be the fall in 
global demand following the financial crisis. Some companies actually tried to circumvent 
the provisions in the law forcing companies to give open-ended contracts to workers who 
had been employed in the company more than ten years. Already in 2007, Huawei, the 
world-renowned Chinese electronics producer fired all employees whose employment in 
the company had lasted close to ten years, and reemployed them as new employees. Chi-
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nese companies have acted alongside transnational business NGOs, against the full im-
plementation of the law in a number of ways. In 2008, China’s richest woman, Zhang Yin, 
Board Chairperson of one of the world’s largest paper makers, Nine Dragon Papers, who 
is also a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (an advisory 
body to the Chinese government), forwarded a proposal to the Conference “to amend the 
Labour Contract Law… to exempt labour-intensive companies from signing permanent 
contracts with the employees who have worked for more than 10 years” (China Daily, 
2008-03-10).
The opposition to the Labour Contract Law inside China has continued since its imple-
mentation in 2008. Problems with the law and companies’ attempts to circumvent the 
provisions of the law led to the drafting of a revision in 2011:
[which was] designed to address abuses of the employment 
agency system …. In an attempt to avoid signing contracts 
with their employees, as stipulated by the Labour Contract Law, 
more and more employers have hired workers from employment 
agencies, in spite of the provisions that restrict the use of such 
labour to temporary, auxiliary and substitute positions….the 
problem is most acute in large-scale state-owned enterprises 
involved in petro-chemicals, telecommunications and finance, 
where an estimated two thirds of employees are agency staff ” 
(China Labour Bulletin, 2012).
The Legal Office received more than 500 000 comments on the draft revision and this 
caused the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress to postpone discus-
sions on the draft, “the greatest pressure on the government to postpone discussion of 
the proposed revisions came from this powerful business lobby, which has openly voiced 
concerns about the need for flexible hiring and firing during the current economic slow-
down in China and across the world” (Ibid.). The struggle over the establishment of a le-
gal framework for labour contracts in China goes on, with the active participation of both 
Chinese and foreign companies.
 
Analysis
The process of drafting, passing and implementation of the Chinese Labour Contract Law 
raises two questions: Why did the Chinese government find it necessary to establish a 
Labour Contract Law? And why did the transnational NGOs – business and labour rights 
NGOs alike – find it necessary to interfere with the legislative process leading to the im-
plementation of the new Labour Contract Law in China?
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Why did the Chinese Government find it Necessary to Establish a Labour Contract Law?
The passing of the Labour Contract Law may be seen as a natural consequence of the 
many worker protests against the abolition of the socialist social contract, and the trans-
formation of the Chinese economy from a socialist planned economy towards a social-
ist market economy may be explained by referring to the bad economic results of the 
planned economy. Professor Wang Shaoguang from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
however, explains the development with reference to Karl Polanyi’s theory about market 
and double movement (Wang, 2008).
According to Polanyi, a market has existed in all societies through most of the history of 
mankind. If a self-regulating market is allowed to subordinate society under itself, it will 
inevitably have a destructive effect on human beings, society and the natural environ-
ment. Therefore, markets have, in most known societies, been what Polanyi calls embed-
ded, i.e. subordinated to society, and have not been allowed to regulate themselves. The 
kind of economy where the market is embedded may be called a moral economy, because 
the economic activities therein are subordinated to political, religious and social relations. 
In the nineteenth century, however, global economy became gradually disembbed from 
society. Societies experiencing the emergence of a competitive capitalist global economy 
gradually did what classical economic theory advised them to do, namely freeing the 
economy from the control of society. The disembedded market economy led to the de-
struction of society and, as a consequence, what Polanyi calls a countermovement to pro-
tect human beings, nature, and productive organisations through protective legislation, 
and other interventions by the state and the society emerged (Polanyi, 2001: 79). After 
the Great Economic Crisis of the 1930s and the Second World War, the market became 
increasingly embedded with growing Keynesian control of the destructive fluctuations of 
the market and its subordination to the development of the welfare state. By the end of 
the 1980s, the Keynesian embedding of the market was, however, replaced by neoliberal 
globalisation, which may be seen as a process of a new disembedding of the market – 
now from the constraints placed upon it by state interventionism and the welfare state.
Wang Shaoguang describes the economy People’s Republic of China until the start of 
the economic reforms in 1979 as a moral economy. The market in this economy was not 
self-regulating, but constrained by collective and national interests, expressed in two 
control mechanisms: soft budget constraint and the ‘iron bowl’. Soft budget constraint 
means that the activities of any economic organisation are not constrained by its own re-
sources. If the organisation has a function within the planned economy, it does not mat-
ter if it experiences no surplus or even has a deficit. A deficit would be compensated by 
the state by the allocation of resources from surplus-producing economic organisations.
‘Iron bowl’ means lifelong, guaranteed employment and social security for all members of 
society, not dependent on work performance. People’s communes in rural areas and the 
danwei in cities were both economic institutions and social and political institutions. The 
soft budget constraint and the iron bowl thus “became the two pillars of the planned eco-
nomic system because it gave priority to human subsistence and equality at the expense 
of efficiency” (Wang, 2008: 17).
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When the Chinese government started the process of reform and opening up, the Chinese 
moral economy was gradually transformed into a market economy and the Chinese polit-
ical leaders replaced the ideology of basic welfare and equality with a search for economic 
efficiency and GDP growth. The market has thus been disembedded from society and has 
instead become a force controlling society. China has been effectively transformed into 
a market society.
Since the initiation of the reform and opening up, China’s economy has experienced a 
remarkable growth in GDP, but this growth has, as a side effect, brought with it many 
problems for society, like the growing inequality and social polarisation, the deteriorating 
environment, and so on. The social problems have necessitated a protective counter-
movement with the aim of reembedding the market into society.
The Labour Contract Law may be seen as part of this development. The reforms have 
meant a total commodification of labour power. Labour power is sold and bought on 
a basically self-regulating labour market, and fluctuations on this labour market may 
kick workers and migrant workers out of their jobs or put a downward pressure on their 
wages, thereby undermining their living conditions. Without rules about working con-
ditions, employers striving for higher labour productivity and lower costs may squeeze 
the workers to the limit. In order to prevent the destruction of workers’ lives, the Chinese 
government has to interfere and create a legal framework protecting workers against the 
negative consequences of market fluctuations and the quest of employers for lower costs 
and higher profits. Otherwise, society will see disrupting occurrences of social misery and 
a rioting, dissatisfied population.
Why did the Transnational NGOs Interfere with the Legislative Process Leading to 
the Implementation of the New Labour Contract Law in China?
The opening up of the Chinese economy was part of the neoliberal globalisation which 
started in the 1980s. Some people, like Wallerstein and other World Systems analysts, 
would argue that the capitalist economy has always been global, but they would also 
agree that neoliberal globalisation changed the global economy in important ways. The 
collapse and economic changes in the communist block and the opening up of China’s 
economy created an all-inclusive global labour market, and this caused a very signifi-
cant widening of wage differences, with a difference of more than a hundred times be-
tween the highest level in Western countries, and the lowest level which is found in China 
(Keane, 2003). These differences in the average wage level made productive investments 
in low-wage countries very attractive for Western companies – especially in China. The 
flow of foreign direct investments to China was accompanied by a global reorganisation 
of the global commodity chains.
The concept of global commodity chains was first created by Immanuel Wallerstein 
(Wallerstein, 1983: 16) in connection with the development of his World Systems Analy-
sis, and the concept was later further developed by Gary Gereffi.
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Global commodity chains (GCCs) are rooted in transnational 
production systems that give rise to particular patterns of co-
ordinated international trade. A ‘production system’ links the 
economic activities of firms to technological and organizational 
networks that permit companies to develop, manufacture and 
market specific comodities (Gereffi, 1994: 215).
Global commodity chains have three main dimensions: (a) an 
input-output structure(i.e. a set of products and services linked 
together in a sequence of value-adding economic activities);(b) 
a territoriality (i.e. spatial dispersion or concentration of pro-
duction and marketing networks, comprised of enterprises of 
different sizes and types); and (c) a governance structure (i.e. 
authority and power relationships that determine how financial 
material and human resources are allocated and flow within a 
chain) (Ibid.).
In the global economy before neoliberal globalisation, the links in these production sys-
tems mainly had the form of market exchange but, as a result of neoliberal globalisation, 
the commodity chains changed into systems of intra-firm links. What Gereffi calls “the 
lead company”, i.e. the company governing the commodity chain, slices the production 
into different subparts placed in the most cost-efficient geographical localities, either by 
outsourcing of production facilities or through subcontracting with local companies.
Gereffi distinguishes between two different types of commodity chains: producer-driv-
en commodity chains and buyer-driven commodity chains. The buyer-driven commodity 
chains are the most common type in the production pattern connecting Chinese export 
production with the global economy.
Buyer-driven commodity chains refer to those industries in 
which large retailers, brand-named merchandisers, and trading 
companies play the pivotal role in setting up decentralized pro-
duction networks in a variety of exporting countries typically lo-
cated in the Third World….common in labor-intensive consumer 
goods industries (Gereffi, 1994: 216).
This type of commodity chain is governed by the company which has the position of seller 
of last resort; often a company without production facilities but controlling the brand, 
design and final distribution of products. Companies in China – not necessarily Chinese by 
ownership – often have important roles in these commodity chains. Two examples may 
be mentioned in this connection: Apple’s production of iPhones and Walmart’s system of 
supplies.
The production of Apple’s iPhones has, since the first model was marketed in 2007, been 
centred in China, where the components are assembled and the final product is marketed 
worldwide labelled as Made in China, but Designed in USA. Actually, only a very small 
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amount, three to four per cent of the total costs in producing an iPhone are spent in 
China, while the rest goes to suppliers of components from Japan, South Korea, Germany, 
and the USA (Xing and Detert, 2010). The components are assembled in a Taiwanese 
company, FoxConn. Still, because of the pivotal position of the assembly line in China, 
Chinese working conditions and labour costs are extremely important for Apple.
The US based global supply/retail chain, Walmart, established itself in China in 1995 as 
Walmart China, and soon created a web of subcontractors supplying Walmart with daily 
consumer goods. In 2005, seventy per cent of all products sold by Walmart were made 
in China, and eighty per cent of the six thousand factories that supply the company were 
Chinese (Sum, 2009). Walmart thus created an efficient buyer-driven commodity chain, 
in which governance was performed by the use of specialised computer software called 
Retail Link. All stores, distribution centres, and suppliers are connected with this software, 
which channels detailed information about all suppliers directly to the management of 
Walmart. “Armed with information about suppliers’ cost and margins, Wal-Mart manag-
ers can routinely evaluate changes in each suppliers’ costs and margins as well as require 
it to match its lowest price or even cut it. It also introduces a form of coordinated compe-
tition among suppliers, for example by asking a specific supplier to match the lower price 
of competing suppliers” (Sum, 2009).  Of course, a system like this demands a very high 
level of flexibility by the suppliers of Walmart, a flexibility which may easily be challenged 
by changes in labour standards in China.
Neoliberal globalisation, the reorganisation of GCCs, and the role of China’s economy in 
all of this has had profound consequences for both workers and businesses around the 
world. Transnational companies have experienced the opening up of a myriad of new 
business opportunities in countries with – compared to international standards – an ex-
tremely low average wage level, and thus extremely cost-effective production oppor-
tunities, giving them full control over all steps in production and marketing processes. 
With the opening up of China’s economy and the inclusion of the Chinese labour pool in 
the global workforce, pressure on worldwide wage levels created what has been called 
a “labour arbitrage” (Roach, 2004) or “race to the bottom”. Of course, companies and 
business NGOs are interested in preserving this situation which gives them so many ad-
vantages and, on the other hand, workers and their representative NGOs all over the 
world are interested in fighting the deterioration of their own working conditions and 
wage levels caused by the inclusion of the large additional workforce working under very 
few rules and at very low wages.
 
Conclusion
The drafting, passing and implementation of the Labour Contract Law in China was a 
replacement for employment conditions embodied in the socialist social contract of the 
planned economy of China. It may be interpreted as part of the development of what 
Polanyi calls a countermovement to the disembedding of the Chinese market from the 
controls of society actualised by the reform and opening up of the Chinese economy. The 
process was the result of, on one hand, popular protests against the destroying conse-
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quences of the disembbeding on the lives of workers and migrant workers and, on the 
other, reactions by the Chinese government to these protests.
The interference by transnational business NGOs in this process was the result of the 
growth in business opportunities for transnational companies resulting from neoliberal 
globalisation, which made investments possible in the newly-included parts of the world 
with immense numbers of low-wage workers accessible to these companies. China was 
the most important of these newly-included areas. With the reorganisation of global 
commodity chains, the internal working conditions in these newly-included countries and 
the rules governing these working conditions became a matter of enormous importance 
for the transnational companies. Both the companies themselves and the organisations 
representing their interests would have to be aware of and try to influence changes in 
this advantageous situation. For workers all over the world and their trade unions, the 
situation was the opposite. They witnessed their own and their colleagues’ places of em-
ployment being outsourced to countries newly included in the global market with low 
labour costs, and experienced a downward pressure on wages in their own countries. For 
them, working conditions in the newly-included countries also became of central impor-
tance, because they influenced working conditions and wage levels in their own coun-
tries. Working conditions in countries like China have become of immense importance in 
the struggle led by workers all over the world to defend and improve their own working 
conditions.
As a result of this development, the legal framework of working conditions in a country 
like China is no longer a matter of interest exclusively for business and worker organi-
sations in China, but has become extremely important for business and worker organi-
sations all around the world. Global civil society has become the battlefield of the global 
struggles between business and labour.
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Transnational NGOs and Reconstitution of  
Military Regime in Egypt
 
 
Abdulkadir Osman Farah  
 
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the role of transnational nongovernmental organisations (TN-
GOs) in recent developments in Egypt. The current scholarly debate on the so-called “Arab 
spring” considers the mobilisation of disempowered youth, intense media-tech applica-
tion, and sustained international pressure as crucial to ousting authoritarian regimes in 
North Africa. Delineating the role of TNGOs1 complements such findings. TNGO activities 
and responses to the Egyptian uprising in 2011 and to the ensuing coup in 2013 reveal 
the capability of such organisations to balance civic transformational-oriented mobilisa-
tions with state-centred institutional considerations. Furthermore, though TNGOs cannot 
directly change the current political stalemate in Egypt, the power elite might misinter-
pret the changing and sometimes contradictory positions of these organisations, and 
might eventually encourage a return to authoritarianism. After introductory remarks on 
the background of the uprising, the chapter proceeds to a theoretical discussion of trans-
national engagement, followed by recent historical and current empirical developments.
Among the countries of the “Arab spring” in the Middle East and North Africa, only Egypt 
claims both a popular revolution and a coup. With a civic revolt in 2011, Egyptians mo-
bilised resources to overthrow an authoritarian ruler. Two years later, with a military 
coup, the public fragmented into antagonistic factions: (i.) those continuously insisting 
on shariyah, the legality of the original revolution of 25 January 2011; and (ii.) propo-
nents of the inqilab, the army takeover of 3 July 2013. This chapter explores the role of 
TNGOs in this unresolved political stalemate. With nationwide mass protests in January 
2011, Egyptians demanded rahil, the departure of Hosni Mubarak, the country’s long-
term autocratic ruler. Protesters called for eish bread (life), karama (dignity), and huriya 
(freedom) for all. These euphoric public eruptions marked the culmination of long-term, 
entrenched civic engagement. Over the years, Egyptian activists established grassroots, 
critical social movements and organisations to directly and indirectly challenge the mil-
itary regime. With diverse civic-associational life, Egyptian nongovernmental organisa-
1  “We define Transnational NGOs as organizations that normally operate, recruit membership and 
attract funding from more than three nations.” “The term “transnational” refers to activities, organiza-
tions, and movements that occur across national boundaries with limited or no involvement by national 
governments. Use of the term “transnational” as opposed to “international” is intended to accentuate 
the fact that the activities, organizations, and movements being described do not occur at the behest of 
national governments”. See more in Peter N. Stearns (eds.), Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World, 
OUP, 2008.
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tions (NGOs) filled the welfare gap left by the state in providing basic services for vul-
nerable communities. Meanwhile, domestic movements complemented the national civic 
efforts with trans-boundary interaction and collaboration with TNGOs. Such transnation-
al connections enabled local NGOs to join global civil society mobilisations, particularly 
those concerned with peace struggles and social justice in connection with the Iraq Wars 
and Palestinian Intifadas (Abdelrahman, 2009). The participation of transnational actors 
with embedded framing opportunities had strengthened the foundations for the subse-
quent popular uprising that, for the Egyptians, reached a climax with the fall of Mubarak 
(Sakr, 2006). Later, a military-administered distressing transitional period ended with an 
internationally-observed democratic experiment in 2012.
Among the winners of the closely-contested national election were activists and leaders 
from previously politically-oppressed movements and NGOs. In retrospect, the transfor-
mation was historic for the troubled nation. The transition, however, resulted in a more 
confrontational political conundrum. The electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood un-
dermined the fragile national and transnational civic convergence that earlier disgraced 
authoritarianism. In Egypt, Islamist resistance has a long history. For instance, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, alongside associated organisations, had pursued a counterhegemonic plat-
form for almost one hundred years. The movement resisted colonial power accumulation 
and the coercion of successive military regimes. Both colonial powers and the militarily 
oppressed religious organisations, while occasionally behind the scenes negotiating with 
the religious leadership. Over the years, the Brotherhood maintained a civic mobilisation 
profile with, for instance, private educational institutions and clinics, enabling the organ-
isation to sometimes operate as a de facto welfare state. As the uprising gained momen-
tum, although not among the prime initiators, the Brotherhood promptly capitalised on 
the volatile situation for political ends. Unlike the digitally-minded youth and non-activist 
civic components, the Brotherhood maintained certain organic connections to local com-
munities. Consequently, the civic mobilisations congregating at Tahrir and other Egyptian 
squares for the common objective of isqad al-nidam, the fall of the regime, expanded 
into diverging ideological clashes: a return to belligerent military rule, interwoven with 
prospective civil conflict (Mahmood, 2003).
 
The Challenge
This study focuses on the contradictory response by some TNGOs to the 25 January up-
rising and the military coup in July 2013. The chapter argues that the inconsistent proc-
lamations by such organisations reflect broader national and transnational civic diver-
gence. For instance, Human Rights Watch, a focal TNGO operating in Egypt, applauded the 
January 2011 upheaval, describing it as the product of “Egypt’s transformers and revolu-
tionaries”2. In comparison, the organisation’s response to the military coup in July 2013 
expressed caution that “Egyptian authorities should take the necessary steps to protect 
churches and religious institutions against mob attacks”3. Absent from the statement 
2  Feature by Human Rights Watch at: http://www.hrw.org/features/revolutionaries-egyptstransformers
3  Statement by Human Rights Watch at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces 
used- excessive-lethal-force.
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was reference to the revolutionaries in 2011, and there was unwillingness to categorise 
the military takeover as a coup. Even the prime stakeholders, the Egyptians, remain divid-
ed in determining the classification of such a dramatic national rupture.
This is due to the leaders of the decades-long military rule often legitimising the acqui-
sition of power with violence and with constitutions which divided society. Another US-
based, powerful TNGO, the Carter Center, had a similar approach to the Egyptian turmoil. 
The former President, Jimmy Carter, who leads this organisation, has a somewhat para-
doxical relationship with Egypt. Under his presidential supervision, the Camp David treaty 
mediating Egypt and Israel sponsored and launched a long-term US-Egypt security part-
nership. The retired statesman, and Nobel laureate, this time as the head of a civic trans-
national platform, articulated willingness to help Egyptians towards “self-governance”. 
The dual approach to the Egyptian predicament seems clearer when, in response to the 
Egyptian uprising, Carter, on behalf of the Carter Center, “congratulate[d] the people of 
Egypt on their courageous steps towards a new era of democratic legitimacy and respect 
for human rights… [and let Egyptians] know that they have the support of the inter-
national community as they embark on the difficult path of building a truly democratic 
nation”4. During the parliamentary elections and the short-lived Morsi presidency, both 
the US embassy in Cairo and the Carter Center sponsored numerous coordination meet-
ings to “mediate” opposing political forces in Egypt5. Later reacting to the military coup, 
the Carter Center refrained from direct association with Egyptian protesters, but instead 
“placed an extra responsibility on the armed security forces of Egypt to remain within 
reasonable limitations of not only applying lethal force but also showing fundamental 
respect for the human rights of their fellow Egyptians”6. Furthermore, when Morsi took 
power and changed the constitution, both Human Rights Watch and the Carter Center 
adopted a critical discourse highlighting themes such as gender inequality and increasing 
violations against religious minorities in Egypt.
The position of the two TNGOs coincides with the US government’s scepticism towards 
democratic Islamist rule (Gerges, 1999: 89). Although TNGOs often seek to reconcile civic 
movement and grassroots-oriented priorities with formal organisational and institutional 
objectives, the statements by Human Rights Watch and the Carter Center confirm or-
ganisational ambivalence aiming at an intermediate position. Such a standpoint would 
require the implementation of parallel and occasionally overlapping functions. Hence, or-
ganisations build partnerships with states or state-linked institutions such as the United 
Nations (UN) system (Willetts, 2001: 356-383). Under such a framework, organisations 
interact with home and host states, as well as international institutions. The recent legal 
actions by Egypt against “foreign NGOs” attest to the existence of competing ideological 
and institutional platforms within and around TNGOs (Malmvig, Helle and Lassen, Christi-
na, 2013). The Egyptian judiciary accused Western TNGOs of undermining the country’s 
political authority, sovereignty and state legitimacy. For their part, Western states, from 
which most of the NGOs and funding indicted here originate, defended the credibility of 
4  Carter Center statement at: http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/egypt-021111.html.
5  http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/egypt-2011-
2012-final-rpt.pdf
6  Carter Center statement at: http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/egypt-081713.html
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these organisations. Consequently, TNGOs create tension within Egypt and beyond.  As an 
intense debate sent in Aljazeera English shows for the supporters of the military regime, 
the action of raiding “foreign NGOs” and confiscating their equipment was justified, as 
Egypt is a sovereign state with the legitimacy to control national territory. For them, de-
mocracy has limitations as “there are red lines” under which civil society could not exist 
unregulated and beyond the state. For human rights activists, the action against the TN-
GOs was “unprecedented and directly targeted all NGOs”. For them, the campaign result-
ed from the long-term government manipulation of public discourse portraying TNGOs as 
“serving [for] external actors”. In contrast, TNGOs consider themselves as “the voice that 
upholds human rights, exposes abuses [making them] heroes of the revolution which 
the military aims to silence”7. Such claims remain debatable, but powerful states and 
international organisations such as the UN, though formally supporting the prevailing 
discourse of national sovereignty, funded and encouraged TNGO efforts. For their part, 
TNGOs interact and cooperate with national and transnational civil society constituents 
in creating “transnational governance spaces” (Lang, 2013: 29). With emphasis on mo-
bilisation-oriented activities, TNGOs contribute to the formation of essential associational 
and expressive spaces. Though such efforts might occasionally appear partial and reflect 
ideological frames, their involvement generates alternative transnational mechanisms 
for Egyptians and their NGOs to counter military rule.
 
The Recent History
Military elites with authoritarian leaderships have dominated Egyptian politics since 
1952 (Said, 2012). All three former presidents, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, reigned 
because of usurpation and with the systematic persecution of political opponents (Mc-
Dermott, 2013). The military restricted non state-sponsored alternative public spheres. 
Under such circumstances, civic movements and organisations had the option of either 
accepting co-option or risking long-term imprisonment and torture. Through successive 
emergency measures, authorities curbed public liberties and mobility (Stachursky, 2013: 
89-90).
For decades, the Egyptian military elite justified such actions with reference to na-
tion-building priorities, prevailing Cold War geostrategic considerations, and threats from 
global extremism. The pattern consolidated a Praetorian state under which the military 
and collaborative elites reproduced socio-political, as well as economic, underdevelop-
ment and increasingly polarised civil society (Cook, 2007: 6-8).
Nonetheless, citizens, victimised by years of military rule, maintained indomitable resist-
ance countering excessive state oppression. In order to undermine any emerging opposi-
tion and consolidate “oligarchic kleptocracy”, Egyptian rulers perennially employed a “di-
vide and rule” strategy, creating social fragmentation and enmity among the population 
(Teti, Andrea and Gervasio; Gennaro, 2012). Equally critical, powerful states such as the 
7  See more at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LCdS5YZXOVE (An Aljazeera program “Inside Story”, 
which invited an Egyptian scholar supporting the regime, a Human Rrights Watch representative and a 
political commentator to discuss the implications and consequences of Egypt’s treatment of NGOs.) 
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USA, from which the regime received sizable funding, as well as international organisa-
tions and TNGOs complicated the state-society relationship in the country. The external-
isation of development mechanisms worries Arab public opinion that considers Western 
TNGOs as “elitist organisations with limited accountability promoting particular interest” 
(Pratt, 2005: 123-150). Consequently, for the military regime, the quest for external 
legitimacy appears desirable, rather than securing a more accountability-demanding in-
ternal legitimacy. Eventually, the waves of uprising that engulfed Middle Eastern and 
Northern African countries in 2011 temporarily overturned this elite and state-centred 
political structure. Witnessing the involuntary departure of the Tunisian dictator Ben Ali, 
the military elite in Egypt initially unsuccessfully tried to constrain the Egyptian people 
from diverse social, economic and ideological backgrounds from mobilising. The efforts 
failed as protesters occupied public squares demanding rahil, the departure of the nid-
am (regime). Likewise, the international impetus and media attention surrounding the 
uprising at the time facilitated and, to a certain extent, accelerated national, regional, 
and transnational political and technological opportunities. In the past Egyptians mainly 
engaged transnationally to bypass domestic pressure and avoid persecution. The political 
opportunities in early 2011 of a world witnessing a potentially-changing region addi-
tionally reduced the gap between national and transnational mobilisation and institu-
tionalisation dimensions of civic engagement. For instance, for a period, Tahrir and other 
Egyptian protest squares attained global inspirational status (Stiglitz, 2011).
The national and transnational civic mobilisations occurred on diverse, competing, and 
complementary levels; firstly, the local social level in which organic associations best ar-
ticulate relevant socio-political issues. Among such constituents are religious and tradi-
tional kinship components. During the uprising, their main goal was to achieve change, 
with the basic demands of freedom and autonomy. The second level arises from the in-
teraction with the state (the military regime). The army controls the security apparatus 
such as the military and other enforcement agencies. At the national level, both support-
ing and oppositional networks operate under this hierarchical structure. Depending on 
declared policies, such diverse groups could either support the status quo or advocate for 
change. The third level relates to the international/supranational level on which interna-
tional organisations such the UN, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and 
the World Bank pursue designed strategies and projects. Similar to the national arena, 
transnational networks include constituents calling for change, and others preferring the 
status quo. Finally, we have national NGOs operating on the transnational networking 
level. Under such circumstances, TNGOs often sympathise with local activism in demand-
ing change, while in practical terms, organisations rely on states (regimes) for institution-
al collaboration and networking within the transnational public sphere.
The regime in Egypt controls and occasionally degrades NGOs. One of the main sources 
for NGO funding is the United States Agency for International Development, while the 
US government is the main donor for the Egyptian regime. Meanwhile, religious NGOs 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood remain in a precarious situation due to the movement’s 
resistance as well as its semi-political function. The stated religious goals of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and related movements differ from the aims stressed by the secular leftists 
and feminist organisations. Similarly, their relationships with the state and TNGOs di-
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verge. Though religious groups remain locally-rooted, their networks operate and extend 
transnationally (Mandeville, 2011). After accessing power with contested democratic 
elections, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood missed a unique opportunity to reach 
out to opposing ideological forces for compromise. Instead, the Brotherhood embarked 
on a transnational ideological campaign.
 
Transnational activism and TNGOs
In theory, TNGOs participate in networks driven by individual activists and related groups 
sharing beliefs and identities. These activists pursue trans-border social, humanitarian 
and political activities in which cultural framing plays a central role. More specifically, 
TNGOs obtain the transnational expertise and knowledge that is necessary for global 
developmental debates, seeking solutions for “instances of Problematic justice” (Haber-
mas, 1990: 108) and social inequalities. In countries like Egypt where such organisations 
confront bureaucratic obstructions, TNGO activists employ the so-called “boomerang net-
working pattern”. The aim of this is to externalise and, through the collection of sensitive 
information, valorise domestic claims which the authoritarian regime initially ignored and 
supressed. The motivation for such endeavour derives from moral/ethical values rather 
than political ambitions and the personal gains of transnational activists (Keck and Sik-
kink, 2014). From this perspective, TNGOs often put maximum pressure on authoritarian-
ism, while leaving others to compete for access to influence and power.
Such transnational activists also qualify as “rooted cosmopolitans” (Tarrow, 2005: 2) 
with the involvement of not just transnational networking, but also with concrete social 
movement engagement and trans-border activism. Apart from politically framing issues, 
such activists and organisations engage in contentious politics with the purpose of ac-
cessing national and transnational power and resources. TNGOs operate through connec-
tive structures in which institutions, technology, management, and leadership play criti-
cal roles. In practice, TNGOs implement “franchising” activities by establishing branches 
and offices in different countries.
The existence of “political opportunity structures” enhances the capability of TNGOs to 
mobilise relevant civic activities in home and host environments. Therefore, the domestic 
national structure remains foundational for the operation of TNGOs. In addition, the un-
predictability of “scale shift” makes a significant difference, if transnational engagement 
seeks to reconfigure civic capability Scale shift refers to “a change in the number and 
level of coordinated contentious actions to a different focal point, invoking a new range 
of actors, objects and broadened claims” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 331). With 
this approach, TNGOs might negotiate and even share institutional power with authori-
tarian regimes.  Furthermore, TNGOs reproduce not just moral and cosmopolitan norms 
through transnational networking, but also as new forms of governmentality and asym-
metric power relations trying to bypass nation states. Such transnational networks have, 
together with international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, “taken over the governmentality of, for instance, vulnerable parts of the 
world. TNGOs often bridge the sovereignty of developing nations in comparison to the 
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developed countries. Operationally TNGOs might reflect the characteristics of “western 
bureaucratic organisation” designed to maintain “liberal global order” with an emphasis 
on secularism (Ferguson, 2006: 44-45). Under this hegemonic and hierarchical structure, 
TNGOs often seek institutional privilege.
In relation to the African continent, TNGOs might exercise “independent sovereignty”. 
Unlike other more consolidated regions (states) in the world, “both the African state 
and the civil society operate within a trans-nationalized environment and global con-
text” (Ferguson, 2006: 100-101). Consequently, countries find themselves almost “ruled 
by trans-nationalized networks under which condition few countries remain sovereign 
not because countries are invaded or conquered but because complex networks rule and 
pressure these countries from distance”. In countries like Egypt, we often see diverse 
projects designed by “people sitting in transnational distant places” (Durac, 2009). In 
recent years, due to technological and communicational development, global civil society 
attained greater significance in issues of transnational social mobilisation and organisa-
tion. Liberalisation, originally designed to expand global markets, provided civil society 
with alternative opportunities to confront and bypass the state. Over the years, expand-
ed liberalisation had, however, instead of promoting democratisation, undermined state 
capacity and fragmented society into haves and have-nots. Under such a global liber-
al environment, we find not just cosmopolitans- the activists involved in global justice 
movements and cultural innovation- but also TNGOs with contentious organisational he-
gemonic capacity (Tarrow, 2005: 24).
 
Diverging Egyptian Forces with Conflicting Political Goals
In a complex globalised world, diverse civil societies maintain formal and informal con-
nectivity across diverse nations and territories. During political upheavals, i.e. the Arab 
uprising, civil society movements and organisations have intensified transnational civic 
exchanges. Similarly, TNGOs systematically engage and invest in actual processes with 
the aim of influencing and achieving suitable outcomes (Stachursky, 2013: 89-90). The 
ideological and organisational priorities of these organisations, combined with the ten-
sion and suffering often expressed in the national and transnational public spheres, as 
well as the concerns of the communities scattered across the world, contribute to such 
endeavour (KUSÇU, 2012). The general public discourse also mobilises communities, 
linking them to their host countries and societies. The grievances and the daily pictures 
projected by national movements and organisations, and their confrontations with op-
pressive states also inspire “global public protest”, motivating people to act individually 
as well as collectively (Milne, 2012: 260). TNGOs operating in developing countries such 
as Egypt often have to balance the dynamics of mobilisation necessary for the empow-
erment of wider civil society and the institutionalised pragmatism tendencies required 
in dealing with powerful political and institutional constituents. This creates a dialectical 
tension and controversy. The ambivalence further explains the reluctance of TNGOs in 
initially taking sides in controversial state-society conflicts. TNGOs depend on the backing 
of both the civic mobilisation side, as well as the institutional side. While the roots and 
sympathy might lie on the mobilisation side, managerial and structural aspects belong 
92
to the institutional dimension of the state. The absence of a transnational public sphere 
with the capability of connecting local indigenous traditions sustains this collective action 
dilemma (Fraser, 2009: 12-14).
One crucial factor, in this context, is the external funding that plays a critical role in 
state-society relations in developing countries, and is occasionally a source of tension 
and struggle among NGOs for accessing economic privileges and recognition (Ozlem and 
Icduygu, 2012). Funding regimes often exercise influence and might even seek to govern 
local NGOs directly. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the essence of transformative 
agency emanates from nationally-mobilised movements and organisations, or whether it 
is from the link with and supervision from TNGOs. In most circumstances, for developing 
countries like Egypt, the distinction between national and international boundaries ap-
pears blurred, as both the state and civil society depend on external support, eventually 
undermining national sovereignty (El-Ghonemy, 2004).
In this complex environment of interdependence with multiple competing actors, TNGOs 
seem better-positioned to deal with challenges. Their ability to link and influence both 
the diverse transnational social groups and different states confirms the centrality of 
such organisations. Similarly, local NGOs often navigate between transnational ideologi-
cal demands and state hegemony. While counterhegemonic NGOs risk exclusion and un-
derfunding, cultural, religious and women’s NGOs could become targets for ideological 
exploitation (Challand, 2011). Such tendencies raise doubts with respect to TNGOs’ ob-
jectivity in relation to the mobilisation and empowerment of locally-rooted cosmopoli-
tans confronting an antagonistic national regime.
TNGOs, through “rooted cosmopolitans”, activists and “connective structures”, influ-
enced the struggle to oust Mubarak. They sympathised with and valorised the protests, 
innovating expressional space in Tahrir and other squares (Newby, 2012). NGOs origi-
nally started their work with humanitarian and advocacy activities partially-funded and 
encouraged by neoliberal tendencies. The IMF-sanctioned liberalism disrupted the so-
cio-economic pattern, as structural adjustment programmes severed basic food subsidies 
for the poor (Salevurakis and Abdel-Haleim, 2008). Furthermore, the creation of a trans-
national frame and space attracted rooted cosmopolitans from both the West and East 
together. Initially, the Egyptian state tolerated such global protest mobilisations taking 
place in Tahrir Square, mainly because it dealt with the Palestinian Intifada and the Iraqi 
Wars. This window of opportunity mobilised Egyptians nationally and transnationally, 
and gradually generated more or less formalised popular activism connected to different 
parts of the world. When the right moment came with the Egyptian uprising, civic groups 
exploited the relationships with diverse national and transnational movements and or-
ganisations from which Egyptians received support. The affiliations with external foreign 
actors, though seemingly beneficial in certain aspects, divide Egyptian NGOs, fragment 
society and confirm the existence of postcolonial dependence (Elyachar, 2002). Hence-
forth, TNGOs might avoid directly promoting public mobilisation and prefer instead to 
pursue networking, opportunities for valorisation, and creating platforms for exchanging 
and transmitting ideas of “the good life”. One of the major problems confronting TNGOs 
in contributing to lasting political transformation is the lack of the so-called indigenous 
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connection to communities at the local level. So far, the scattered Diaspora communities 
have the capacity to deliver some sort of simultaneous transnational links to host and 
homeland environments. In addition, global movements for justice promote targeted pro-
jects on issues such as democratisation, human rights and gender. Undoubtedly, transna-
tional NGOs provide alternative platforms for oppressed civil society. With transnational 
networks, global deliberations and civic engagements emerge from the existing connec-
tion on local, national and transnational levels.
In Egypt, the case of the Academy for Change shows that Diaspora originated TNGOs have 
empowered the mobilisation and education of Egyptian youth during the uprising8. Un-
like conventional TNGOs, Diaspora-rooted organisations build upon indigenous connec-
tions that facilitate the flow of transnational resources to concrete local entrepreneurship 
developments. In contrast, the activities of, for instance, the Carter Center, Human Rights 
Watch, and other TNGOs, show the continuing struggle to reduce the gap between com-
peting mobilisation and organisational tendencies.
Transnational networking emanates from diversified sources. Egypt has been the tar-
get of EU liberalisation and democratisation policies oriented towards the region. Such 
policies fostered both favourable and oppositional social mobilisation platforms. For in-
stance, Western countries funded transnational projects which facilitated transnational 
civic negotiations and empowerment. In addition, there are opposition groups, often ex-
iled from their countries by authoritarian regimes, linking in Western countries, and from 
which Diaspora activists and organisations mobilise resources (Yom, 2005). Transnation-
al community movements, i.e. Diaspora constituents, link to transnational NGOs at the 
beginning to contribute to humanitarian tasks, but gradually pursue greater political and 
social institutionalisation. The liberal public space in more-democratic countries provides 
Diaspora communities with opportunities to mobilise and engage.
 
Removing an Authoritarian but not Authoritarianism
The January 2011 uprising removed an authoritarian ruler, but the current situation attests 
to the failure of the upheaval in dismantling dictatorship. Though not the major cause, TN-
GOs’, as well as their home countries’, calm reactions to the military partially contributed to 
this outcome. TNGOs no longer unambiguously side with civic mobilisation against the con-
tinuing military consolidation. In accordance with policy positions taken by home states, 
TNGOs call for national dialogue, restraint, and better management from military rulers:
For the first time in the history of the world, a coup is not a 
coup. The army take over, depose and imprison the democrat-
ically-elected president, suspend the constitution, arrest the 
usual suspects, close down television stations, and amass their 
armour in the streets of the capital. But the word “coup” does 
not – and cannot – cross the lips of the Blessed Barack Obama9.
8  See more at: http://wagingnonviolence.org/2011/04/the-role-of-the-academy-of-change-in-egyptsu-
prising/
9  Robert Fisk at: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/when-is-a-military-coup-not-amili-
tary-coup-when-it-happens-in-egypt-apparently-8688000.html
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It was not just TNGOs and their sponsoring states, but Egyptian intellectuals also refrained 
from opposing the coup. A prominent Egyptian leftist scholar contended the following:
The fall of Morsi and of the rule of Muslim Brotherhood came 
as expected. Firstly, the government of the Muslim Brothers has 
been pursuing the same neoliberal policies as that of Mubarak, 
and even worse. It could not solve any of the problems faced by 
the Egyptian people. Secondly, Morsi was elected as a result of a 
gigantic fraud … Millions were given to people to buy their votes. 
The Muslim Brotherhood were mobilised to control the polling 
stations, which made it impossible for the others to vote, to such 
an extent that the Egyptian judges who normally oversee the 
election were disgusted and withdrew their support for the elec-
tion process. Despite that, the US Embassy and Europe declared 
the election was perfect. This is how Morsi was elected.10
Amin expresses a valid critique that both the military and the religious organisations em-
brace a neoliberal orientation in their economic priorities. Together, they manage a large 
portion of the Egyptian economy. Many Egyptians work for and get so-called “welfare” 
services from them. The almost never-ending conflict between the two powerful organi-
sations (one supposedly secular, the other religious) might lead to the collapse of order. 
It happened in Somalia, and it is currently generating the semi-collapse of Syria – and it 
might possibly lead to some sort of ongoing disorder and disenchantment in Egypt. Both 
organisations benefit from powerful transnational networks. On the other hand, Africans 
have, this time, chosen the civilian side. African leaders suspended Egypt’s membership 
in the AU, while some countries on the continent severed diplomatic relations with Cairo. 
Historically, the continent has had considerable experience of military coups.
With the January uprising of 2011, TNGOs expected a more open and Western-oriented 
democratic Egypt. Instead, better-organised Islamic groups won the elections and the 
subsequent referendum. Responses from several TNGOs indicated their disappointment 
with developments in Egypt. TNGOs criticised the process of constitutional reform, par-
ticularly on gender issues, and also the pressure on foreign NGOs operating in Egypt. 
TNGOs failed to take a tougher stand against the Egyptian coup for two main reasons. 
The first relates to “rooted cosmopolitans” that operate through transnational “connec-
tive” structures with contentious power and political national institutions that constrain 
TNGOs. According to this perspective, in “contentious politics” TNGOs might choose coop-
eration rather than confrontation with governments. In addition, some Western govern-
ments have little sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood taking power in Egypt. Islamists 
leading powerful countries like Egypt and Turkey might transform the region in favour of 
implementing alternative socio-political structures. It is possible that conflicting signals 
sent by Western governments and TNGOs after Morsi took power might have convinced 
the military to reclaim power. Secondly, the international impetus for the “Arab spring” 
no longer exists. With the absence of a global civic movement, TNGOs prefer to concen-
trate on institutional organisational conditions.
10  Samir Amin at: “http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?article1817”
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Conclusion
The case of Egypt following the January 2011 uprising and the subsequent July 2013 
coup shows that TNGOs actively contribute to the development of, and political transfor-
mation in, developing countries. Their contribution depends on the prevailing power re-
lations and dynamics of the local, national and transnational circumstances. TNGOs seek 
to balance the mobilisation dimension, which is often popular and civic-oriented, with 
the organisational aspects necessary for organisations to operate in politically-conten-
tious institutional environments. Responses from TNGOs such as Human Rights Watch 
and the Carter Center to the Egyptian January 2011 uprising and the military coup in July 
2013, confirm this pattern. The Egyptian conflict remains unresolved, and continues to 
dominate debates in international politics. Furthermore, the case illustrates the failure of 
postcolonial politics and decades-long authoritarianism sustained by geopolitically-moti-
vated external interventions. Consequently, the Egyptian people fragmented into diverse 
political and social groups linked to complex transnational constituents. For instance, the 
two most powerful groups, the military complex and the Muslim Brotherhood, both retain 
international networks. Power and substantial political struggle in Egypt revolves around 
these two powerful contenders and their formal and informal national and international 
networks. The military remains the main industrial producer and property owner in the 
country. This economic platform links the army to the global economy. General Abdala-
ziz Sisi, the top military figure, currently gets funds from Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates, which consolidates his position and a process of constitutional reform 
favouring military consolidation. General Sisi is now the elected president of post-coup 
Egypt. The election process has been mainly biased and unfair for opposition groups, as 
procedures seemed more of the crowning of an individual, rather than an equal contesta-
tion. With this new military head of a military regime expected to rule the country under 
harsh authoritarianism, Egypt’s future remains uncertain, unless some sort of bottom-up 
movement remerges.
For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood, as a religious organisation – though banned within 
the country – continuously interacts with transnational devotional networks in almost 
every country in the world. Thus, their persecution and prohibition in Egypt is unlikely to 
succeed in the long term, as the organisation has transnational offices and a member-
ship that will persist in challenging the military regime. In between the two competing 
heavyweights, the Egyptian people suffer. Increasingly, some new movements calling for 
consensus for the sake of Egypt are trying to emerge in the country. Activists established 
multi-religious and multi-ideological networks seeking to overcome the entrenched mili-
tary-Brotherhood dilemma by concentrating on non-ideological solutions, rather than the 
usual confrontation11. These new movements have the potential to help Egypt overcome 
the stalemate.
Therefore, despite the presence of authoritarianism in Egypt, the civic call and mobilisa-
tion for eish, karama and huriyah (bread, dignity and freedom) continues to send a res-
11  See more in “Coup or Revolution”, Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series,
 50/ I: 7, page I, August 2013.
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onating message. The reason is that the overwhelming majority of Egyptians are young 
people, many of whom are connected to the world and exposed to the lifestyles in more 
prosperous parts of the world. Besides, the funding from richer countries currently par-
tially-ensuring military superiority in the country might not persist.
At the moment, TNGOs seem reluctant to fully oppose Egyptian authoritarianism. There-
fore, it is difficult to conclusively categorise these organisations as either transnational 
network activists – rooted cosmopolitans that depend on political opportunities – or as 
transnational cultural platforms for hegemonic states.
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Rethinking Transnational NGOs in African Development   
 
 
Paul Opoku-Mensah
 
Introduction 
The publication in 1987 by World Development of a special issue titled, “Development 
Alternatives: The Challenge for NGOs [Nongovernmental Organisations]”, brought to the 
fore actors that, hitherto, were marginal to both research and development practice. In 
addition, the issue also served to launch a veritable research industry on development 
NGOs that continues until today. But, even more important than introducing a new set of 
actors to research, was the fact that the issue, which has since become the locus classicus 
of the  development NGO literature, introduced  a normative framework within which the 
roles of NGOs was to be understood and promoted.   Specifically, these were new actors 
whose roles were to change the nature of development itself by implementing new con-
ceptions of development. In this conception, NGOs were to provide alternatives to the 
dominant development model. For instance, writing during the very the early days of NGO 
growth, Robert Chambers argued:
Against the gloom and frenetic rise and fall of fashions can be 
set one steady trend which augurs well in the long term: the 
gradual emergence of a new set of ideas about the theory and 
practice of development ... NGOs are well placed to develop and 
implement the new paradigm (Chambers, 1986).
Similar sentiments are expressed by the authors of one of the early comparative studies 
on development NGOs:
NGOs inspire the thinking behind a theoretical reformulation of 
development and become the vehicles through whose actions 
that possibility might be made real (Farrington et al, 1993). 
This attention to NGOs at the research level was also reflected at the policy level, where 
NGOs became the favoured channel of official development aid.   Concretely, since the 
1980s in particular, NGOs have become an important channel for development assistance 
across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, 
including the Nordic countries. For instance, in the US, a New Partnership Initiative by the 
Clinton Administration was introduced, which aimed to channel at least forty per cent of 
all USAID support through NGOs. Coming to Scandinavia, the case of Norway exemplifies 
this trend, with   total assistance channelled through NGOs in 2000 amounting to close 
to three billion Norwegian Crowns (NOK), or almost fifty per cent of all bilateral aid. In 
1999, the amount was close to 2.6 billion NOK. This is an increase of almost 200 million 
Chapter 6
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NOK compared with 1998. In 2002, the amount channelled through NGOs was close to 
three billion NOK. The Norwegian situation partly reflects global trends, where in 1994, 
over ten per cent of public development aid (eight billion USD) was channelled through 
NGOs, surpassing the volume of the combined United Nations system (six billion USD). 
This increased attraction to NGOs contributed to massive growth of development NGOs 
all over, Denmark, included. The Norwegian situation was symptomatic of the general 
situation in most OECD countries. That is, an NGO channel in aid that, as I will be arguing 
later, came to be known as the Donor-State-NGO (DOSTANGO), and was established with 
implications for development.  The establishment of this system, and the resources chan-
nelled through it, partly provided the impetus for the massive growth and proliferation 
of development NGOs that took place in the OECD countries.   
Overall, this growth of the NGO channel in development was premised on the grounds 
that NGO activities were able to bypass the bureaucratic and corrupt state agencies in 
developing countries, thus ensuring that  development reached the poorest and most 
marginalised. Additionally, their activities were said to contribute to strengthening “civil 
society”, essential to the consolidation of democracy in developing countries.  Partly as 
a result of this policy shift in the OECD countries, transnational NGOs established a pow-
erful presence on the institutional landscape of many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, and became central actors in the debates, policies, and programmes related to 
the development and democratisation of these countries. While this normative expecta-
tion found expression worldwide, its impact was particularly felt in African development. 
Here, and beginning from the late 1980s, transnational development NGOs became major 
development actors because of normative expectations of their emancipatory potential 
to transform the nature of African development and democratisation. 
Almost thirty years after this massive engagement of transnational development NGOs 
in African development, what is the result?  Put differently, to what extent have transna-
tional development NGO activities contributed to the objectives of development in Afri-
ca? In other words, have NGOs restructured African development in terms of contribution 
to the emergence and implementation of alternative conceptions of development?  This 
is the focus of this chapter, which seeks to examine the evidence vis-à-vis their hypothe-
sised roles in African development. To do so, the chapter is structured as follows: the next 
section looks at internal factors within Africa that led to the proliferation of NGOs. This 
is followed by an examination of the extent to which NGOs have actually restructured 
development, using mostly the case of Ghana, albeit with examples from other places. 
The section which follows examines the extent to which the activities of NGOs have trans-
formed the nature of development in line with the expectations of the theoretical and 
policy literature.  In other words, have they changed the dominant conceptions of devel-
opment and aided the development of a viable civil society space and actors in Africa? 
The concluding section ties the thread together and examines the implications for the 
future of NGO roles in Africa. 
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Transnational NGOs and the Roots of Engagement 
Writing two decades ago, at the height of the “NGO Decade” in African development, Eve 
Sandberg argued that, from relative obscurity, NGOs had become a “significant force”, 
not just a “category,” in African politics. The result, she stressed, is that one could no 
longer pretend to understand African politics, especially development politics, without a 
critical understanding of the relations among NGOs and African states (Sandberg, 1994: 
3). Like other authors, Eve Sandberg was reacting to the dramatic increase in the activi-
ties of development NGOs per se, as well as a redefinition of power in development that 
their roles were engendering in Africa. In effect, Sandberg and other actors were referring 
to an “NGO-isation” of African society that was taking place.  That is, while NGOs had al-
ways been a part of Africa’s institutional landscape, this phenomenal growth was a new 
development, and was unprecedented.  The (domestic) context for this NGO-isation of 
African development were two domestic processes – economic and political liberalisation 
adopted by African countries in response to economic and political crisis.  
Economic Liberalisation and NGOs in African Development
The initial impetus for the growing academic and policy interest in NGOs was an economic 
crisis that affected African countries between the 1970s and 1980s, and the resultant 
attempts at addressing it. The economic crisis of African countries of the 1980s has been 
widely discussed and documented (World Bank, 1989). At base, this crisis involved a 
massive debt burden, balance of payments problems, political instability, and the preva-
lence of poverty in the midst of autocratic and corrupt regimes.  Three issues arising out 
of the crisis provide the context for NGO roles. These were i) the perceived “retreat” or 
“withdrawal” of the state from development, ii) the presumed comparative advantages 
of NGOs to contribute to addressing the crisis, and finally, iii) the “emergence” of a new 
global development orthodoxy highlighting the role of NGOs.  First, as the crisis led to 
a “withdrawal” of the state in development, local communities responded by forming 
voluntary organisations.  At the same time, there was a massive inflow of transnational 
NGOs to the continent to respond to this development crisis (Bratton, 1989).  The sec-
ond relates to policies adopted to address the crisis, which also focused attention on the 
roles of NGOs. The overall policy response in African countries to this crisis consisted of 
the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). These neoliberal inspired 
programs, introduced under the auspices of the World Bank and the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) involved  massive reductions of the role of the state, and a corresponding 
emphasis on private sector actors in development. In its prototype, the SAPs enjoined 
African governments to pursue liberal economic policies (e.g. the liberalisation of foreign 
trade, currency devaluations, cutbacks in social expenditure, removals of food and agri-
cultural subsidies, tight controls of money supplies, reductions in public employment, and 
privatisations of state-owned enterprises). At the core of structural adjustment, there-
fore, was disillusionment with the efficiency of state intervention.  The implementation 
of SAPs, therefore, specifically emphasised the size and inefficiency of the public sector as 
the main cause of Africa’s lack of economic growth. The goal, therefore, was to institute 
policy changes that would  reduce the state’s role and revitalise institutional actors in the 
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private sector to fill the gaps resulting from the state’s withdrawal (Gibbon and Olukoshi, 
1996). 
The SAPs influenced the evolution of NGOs in Africa at two levels: first the World Bank, 
along with other multilateral and bilateral donors, supported an expanded role for NGOs 
because they were interested, ideologically, in the promotion of initiatives to circumvent 
the pervasive public sector. This is because the public sector was regarded as corrupt, 
over-bloated and inefficient, and indeed the cause of Africa’s dismal development per-
formance. Therefore, a consensus emerged: to look for alternative actors in promoting 
Africa’s development. The private sector, including NGOs, was identified as such an actor 
as, in contrast to the public sector, it was regarded as more flexible and efficient (World 
Bank, 1989).  NGOs were particularly targeted by the market-oriented economies whose 
agenda was the simultaneous expansion of the role of the private sector and a curtailing 
of state involvement in social and economic activities (Kanyinga, 1993). Second, in the 
implementation of the social aspects of the programme, NGOs were targeted because of 
what was perceived as their “comparative advantages” over the state and the multilat-
eral agencies. Specifically, the perception was that NGOs had vast practical experience in 
mitigating local development problems: utilising cost-effective, innovative and flexible 
methods of development operations; understanding and incorporating local institutions 
and values; and targeting the poor and marginalised in their operations. As Bratton ar-
gues: 
Recent performance suggests that non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) have a comparative advantage over international 
donor agencies, national governments and private firms when 
addressing the basic needs of the rural poor … Operating with 
minimal resources on micro-projects in neglected regions, NGOs 
promise to strengthen rural people’s abilities to improve their own 
lives (Bratton, 1989: 569. See also  Drabek 1987; UNDP, 1993).  
This conception of the roles of NGOs was decisive in legitimising and funding their in-
creased involvement in development programs in the 1980s and early 1990s. This is 
particularly evident at the level of implementing programmes which addressed the so-
cial costs of the adjustment process. In the face of sustained, and, in some instances, 
violent criticisms of the social effects of the adjustment regime, the SAPs were modi-
fied after 1987-88 to include “social safety nets” or “Social Dimensions” programmes. 
These activities, mostly project-based and funded by external donors, involve various 
compensatory initiatives directed at benefiting the poor. In implementing these projects, 
NGOs, because of their comparative advantages, were considered to be implementers par 
excellence by donors. Consequently, the funds for these compensatory initiatives were 
channelled through NGOs. As of 1996, the World Bank, for instance, had financed some 
thirty major social funds, mainly in Latin America and Africa, amounting to more than 
one billion US dollars, with a considerable part of that amount being channelled to NGOs. 
In the 1995 fiscal year, for instance, NGOs played an implementation role in 78 percent 
of Social Fund projects approved the World Bank (World Bank 1996a). In justifying its 
reliance on NGOs, it says: 
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Experience has shown the importance of ensuring NGO partici-
pation in the design as well as the administration of Social Funds 
– particularly to help guard against the funds being distorted 
toward political objectives. Furthermore, involvement of bene-
ficiaries ... is vital to long-term sustainability, and often NGOs ... 
are well positioned to support local participation in community 
development (World Bank 1996a). 
Beyond financial resources, the process of developing these social programs represented 
the first time that African governments were relating to NGOs as autonomous institu-
tional actors in development policy discussions (Laryea, 1994). These African-specific 
policies coincided with developments in the international political economy, characterised 
by the dominance of a global development ideology with preference for the use of private 
non-state actors. With the opportunities created by these developments, NGOs were set 
up with the aim of sharing in the flow of international donor funding that had become 
available, thus tremendously increasing the number of NGOs on the continent. In effect, 
the development crisis, and its response in Africa, as well as the ideological dominance of 
neoliberalism, provided the initial context for the role of NGOs in Africa’s political econo-
my. 
 
Political Liberalisation – Good Governance – and NGOs in African Development
The context and justification for transnational NGO roles in Africa shifted in the 1990s in 
ways that reinforced, and in many respects strengthened, the continuous role of NGOs in 
African development. Specifically, the 1990s marked the third wave of democratisation 
that blew across the world, Africa included. In the African context, this period witnessed 
historically-unparalleled transitions from autocratic to democratic forms of governance, 
with implications for NGOs. Whereas before 1989, only nine sub-Saharan African coun-
tries held competitive multiparty elections, by the end of 2000, sub-Saharan Africa wit-
nessed seventy presidential elections (spread across most of the region’s forty-eight 
countries) involving more than one candidate. Over the same period, legislative elections 
involving at least two parties were held at least once in forth-two countries. By the late 
1990s, national legislatures in thirty-nine of the forthy-eight sub-Saharan countries con-
tained representatives from at least two political parties. Only Congo-Kinshasa, Eritrea, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, and Uganda resisted this trend towards the hosting of mul-
tiparty elections.
This development had profound implications for NGOs’ roles in African development in at 
least three ways. First, the democratic environment provided conditions in which NGOs 
and other civil society organisations could emerge.  In other words, political liberalisation 
in Africa opened up more civic space for the formation of autonomous organisations in 
countries where previously it was impossible to do so (Gyimah-Boadi, 1997).  Second, the 
development of this civic space and the organisations therein became a critical source of 
legitimation and continued support for NGO roles on the continent.  The argument was 
that the consolidation of democracy on the continent, as elsewhere, was critically de-
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pendent on an active, well-resourced civil society able to engage, and limit, the autocratic 
reach of the state. Buoyed by civil society’s role in the transition, expectations were that 
civil society would play an active role in the consolidation of democracy on the continent 
(Gyimah-Boadi, 1997; Habib and Opoku-Mensah, 2003). This then became a central ele-
ment in legitimising a continuous role for NGOs in Africa in the 1990s and beyond. 
The third, and by far the most profound, effect of the wave of democratisation was the 
reformulation that occurred at the level of development theory and policy. The theoreti-
cal discussions on civil society and its roles in democratisation entered the development 
discourse in the 1990s. In its (re)incarnation within development discourse, it took the 
form of a “good governance agenda” (Lewis, 2002; World Bank, 1989; 1992; Abraham-
sen, 2000), also referred to as the new policy agenda (Edwards and Hulme, 1997; or new 
development paradigm (Tvedt, 1998). In general, however, “good governance” has been 
the dominant term in usage promoted first by the World Bank, but subsequently appro-
priated by other multilateral and bilateral development agencies.  The good governance 
discourse represented the (re)discovery of politics and its relevance to development, and 
was thus a major departure from the neoliberal development orthodoxy of the 1980s, 
which largely ignored the political sphere.  The agenda was a recognition that merely 
“rolling back the frontiers of the state” was not enough to promote development, and 
that closer attention had to be paid to politics. The agenda thus inserted democracy into 
the development discourse, and in the process, reversed years of development orthodoxy 
on the role of democracy in development, and the link between the two. Early develop-
ment theorising alternated between views that democracy would be the ultimate result 
of development, to ideas that development and democracy were incompatible. This re-
versal was absolute, as democracy became the unifying theme of development discourse, 
an absolute necessity for a successful development process, and its main source of public 
legitimacy in donor countries (Abrahamsen, 2000; Tvedt, 1998).
As a policy prescription, it introduced some far-reaching changes with implications for 
NGO roles on the continent. Africa’s development crisis and its solution, diagnosed in the 
early 1980s as one of economic mismanagement, were reformulated to include the level 
of politics.  The crisis therefore was also one of (good) governance. While this was a ma-
jor departure from the 1980s, the crucial role of NGOs was, however, still a central part 
in the reformulation. Indeed, the ultimate aim of the good governance agenda was the 
liberation of civil society which, it was argued, had been weakened by the authoritarian 
governments of previous years (Abrahamsen, 2000). In this conceptualisation, attention 
was still focused on development NGOs. This time, however, their engagement was not 
to be limited to development. To the contrary, both development and democracy were 
dependent on building a strong “civil society” with strong organisations, represented by 
development NGOs. As Alan Fowler explains: 
The dominant western concept of socio-economic development 
based on liberalism and market forces maintains that NGOs 
must be supported because of their political role within civil so-
ciety. It is envisaged that people must be empowered to take 
over some aspects of development from the overbearing, auto-
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cratic, inefficient and corrupt states that have commonly ruled 
in Africa. NGOs must also provide countervailing power to gov-
ernment expansionism; strengthen people’s ability to hold pub-
lic servants and politicians accountable for their actions; and, 
foster democratic change by expanding social pluralism (cited 
in Allen, 1997: 336).
The policy imperative, therefore, is to strengthen the position of NGOs vis-à-vis African 
governments. The expectation, therefore, is that, as NGOs are strengthened by channel-
ling funds through them and by increasing their control over development programs, so 
too would civil society be as a whole (Farrington et al 1993; 1996; Allen, 1997). This was 
a departure from the conceptualisation of the 1980s, where the role of NGOs was to re-
place the state in development, to ensure that development reached those who needed 
it most. 
This, in sum, provides the context for the discussion of NGOs and their roles in African de-
velopment. It is a context that builds on normative expectations for NGOs to restructure 
the nature of development in ways that break the dominance of the state in development 
and governance. It is informed by, and feeds on the NGO channel in aid that was estab-
lished by the OECD countries, and which influenced the growth of transnational NGOs in 
African development.
 
Transnational NGOs and the restructuring of African Development 
The culmination of the external policy context – the reformulation of development think-
ing and the OECD donor interest in NGOs – as well as the internal domestic dynamics in 
African countries, largely account for the roles that NGOs came to play in African devel-
opment. In large part, their activities were therefore legitimised at two levels:  first they 
were to restructure development; and second, they were to build civil society. What has 
the result of the nearly thirty years of their involvement in African development been? 
Have they [NGOs] been able to influence African development along the lines conceptu-
alised above? In other words, have they transformed the nature of African development, 
as well as empowered civil society in Africa? 
In answering these questions, it needs to be stressed that first, by their very presence on 
Africa’s institutional landscape, they have helped to change the institutional dynamics 
in African development.  In a number of African countries, transnational NGOs such as 
World Vision; Oxfam, IBIS, the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), 
Plan; and the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) have become household names and are en-
gaged in crosscutting relations with a diverse set of actors, and contribute strongly to the 
discourse and practice of African development.  Through their activities and resources, 
they contribute to the practice of development, particularly in rural areas. For instance, 
the city of Tamale, the capital of Northern Ghana where the field headquarters of the or-
ganisation I direct is located, is referred to as the “NGO capital” of Ghana because of the 
large presence of NGOs in the city and region. Beyond the development activities per se 
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is the level of employment that transnational NGOs provide in the country.   From organ-
isation like IBIS, World Vision, CARE, Plan, CRS, and Techno-serve, Conservation Interna-
tional, Compassion International, Oxfam, Action Aid, Christian Aid and so on, NGOs have a 
ubiquitous presence on the developmental landscape, even in the midst of reduced roles 
in official development assistance.  Public action by, and in support of, disadvantaged 
people undertaken by NGOs (and a range of other nongovernmental actors) is therefore 
an increasingly-important aspect of social and economic change at local and international 
levels (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah, 2007).
But, thirty years after their increased involvement in African development, an assess-
ment of their roles would have to engage the theoretical and policy debates that that 
heralded and supported their roles in African development. And this debate relates to the 
extent to which they have been able to rethink and develop alternatives to the dominant 
development practice, and the extent to which they have helped build civil society.  To 
answer the first part of the question, I examine their roles in development policy-making 
in Ghana, a domain with the possibility of changing development policy directions. This is 
because of normative expectations that it is, at the level of policy-making, that NGOs can 
actually influence the macro-level changes essential to address Africa’s developmental 
problems. It is in this context that Michael Bratton, for instance, argues that “NGO contri-
butions will be piecemeal and short-lived unless NGOs themselves develop the capacity to 
form and influence the public policy environment” (Bratton, 1994: 57); and Yash Tandon 
maintains that, given Africa’s problems, NGOs in Africa remain “unthinking” so long as 
they are not involved in policy discussions (Tandon, 1996). Against this backdrop, how 
and to what effect NGOs influence development policies remains an issue of both theoret-
ical and policy importance, and is a crucial yardstick for measuring the overall impact of 
NGOs in African development. The next section therefore   examines the extent to which 
NGOs are redefining the nature of the continent’s development politics, and does so in the 
context of an analysis of NGO roles in development-policymaking in Ghana. The focus of 
the analysis is not on specific policies. Rather the focus is on the major development-pol-
icymaking processes in the country, and the extent to which NGOs – both as institutional 
actors as well as as individual organisations – influence these processes. 
 
NGOs and Development-Policymaking in Ghana: The Beginnings 
The initial impetus for NGO-involvement in development-policymaking in the country was 
the process of the SAPs initially adopted in 1983.  Specifically, as a result of international 
campaigning by NGOs towards the World Bank, an agreement was reached in 1995 by 
NGOs and the World Bank to undertake a joint investigation into the impact of the SAPs 
worldwide. Ghana was selected as one of eight countries in which such an investigation, 
referred to as the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI), would be 
implemented. The SAPRI review, formally launched in Ghana on November 25, 1996, and 
its implementation completed in 2001, began a process that has profoundly affected the 
nature of development-policymaking in the country.  Specifically, it initiated a process of 
breaking the (historical) monopoly of the state in development policy, and legitimised 
and institutionalised the inclusion of civil society organisations, including NGOs, in the 
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process.  This occurred at two levels. First, although SAPRI was a tripartite process involv-
ing the World Bank, the government and NGOs, the coordination of the process at all lev-
els: global, regional, and national, was given to NGOs. At the global level, the process was 
coordinated by an NGO, the Development Group for Alternative Policies (Development 
GAP) in Washington D.C. (www.developmentgap.org), while the Africa regional office of 
the Third World Network (www.twn.org) was appointed the lead organisation for Africa.
Institutionally, however, the SAPRI process in the country was managed by the Civil So-
ciety Coordinating Council (CIVISOC), an elected body representing about forty NGOs in 
Ghana, which coordinated the review process on behalf of NGO and other civil society or-
ganisations. An important body was an eight-member CIVISOC management committee, 
which was responsible for management decisions and the provision of general direction 
to CIVISOC, in both the administrative and technical sense (Britwum et al., 2001). This 
process of assigning responsibility for SAPRI to NGOs had the effect of instantly confer-
ring visibility and credibility to these organisations that had, historically, been peripheral 
to development policy processes (ibid). For instance, it allowed for high-level interaction 
between NGOs and government through, among others, the setting up of committees 
made up of representatives of NGOs, the Ghanaian government, and the World Bank. The 
first of such committees established by SAPRI, a twelve-member information team, had 
half of its membership made up of NGOs and the other half from the Ghanaian govern-
ment and the World Bank. This SAPRI team had access to and reviewed confidential World 
Bank documents related to the structural adjustment programme in Ghana.  CIVISOC also 
embarked on a series of development policy literacy programs to improve the low level 
of knowledge of economic policy issues by NGOs. The first of these CIVISOC educational 
activities on economic policy issues was a workshop on the International Financial Institu-
tions (IFIs) held in February 1999. This meeting was designed to increase the knowledge 
of NGO participants about the enormous power and controversial roles of the IFIs over 
development policy in Ghana and the developing world at large (Britwum, et al, 2001).
Second, in addition to a review of the impact of the SAPs, a major objective of the SA-
PRI was to determine how NGOs and civil society organisations could participate in and 
improve development-policymaking (ibid). Consequently, the World Bank, through its in-
fluence in the country, began a process that has led to the gradual institutionalisation of 
NGOs and civil society participation in development-policymaking.  First, as a product of 
the SAPRI process, a biennial National Economic Forum that brings together all the major 
institutional actors in the country: donors, the government, the private business sector 
and NGOs, to discuss the country’s development direction has been established. In addi-
tion, a number of developments have further consolidated this. For instance, and in what 
was a major recognition of the SAPRI process, the World Bank Country Director asked 
for CIVISOC-input into the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Ghana for 
the 2000-2003 period. In response, CIVISOC organised a series of national and region-
al workshops at which NGOs could express their views on the CAS. Similarly, on April 4 
2000, a workshop was organised on The Work of the Finance Committee of Parliament 
for CIVISOC. The aim was to strengthen the relationship between NGOs and the economic 
committees of parliament, and to teach NGOs ways of influencing the work of parliament 
and its committees. A final symbolic recognition of the new role of NGOs as major devel-
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opment actors occurred during the December 2000 Presidential Elections, when Ghana 
recorded its first democratic transfer of power from one elected government to another. 
The transition team of the new government invited CIVISOC to participate in the work of 
four subcommittees appointed to work on various aspects of the economy. A meeting 
was organised on the 17th of January 2001, between a nine-member civil society dele-
gation and the transitional team. This meeting is symbolic, as it represents a final step 
in the consolidation of the position of NGOs as major development actors in the country 
(Britwum, 2001).
In effect, SAPRI began a process that is breaking the monopoly of the government in 
development-policymaking, turning it into a more-inclusive, participatory process of de-
cision–making. The SAPRI process initiated activities which have had far-reaching im-
plications for the nature of development politics in the country. Indeed, some of these 
activities have achieved a momentum of their own and, in the process, are leading to a 
tradition of participatory decision-making, involving state and non-state actors in the 
country. However, the most far-reaching effect of the impact of the SAPRI process on 
development-policymaking remains the establishment of biennial National Development 
Forums, three of which have been organised so far in the country.
The National Development Forums in particular provide an indication of the extent of 
these changes. They bring together representatives from the government, the World 
Bank, NGOs and the private business sector to discuss development policy directions for 
the country. The First National Forum was a three-day event held under the aegis of 
Vision 2020 at the Accra International Conference Centre under the theme, “Structural 
Adjustment – The Issues and the Debate” with the Speaker of Parliament as the key-
note speaker. It was the first national consensus-building exercise for all stakeholders 
to discuss economic and development policy measures for growth under the Ghana-vi-
sion 2020. It was attended by the President, Vice-President, ministers and various other 
stakeholders, including NGOs, and was supported by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). The forum was intended to bring on to the discussion-table the im-
pact of Ghana’s structural adjustment on health, education, governance, agriculture, mi-
cro impacts of macroeconomic policies, and gender. The unique feature of the Forum was 
the opportunity given to the World Bank and Ghanaian government to respond to the is-
sues raised by civil society organisations, including NGOs. A total of 350 participants from 
the World Bank, Government of Ghana and Civil Society attended the meeting (Britwum, 
ibid). The second forum was held in March 2001, with the third in May 2003. The third 
dialogue, which just before the end of May 2003, was organised by the Ghana office of 
the World Bank, with the support of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and 
in collaboration with two NGOs: the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development and the 
Centre for Policy Analysis. 
Through these dialogues, a process of institutionalising a new architecture of develop-
ment-policymaking, involving the participation of state and non-state actors – including 
NGOs – is taking shape in the country. This new architecture reverses the monopoly of 
the state in development policy decisions, and formalises a role for NGOs and other civil 
society organisations in development-policymaking. Increasingly, there is evidence that 
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this has the potential to develop a national consensus for development, something that, 
so far, has eluded the country. Although the impetus is from the World Bank and the ex-
ternal donor system, there are expectations that the process will be sustained to become 
a permanent feature in the governance of the country. The indications, so far, indicate 
that this might be happening. Indeed, since the end of the SAPRI process in 2001, the 
forums have been transformed into annual National Economic Dialogues which are grad-
ually becoming the forum for discussing national policy directions.
An evaluation of the SAPRI and the other processes indicates a definite shift in the nature 
of development-policymaking in ways that are completely different from just a decade 
ago, where development-policymaking was the preserve of the state. Currently, develop-
ment-policymaking is becoming a consultative process, with NGOs and other civil society 
organisations becoming an institutionalised part of it. Increasingly, the utility of the pro-
cess is acknowledged by all the major institutional actors in the country: the government, 
opposition parties, the private sector and NGOs.  Overall, the evidence points to changes 
in the nature of development-policymaking in the country, in ways that allow participa-
tion by NGOs.   But is it an indication of a long-term and permanent realignment of power 
relations, enabling NGOs to restructure the nature and content of African development? 
In other words, do these changes allow NGOs to outline and implement alternative con-
ceptions of development?
The evidence so far indicates that, while NGOs have become actors in African develop-
ment, the structural relations of power have remained relatively intact. Consequently, 
questions have been raised about the extent to which one can talk of substantive chang-
es in the nature of development-policymaking in the country. For instance, an assess-
ment of the process of developing the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) shows 
that the process did not represent a decisive break with the past, as it left the power 
relations and old practices intact:
First, the transparency of the process has been compromised by the inaccessibility of 
key information held by the IMF and the World Bank. For example, the World Bank Let-
ter of Development Policy remains secret. The IMF’s staff review reports are released 
selectively. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries documents are also largely inaccessible, 
even to parliamentarians, let alone NGOs. Second, the credibility of the process has also 
been undermined by parallel commitments with the IMF (e.g. the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility) and the World Bank (Poverty Reduction Support Credit), which prede-
termine the conclusions of especially-key macroeconomic and structural-reform policies. 
Thirdly, major, contentious sectoral policies contained in the GPRS were hardly debated. 
They appear to either have been transported from past programme commitments (e.g. 
the privatisation of utility services, energy policies, land reforms, the sale of state-owned 
enterprises, and so on) or were picked from official addresses and passed on or strongly 
pushed by donors (ibid). 
In effect, while there are obvious changes in terms of the inclusion of more actors in pol-
icy discussions, these new actors hardly determine outcomes.  It is for this reason that 
Charles Abugre, a long-time observer on the NGO and civil society scene in Ghana, argues 
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that development policy preferences in the country are predetermined by external do-
nors, and therefore are outside the influence of civil society actors, including NGOs. This, 
de facto, ensures that NGOs – both transnational and national – can only react to policy 
prescriptions, rather than respond to policy choices.  An assessment of participation of 
different actors in the formulation of the National Renewable Natural Resources Strategy, 
for instance, indicates that, although NGOs and civil society organisations have become 
part of the development-policymaking community, they are secondary actors whose in-
put comes very late in the process. They do not participate in the initiation of policies. 
Rather, their participation is limited to strategy formulation and finalisation, at which 
stage they hardly have any room to change the contents of policies.
At the organisational level, capacity problems also work to preclude effective NGO par-
ticipation in development-policymaking. In principle, effective participation in policy pro-
cesses must rest on solid fiscal, cognitive and political legitimacy. Practically, this implies 
that NGOs have the requisite technical expertise and competence related to policies under 
discussion, the financial resources to participate, and finally the political legitimacy aris-
ing from their embeddedness in the domestic polity. At the institutional level,   Ghanaian 
NGOs lack all these. First, technical competence has been lacking, leading to a reliance 
on external consultants from transnational NGOs to represent them in policy discussions 
(MacKay and Gariba, 2000). Indeed, at the national level, only one NGO, the Integrated 
Social Development Centre, is repeatedly mentioned as having capacity of any sort to 
effectively engage in policy discussions. Those with the capacity have been the transna-
tional NGOs whose governments promoted their participation. This has led to concerns 
about the danger of crowding out African NGOs in the emerging policy spaces on the 
continent. With the relative thaw in state-civil society relations, and with it an opening up 
of policy spaces for NGOs and other civil society in most African countries, there are real 
concerns that these spaces are not occupied by African NGOs. Rather, because of a lack of 
capacity, they can be pushed out of these policy spaces by foreign NGOs. The example of 
development-policymaking in Ghana is also sometimes reflected at the continental level. 
The case of the African Commission for Human Rights (ACHR), with a progressive history 
of engaging civil society, is an example of this. The activities of African NGOs and civil 
society organisations are critical in ensuring national implementation of the rights en-
shrined in the Charter and enforcement of the recommendations of the Commission. Yet, 
access to and engagement with the Commission, as with other pan-African institutions, 
favours international NGOs because of their superior resources.
Second, without the support of external donors who have underwritten the participation 
of NGOs in national-level strategic policy frameworks, NGOs would have been prevented 
from participation due to a lack of financial resources. This is particularly reflected in 
the finances of the existing NGO networks that, as is discussed later in the next section, 
exist on the beneficence of external donors (ibid). The final challenge relates to a lack of 
political legitimacy by Ghanaian NGOs, as the evolution of NGOs into actors who relate to 
the state on issues of development policy has been achieved at the instance of donors, 
in particular the World Bank and the UNDP (Opoku-Mensah, 2004). In the case of SAP-
RI for instance, not only was the decision to involve NGOs taken outside Ghana by the 
World Bank, but indeed the selection of the particular NGOs to participate was made in 
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Washington D.C., without any involvement by Ghanaian NGO actors. The corollary is that 
the political legitimacy for NGO-involvement in development-policymaking is not derived 
domestically, but through donors. This in itself does not make the participation of NGOs 
illegitimate. However, it does raise questions of long-term viability, and continuous in-
volvement of NGOs in the policy process, should donor support cease.  
Additionally, and most importantly, not only are there indications that NGOs have not 
been able to change the content of African development politics, there is also growing 
concern that, through their participation in donor-sponsored processes like SAPRI and the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), they serve to create consensus and legitima-
cy for a depoliticised neoliberal, market-oriented conception of development and poverty 
reduction that, it is argued, has caused much of the recent growth in poverty and inequal-
ity in Africa. For instance, while the legitimacy of this system is premised on its ability to 
reduce poverty, it is also a corporatist system in which NGOs, through their inclusion in 
donor-sponsored processes like the PRSPs, are mobilised in support of a depoliticised ne-
oliberal conception of development and poverty reduction.  Indeed, in Ghana and a num-
ber of African countries that adopted SAPs, the effect of donor support for NGOs has been 
to ensure the incorporation and acquiescence of the constituency which initially opposed 
the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and the IMF.  In effect, donor-NGO 
relations contribute to poverty production through their perpetuation of the very same 
neoliberal, market-oriented policies and structures that, as is often argued, produce the 
same poverty they seek to address (Manji and O’Coill, 2002). 
Conclusion 
Since the 1980s, the “NGO Decade” in African development discourse, transnational 
NGOs have become major actors in African development, with the capacity and resources 
to match UN agencies, and, in some instances, dwarfing governmental ministries in Africa 
countries. Indeed, from  service delivery to advocacy,  transnational NGOs such as World 
Vision, Save the Children, Oxfam, Plan, and Action Aid have become household names, 
engaged in crosscutting development issues in a number of African countries.  Their role 
in African development is premised on normative expectations of their ability to serve as 
agents for social empowerment, transformation and justice. 
This chapter has sought to provide the context and rationale for this growth of NGOs in 
African development, and to assess and question this normative expectation of the trans-
formational roles of transnational NGOs. Specifically, the chapter argues that the role of 
transnational NGOs in African development presents a paradox. While they play critical 
developmental roles, their activities also undermine the long-term structural changes that 
are necessary for transformational development on the continent.   First, transnational 
NGOs, while rhetorically committed to transformational development, are, in reality, part 
of an international system referred to as the DOSTANGO system. This is a corporatist sys-
tem in which transnational NGOs are mobilised in support of a depoliticised conception of 
development that, it is often argued, produces the same underdevelopment that trans-
national NGOs seek to address.  Second, transnational NGOs which, through their superior 
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resources and capacity, crowd out national NGOs, undermining the urgent need to build a 
transnational NGO sphere that is embedded in African societies, are organically-linked to 
African organisations and respond to the specificities of pan-African development policy 
challenges. The case of development-policymaking in Ghana, as well as the ACHR, with a 
progressive history of engaging NGOs, is an example. While the activities of African NGOs 
are critical in ensuring national implementation of the rights enshrined in the Charter and 
the enforcement of the recommendations of the Commission, access to and engagement 
with the Commission, as with other pan-African institutions, nonetheless favours trans-
national NGOs because of their superior resources.
This has implications for understanding the future roles of NGOs in African develop-
ment.  A critical examination of these changes, however, does not support claims of a 
fundamental redefinition of development  in the country. This is because NGO roles are 
a process micromanaged by the aid system (cf.  Tvedt, 1998; 2002), and which leaves 
the structural relations of power intact. This has implications for assessing the impact 
of transnational NGOs in African development. Specifically, it questions the triumphalist 
claims (cf. Sandberg, 1994) of a permanent realignment of power relations in African de-
velopment that allows NGOs to influence the content of African development in profound 
ways. While NGOs have become integral parts of development-policymaking, they are 
secondary actors who do not participate in the initiation of development policies.  Rather, 
their participation and input comes very late in the process, and is limited to strategy 
formulation and finalisation, at which stage they hardly have any room to change the 
contents of policies.  
This does not make the role of NGOs illegitimate. It rather highlights the limitations with-
in which these roles are played and the existing disconnection between the normative 
theoretical discussions and practical reality of NGO roles.  The challenge for development 
NGO research therefore is a reformulation that addresses foundational questions related 
to the formative role and structural impact of the international aid system on NGOs and 
their roles; that is, to frame NGO roles in relation to the opportunities and constraints 
provided by the donor system. Such a reformulation moves the discussions from the nor-
mative strictures within which it is currently enmeshed, and enables analyses that pro-
vide understanding of the actual and potential role of NGOs to transform development 
processes in Africa, as elsewhere. Indeed, reframed thus, it can offer a new impetus and a 
programmatic platform to understand transnational NGOs and their roles in development 
processes, including in Africa.  
 
114
References 
Abrahamsen,  Ritta (2000) Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good 
Governance in Africa. London and New York: Zed Books.
Allen, Chris (1997) “Who Needs Civil Society?” Review of African Political Economy, 73 
(329-37).
Bratton, Michael (1989) “The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa”, World De-
velopment, 17(4):569-587.
Bratton, Michael (1994) Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa. Institute for Devel-
opment Research. Boston.   
Britwum, Akua, Kwesi Johan, and Ferdinand D.Tay (eds.) (2001) Structural Adjustment 
Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI): Ghana Country Report. 
Drabek, Gordon (1987) “Development Alternatives: the challenge of NGOs”, World Devel-
opment, 15 (supplement).
Farrington, John; Anthony, Bebbington with Kate Wellard, K. and David Lewis (1993) Re-
luctant Partners: Non-Governmental Organizations, the State and Sustainable Agri-
cultural Development.  London and New York: Routledge. 
Gibbon Peter and Olukoshi, Adebayo (ed.) (1996) Structural Adjustment and Socio-eco-
nomic Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nordic Research Report nr. 102. Uppsala-Swe-
den: Nordic Africa Institute.  
Gyimah, Boadi (1997) “Ghana’s Encouraging Elections: The Challenges Ahead,” Journal of 
Democracy, 8(2): 78-91
Habib, Adam & Paul Opoku-Mensah (2003) “Mobilizing across Africa: civil society and 
democratization”, in South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2002/03 (South 
Africa Institute for International Affairs, 2003), pp. 267-274. 
Hulme, David (1994) “Social development research and the third sector: NGOS as users 
and subjects of social inquiry” in David Booth (ed.) Rethinking Social Development: 
theory, research and practice. Harlow: Longman. 
Hulme, David and Michael, Edwards (1997) NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Com-
fort? International Political Economy series. Basingstoke: Palgrave in association with 
Save the Children.
Kanyinga, Karuti (1993) “NGOs in Kenya” in (ed.) Peter Gibbon, Social Change and Eco-
nomic Reform in Africa. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
115
Laryea, Nii (1994) “Challenges and Prospects of Community Management in Ghana 
UNPD/GWSC Rural Water  and Sanitation Project, Sri Lanka”  WEDC Publication
 Lewis, David (2002) “NGOs, Performance and Accountability: An Overview”, in Desai, 
Vandana and Potter, Robert (eds.) The Arnold Companion to Development Studies. 
London, UK: Arnold Publishers, pp. 519-522. 
Lewis, David and Paul, Mensah (2006) “Moving forward research agendas on internation-
al NGOs: theory, agency and context”, Journal of International Development, 18(5): 
665-675.
Manji, Firoze, and Carl, O’Coill (2002) “The missionary position: NGOs and development in 
Africa”, International Affairs, 78(3): 567-83. 
Mensah Paul, David Lewis  and Terje, Tvedt (2007) Reconceptualising NGOs and their 
roles in Development: NGOs, Civil Society and the International Aid System (eds.) Aal-
borg University Press.  
Mensah, Paul (2007) “Reconceptualising NGOs and their roles in Development: An Over-
view of the issues”, in Opoku-Mensah et al. (eds.) Reconceptualising NGOs and their 
roles in Development: NGOs, Civil Society and the International Aid System. Aalborg: 
Aalborg University Press.    
Michael, Sarah (2004) Undermining Development: The Absence of Power among Local 
NGOs in   Africa. Oxford: James Currey, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana Univer-
sity Press.  
Sandberg, Eva (1994) The changing politics of non-governmental organizations and Af-
rican states. Columbia University. Institute of African Studies. 
Tvedt, Terje (1998) Angels of Mercy or Development Diplomats? NGOs and Foreign Aid. 
Oxford: Africa World Press.
Tvedt, Terje (2002) “Development NGOs: actors in a global civil society or in a new inter-
national social system?” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
Organizations, 13(4), 363–375. 
116
Reflections on the ‘Development Encounter’: Transnational 
NGOs and a Development Project Reality in Kenya
 
 
Olivia Bryanne Zank 
     
For us, whatever development is, good or bad, success of failure, 
desirable or otherwise, it is first and foremost a social reality 
that has to be studied and carefully analysed (J.P. Olivier de Sar-
dan, 1988: 217).
 
Introduction 
Most development professionals would agree that the reality of a development project 
looks very different from the blueprint set out during the planning process. Explanations 
for this discrepancy are often project-specific, i.e. blaming the presence of corruption, last-
mile problems, inappropriate strategy or technology, the absence of good governance 
or implementing partner capacity or something completely different but project-specific 
nonetheless. Some, however, including authors such as Ferguson (1994), Mosse (2004) 
and Olivier de Sardan (2001) consider inconsistency between policy and practice as in-
herent to and inevitable in what they call the “developmentalist configuration”, i.e. the 
billion dollar industry of government agencies, private foundations, NGOs and other civil 
society organisations with the stated aim of improving the lives of the world’s deprived. 
Employing anthropological methods on the industry itself rather than its supposed bene-
ficiaries, these authors illuminate how and why various actors (“stakeholders” in industry 
jargon) with diverging and often opposing strategies, objectives and life-worlds trans-
form development projects during the process of implementation. Implied is that by de-
sign the stereotypical transnational NGO-led development project is unlikely to reach its 
stated targets and aims, regardless of other contextual issues such as corruption, the ap-
propriateness of the project’s technical solution and the implementing partner’s capacity. 
Using Ferguson, Mosse and Olivier de Sardan’s theoretical frameworks, the present pa-
per presents a case study of a transnational British-Kenyan employment generation and 
poverty reduction project. In this case study, other contextual and situational logics took 
precedence over the technical rationale of the project solution, resulting in an outcome 
that looked radically different from the one intended. This in turn had adverse effects 
on the achievement of the project’s two objectives, employment generation and pov-
erty reduction. It is not the intention of this paper to offer ‘how to’s’ and general policy 
recommendations. Rather the intention is to show how a specific project inevitably was 
distorted when encountering reality and that project planners do well in anticipating this; 
and no-where more so than when working transnationally as is the theme of this volume. 
Chapter 7
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At the present moment, the literature summarised below on the “development encoun-
ter” is non-normative in its analysis and explicitly avoids making generalised statements 
about the desirability of discrepancies between blueprint and reality. The present paper 
should therefore be seen as an extension of and a contribution to this theoretical work, 
analysing the outcome implications of said discrepancies in a specific case study setting. 
While the analysis of the present case study is carried out with a transnational develop-
ment project in mind, the bulk of it easily lends itself to a purely domestic development 
project context.
 The following section of the paper section deals with the literature and theoretical frame-
work, setting out the actor-oriented framework and the ethnographic approach used for 
examining project distortions and the “developmentalist configuration”. This is followed 
by the case study description and analysis. Finally, the paper concludes and reflects on 
the significance of the above theories for development practice. 
Theoretical Framework
The opening quote by Olivier de Sardan highlights the importance of non-normative anal-
ysis in  development studies. As a discipline, development studies is generally concerned 
with the normative exercise of ranking various states of human existence according to 
perceived universal judgements on their desirability; a ranking that in turn informs the 
operationalized branch of development studies, namely development interventions or 
projects. However, all interventions must invariably encounter the reality that they aim 
to transform and it is this “development encounter” that constitutes the stage of the 
present analysis; the interface between the ideal model and the messy reality, between 
notions of how things should be transformed and how they actually are transformed (or 
not transformed). Furthermore, it is the interface between the “developmentalist con-
figuration” and their beneficiaries, implying that inherent to the encounter is a meeting 
of cultures, knowledges and diverging interpretations of the same events as well as the 
physical meeting between the developers and developees. In the following, each aspect 
of the encounter is analysed to shed light on the various aspects of the encounter, central 
to which are the often underestimated differences between the different actors and the 
less-understood nature and functions of agents at the interface itself. 
The “Developmentalist Configuration”
The developmentalist configuration is, as previously noted, an industry with the stated 
aim of increasing human wellbeing in developing countries and it is enormous. In 2012, 
the latest year for which data is available from the OECD (2014), total development-re-
lated disbursements1 from DAC countries alone amounted to almost USD 474 billion; with 
1  This is includes official development assistance, ODA; other official flows i.e. transactions from the offi-
cial sector but not primarily aimed at development efforts or developmental loans with a grant element 
of less than 25%; and private flows into direct and portfolio investments and export credits. This figure 
does not include commitments, only actual disbursements. 
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an additional annual USD 160-175 billion from multilateral aid agencies (QWIDS, 2014). 
Add to that the billions of dollars that is donated by members of the public to (often re-
ligious) foundations, large and small NGOs and local initiatives for which no reliable data 
is available. It is a highly unregulated and fragmented industry, defying comprehensive 
analysis, however, several authors have highlighted certain trends and organisational 
characteristics that have emerged in the post-WWII era. Ferguson’s seminal publication 
on the ‘Anti-Politics Machine’ in Lesotho (1994) showed how the effects of development 
projects were not the intended poverty eradication but instead the extension of the bu-
reaucratic power of the Basotho State, a trend he claims is common in most developing 
countries. Subsequently, his work has informed a series of ethnographic studies on the 
development industry, many of which do not present a very favourable image of the in-
dustry. Rather, a number of studies accuse the industry of serving its own interests, espe-
cially the continuation of financial flows, over those of the people it purports to help (e.g. 
Gould, 2005; Chambers, 1997). Ferguson and others, however, focus their analysis on 
the structural changes brought about by the industry as social phenomena in their own 
right, developing positive as opposed to normative theories about the outcome of devel-
opment encounters. These structural changes are heavily influenced by the certain oper-
ational logics inherent to the developmentalist configuration, chief among which is the 
Foucaultian deployment of policy discourse by powerful actors within the configuration. 
For instance, Holtom (2005 and 2007) offers insight into the negotiations for the World 
Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, PRSPs that guide the Bank’s engagement with 
developing countries. Holtom shows how for the case of Tanzania the negotiations were 
heavily influenced by what he termed a “fraternity of economists”, i.e. an epistemic com-
munity that share a common understanding of how the world works, and that all efforts 
informed by this PRSP necessarily reflect that worldview. Furthermore, Wilson (2004) 
in a case study from Ethiopia shows how the speed with which discourse and policies 
change is much too fast for actual project practice to follow, leading her to conclude that 
projects must continuously reinvent themselves in order to maintain support. This point 
is of course much similar to Mosse’s (2004) findings that preserving a supportive, “in-
terpretive community” is paramount for the perceived success (and thereby continued 
funding) of a development project and much more important than actually achieving the 
original goals on the ground. Common to all the studies mentioned here is the presence 
of seemingly inevitable, overwhelmingly upwards accountability and unintentional bias 
in project planning caused by the structural positions of the planners involved. 
At the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the developmentalist 
configuration appear to favour civil society organisations, CSOs2, as vehicles for social 
change. This is informed by a liberal, de Tocquevillian reading of the health of societies 
and democracy as positively correlated with the number of CSOs that is currently in fash-
ion amongst decision-makers. The most common setup is therefore as follows3: A North-
ern transnational NGO identifies a perceived need in a Southern country and designs a 
project in such a way as to appeal to Northern donors. These include international and 
2  By which is regrettably often understood NGOs, despite the much wider forms of organisations encom-
passed by the term, including trade unions, social movements etc. See Lewis and Kanji (2009) for a 
detailed treatment of the role of NGOs, CSOs and development, by which this chapter is informed.
3  This is a stylised description and the reality is, as always, more complex with NNGOs basing their initial 
needs assessments on Southern inputs etc.
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bilateral aid agencies and private foundations and together make up an (Northern) epis-
temic community on a certain policy issue. However, one of the currently central dogmas 
of the configuration is that the implementation of said project is best done by Southern 
organisations. Northern NGOs therefore require Southern “implementing partner organ-
isations” that are enlisted into the configuration with the promises of funds, jobs and 
knowledge transfers in order to carry out the actual project work with the beneficiaries. 
The central importance of this dogma is that planners and implementers are separate 
groups and the result is an organisational setup comprising of four distinct groupings of 
actors (donors, NNGOs, SNGOs and beneficiaries). On the surface all four appear to share 
a common understanding of the nature of the development issue at hand; after all they 
have all bought into the proposed issue identification and project blueprint designed by 
the NNGO. Potentials for conflict, however, arise when deeper understandings of the issue 
at hand differ but the short term objective of continuing resource flows takes precedence. 
Olivier de Sardan (2004) identifies four levels of coherence that must be accommodated 
by a project design for it to go ahead, namely that i) the technical reasoning behind the 
proposed solution to the perceived problem must resonate with current sector stand-
ards and practices; ii) the ‘real’ mode of organisational behaviour at the project locality 
must be incorporated to minimise local resistance to change; iii) donor requirements as 
to budget spending and prioritisation must be accommodated, which, within a global 
trend towards micro-management under the banner of “results-based management” 
and “governance mechanisms” becomes increasingly invasive at the project level and iv) 
the internal, organisational logic in terms of staff-management interaction must be ac-
commodated since internal dynamics have the potential to side-track the entire project. 
If we perceive the four groups of actors as having differing understandings and ultimate 
objectives and sharing only a short-term objective in the continuation of resource flows, 
then we have set the stage for a potentially problematic encounter due to the challenges 
posed by these four required levels of coherence inherent to any project. 
What the Beneficiaries Bring to the Configuration: Peasant Logics and Principles of 
Side-tracking
No development project is implemented in a vacuum. After 60 years of development ef-
forts virtually every village, town and rural spot in the global South has either had some 
experience or observed others experience the development encounter. The significance of 
this fact is that target beneficiaries have formed expectations of likely outcomes, based 
upon previous experiences but biased towards desired social change (or wish to maintain 
the status quo). As previously discussed it is plausible that these expectations differ from 
those of the actors in the developmentalist configuration. Olivier de Sardan (2004) finds 
that the three main logics underlying the actions of peasants faced with a development 
project are4: to seek safety (minimising perceived risks); making the most of external 
aid (attempting to maximising resource receipts); and monopolising aid opportunities 
(not sharing widely within the community, presumably in fear of later losing out). The 
emerging principles commonly followed by project beneficiaries are therefore a selec-
4  Olivier de Sardan examines the stylised African, agricultural development project, but his findings are 
very relevant for the business development project analysed here. 
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tive adoption of package solutions and using resources for other-than-intended purpos-
es as defined by the project. As the reader will notice, these logics and principles differ 
quite significantly from those of the developmentalist configuration. Its actors will have 
an interest in being perceived as being innovative and daring yet frugal with resources, 
reaching the maximum number of the most deserving beneficiaries. They may therefore 
attempt to prevent the appearance of these emergent principles by putting in place vari-
ous governance checks and balances (or “nudges” or “incentives” if project planning has 
been informed by the behavioural sciences). In the event that such mechanisms are less-
than-perfect in achieving their objectives and the emergent principles do materialise, 
Olivier de Sardan argues, the structural changes that occur from project interventions are 
likely to differ from planning blueprints. A similar point is made by Mosse (2004) who 
argues that planners have little or no control over what actually happens in practice and 
must instead rely on changing the policy discourse to maintain a perception of coherence 
within the “supportive communities” where financial and political support is raised. Policy 
thus becomes a tool for post-rationalisation of situationally ordered events. As will be ev-
ident in the case study analysis below, both principles and all three logics are observable 
in the way the project played out in reality, spurring changes in policy discourse amongst 
planners as it went along.
Power Relations and Hidden Transcripts
The work of Scott (1990) on the concept of “everyday resistance” is highly useful in 
the context of highly unequal power relations that can be found within development 
projects. While Scott’s framework of hidden transcripts was developed with a different 
type of power relation in mind, namely one that involves the deployment of overt force 
and control over certain populations, his sociological framework of how relatively power-
less groups respond to perceived unjustly unequal power relations offers insight into the 
beneficiary principles and logics observed by Olivier de Sardan. Using a framework of situ-
ational logics, Scott states that power relations are best understood by comparing the of-
ficial transcripts5 of public interactions to the hidden transcripts of the powerful and the 
powerless. The more unequal the power relation, the more the official, consensual tran-
script will resemble that of the powerful actors while differing from that of the relatively 
powerless. The powerless in turn engage in small gestures of resistance and seeming con-
tempt for rules as a way of partially regaining dignity that is lost through conforming to 
the public transcript which is commonly humiliating and to a varying extent restricts their 
agency. Note that it is the perception of unjustly unequal power relations that brings 
this mechanism about, not the inequality itself. In the context of the developmentalist 
configuration’s relationship with its beneficiaries this is likely to occur in the face of be-
havioural restrictions or requirements that are intended to prevent side-tracking and 
selective adoption of resource packages. On the surface there may seem to consensus 
and beneficiary buy-in, but the hidden transcripts (what is intimated and discussed in 
private) may reveal beneficiary dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the developmen-
talist configuration and its overtly normative discourse and restrictions on agency. Due 
5  By ‘transcript’, Scott defines all aspects of communication, including verbal exchanges as well as body 
language, insinuations, hints, deployments of symbols and the intentional withholding of information.
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to another situational logic in play, however, namely that of making the most of external 
aid sources, direct confrontation is perceived too risky, since it may result in the discon-
tinuation of funds. The outcomes of the conflict between these logics (the loss of dignity 
associated with being subordinated to the developmentalist discourse and subsequent 
loss of agency  on the one hand and the imperative of continuing resource flows on 
the other) are small acts of everyday resistance and contempt for project stipulations. 
The same analysis is easily adapted to the relationship between Northern planners and 
Southern implementers and between donors and Northern planners. While not denying 
that logics of corruption and personal enrichment may also inform the choice to not ad-
here to officially agreed-upon codes of conduct, it is important to note that everyday 
acts of resistance may have the same transformative effect upon projects as corruption 
if the relation to the Northern partner NGO is perceived as unjustly unequal. Dennehy 
et al.’s survey of Kenyan implementing NGOs with Northern planning partners (2013), 
indicates that issues of disempowerment and a lack of Southern engagement are highly 
salient and potentially destabilising due to widespread perceptions of unjustly unequal 
distributions of power. In any case, such tensions were highly present in the case study 
analysed below, with significant effects on the ways in which the project was distorted 
during implementation. 
Functions at the Interface: Brokerage and Intermediation and the Role of the Field 
Agent
So far we have defined the actors and certain characteristics of their relations. We es-
tablished the likelihood of the various actors coming from differing worldviews thus also 
introducing the possibility of them not sharing identical points of reference, having dif-
fering interpretations of and expectations to the same events. Furthermore, we have dis-
cussed how people are likely to respond to unequal power relations that are perceived as 
unjust. One final aspect to consider is how cooperation between these different interpre-
tations and knowledge systems is facilitated. This is where the concept of development 
brokerage becomes incredibly useful. 
Brokerage as an institution is very old but has received increased attention in interna-
tional development circles since the 1970s (see Marsden, 1982 and Gould and Fernan-
dez, 1989, for theoretical treatments of the brokerage concept in exchange networks). 
Defined as the process by which intermediary actors facilitate transactions between oth-
ers lacking trust and/or access to each other, brokerage is closely linked with issues of 
the distribution of power, influence and the transmission of information within networks. 
Bierschenk et al. (2002) find that while it is found in every society, it seems particularly 
common in African societies, which the authors attribute to its central administrative 
function under colonial rule. All colonial regimes on the continent relied heavily on inter-
mediaries such as interpreters and local chiefs for governing vast territories through so-
called indirect rule (e.g. Berry, 1992). Lewis (2006) shows how the function of brokerage 
has remained largely unchanged even if the actors performing the brokerage services 
have changed from government officials to NGO staff. Fundamentally, development bro-
kerage is the specialisation in networking for development and hinges on the ability to 
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position oneself as an indispensable link of the chain connecting development institu-
tions and their intended beneficiaries. For the developmentalist configuration brokers are 
absolutely crucial, since without them, donors and Northern transnational NGOs would 
have no access to their intended beneficiaries6. From the broker’s point of view, keeping 
the two separate is paramount lest they circumvent the broker, rendering him/her su-
perfluous (current dogmas in the development configuration as mentioned above makes 
this somewhat non-salient threat). Poignant tools to this end are the monopoly over 
knowledge and using the trust vested in the broker by one universe to gain trust from the 
other; i.e. while obtaining legitimacy in the eyes of external donors and planners by claim-
ing to represent the target group, the broker may use this legitimacy to gain authority in 
the eyes of the beneficiaries by claiming to understand donors and planners. Such under-
standing is measured by the broker’ success at directing resources to the target popula-
tion, a move that resonate with the beneficiaries’ situational logics discussed above. As 
such increasing budgets will be the most salient preoccupation of any broker. Gonzalez 
emphasises the ability to ‘speak’ both cultures for successful brokerage; beneficiaries 
and donors alike must be comfortable in the broker’s presence and take this feeling of 
wellbeing as signs of the broker’s intelligence and higher moral standards (Gonzalez, 
1972). Bierschenk et al. (2002) define four competences that successful development 
brokers must have (namely, rhetorical, organisational, scenographic
7 and relational com-
petences), while citing the availability of decentralised development funds as a crucial 
enabling condition. This is due to the fact that state bureaucracies may well perform the 
function of brokerage as has been evident in instances of state-led development efforts 
where individual brokers have played minimal roles. Finally, Olivier de Sardan (2004) 
makes a useful distinction between the functions of development brokers and develop-
ment agents, assigning the former a somewhat negative connotation as someone who 
siphons off “development rents” in the form of aid flows from the developmentalist con-
figuration. The latter is a more technical role as the field agent who acts as the face of the 
project to beneficiaries and who must not only mediate between the two knowledge sys-
tems but also act as a spokesperson for and interpreter of the technical solution proposed 
by the project. To a large extent, Olivier de Sardan claims, planning-practice discrepancies 
can be explained by lack of appreciation of the difficulties development agents have in 
translating technical solutions belonging to another knowledge system to the intended 
beneficiaries. In the case study, it will be evident how the project changed nature both 
due to the intentional actions of development brokers and the practical difficulties of de-
velopment agents. Interestingly, the functions of both development brokers and agents 
were embodied in the same person albeit in different situations. 
The Fallacy of the Passive Beneficiary
By emphasising beneficiary and local staff agency, Mosse, Olivier de Sardan, Ferguson, 
Scott and their kindreds follow a school of international development sociology associat-
ed with Norman Long and his actor-oriented approach to development interventions (e.g. 
6  Brokerage remains necessary even if donors and planners are local to the country where projects are 
carried out; it is just as necessary to bridge urban-rural gaps as international ones. 
7  The skill of showcasing situations that correspond to the viewers unarticulated expectations
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Long, 1977 and 2001). Within this approach the target population is considered as com-
prising of active, conscious agents with specific strategies, reacting to the specific context 
and changes in their environment and not merely passive developees receiving a service. 
Echoed in the ethnographic writings of his followers discussed here, Long questions the 
very existence of “planned interventions”, arguing instead that local economic, political, 
historical and cultural logics dictate the course and outcomes of events and that develop-
ment projects are but one of many events taking place in the social world in which they 
are located. It is therefore not realistic to expect the technical logics of a development 
project to take precedence and dictate the outcome of events. As will hopefully be evi-
dent in the following case study, beneficiaries and development agents alike were very 
active during the implementation of the project, and all had many other spheres of so-
cial life that had to be catered for outside the project. The problems encountered by the 
project in terms of reaching its objectives were to a large extent due to the failure of the 
Northern planners to fully grasp this fact.
The Case Study
The Project in question here is a setup by a British NGO8 (the Planner) providing business 
loans to medium-sized entrepreneurs in several African countries. The technical rationale 
of the Project is that the African private sector holds enormous potential for creating 
jobs and thus for reducing poverty and adding value to the economy, but that this po-
tential is constrained by lack of access to meaningful finance: Common microfinance and 
informal credit schemes are too small to be of use for a successful entrepreneur and in 
any case too indiscriminate in terms of entrepreneurial talent, while formal banks have 
prohibitively strict collateral requirements, requiring land title deeds which many people 
do not have. This lack of access to business finance is thought to explain the observed 
economic pattern in African economies whereby a plethora of small (informal) business-
es with limited and insecure employment opportunities co-exist with a handful of large 
(formal) companies run by those few individuals with both access to finance and entre-
preneurial talent. Not only does the lack of access to finance perpetuate inequality, but it 
hinders employment creation, especially in (semi-)urban areas where dependency ratios 
and unemployment rates are high9. Through this reasoning, job creation has become the 
favoured metric of success used by the Project, not least since the 2013 World Develop-
ment Report mapped out the seemingly automatic linkages between job creation and 
poverty reduction. The Project therefore attempts to restrict the beneficiary logics and 
emerging principles discussed above in favour of more job creation, and invariably, also 
restricts beneficiary agency in the process. The Project follows the two-tier donor struc-
ture common in the developmentalist configuration whereby Northern donors channel 
funds through the Planner to a Southern NGO (the Implementer), who handles the actual 
operations and acts as the representative of the Planner and donors in project contexts. 
The Planner has several governance safety mechanisms in place, the most important ones 
being that loans can only be used on non-movable equipment and that the Implementer 
8  The founders have requested that their organisation remains anonymous. 
9  There is plenty of evidence in favour of this theory, e.g. Fafchamps (2004) and Ramachandran et al. 
(2009).
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CEO has to oversee procurement in order to avoid fraud and side-tracking of resources. 
In addition to covering direct project costs, the Planner reserves significant budget allo-
cations for “capacity building and training purposes” for the Implementer and its staff. 
These resources constitute half of the “development rents” associated with the Project, 
the other half being the loans themselves, rents a successful broker may attempt to 
capture. The Kenyan chapter was the Project’s first such chapter, opening in 2006 in Oyu-
gis in the western province of Nyanza and the Implementer’s primary activities involve 
smallholder food security and assisting HIV-positive widows through various income 
generating activities. Loan applications are received at the main office in Oyugis, where 
the Implementer CEO screens and prepares them for sending to the Planner’s board of 
trustees in the UK via email. Here applications are evaluated on the basis of financial 
soundness as well as social impact criteria and if approved, sent back to the Oyugis office 
with required funding10. The CEO in Oyugis is also in charge of repayment collections and 
borrower adherence to reporting requirements, which are monthly and quarterly reports 
on business performance and employment statistics for monitoring and evaluation pur-
poses. The Planner remunerates the Implementer with a percentage-based commission 
of each loan disbursement and of each repayment. Frequently applications are approved 
that would only generate one job. As such, the incentives for the Implementer are biased 
towards bigger, safer loans which may not necessarily be the most effective at creating 
jobs. 
As an internal impact evaluator, I worked with the Implementer when it had been in-
volved with the Project for six years. By then it had administered 14 loans, ranging in 
size from £1000-3500 (€1200 -4175 or US$1600-5550) in various business sectors 
in Oyugis and the surrounding countryside. Three loans had been fully repaid, two of 
which resulting in a second round of (larger) loan disbursements to the same borrow-
er. Through my evaluation, I did find that the loans had largely gone to firms with no 
or limited access to finance and that the employment generated did have a significant 
impact on poverty (employee poverty rates dropped to less than 1%, compared to close 
to one third pre-Project engagement and 46% average in Kenya; author’s findings and 
World Bank, 2013). However, total employment generation has been low at roughly 60 
jobs created with a total loan disbursements of in excess of £30,000. The Project did not 
have a clearly articulated target for job creation, but 60 jobs has largely been considered 
a disappointment, especially as it became evident that nine out of the fourteen borrow-
ers had personal connections to the CEO or the chairman of the Implementer’s board of 
trustees. There was therefore a sense amongst donors and Planner staff that the Project 
had been subject to elite capture and that it was being used to further other aims that 
poverty reduction. 
Perceived Unjust Power Relations and Inherent Project Incoherence
The Implementer comprises of a head office and three field offices and has had a long his-
tory of discrepancy between official and hidden transcripts. This has had negative effects 
10  The Project has a policy of keeping funds in-country, i.e. additional funds will only be transferred if 
existing funds from loan repayments are insufficient for new disbursements. 
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on several projects, much to the frustration of both the Planner and the Implementer’s 
main donor11. Internal bickering, gossiping and reluctance to share information amongst 
staff while keeping a pretence of congeniality and cooperation has been commonplace; 
all signs of what Scott would define as perceived unjust power relations. The staff is 
largely dissatisfied with the management and with reason; at various points in time there 
has been issues with (intentionally?) incompetent bookkeeping; budget items such as 
project officers perks have been prioritised over project inputs and staff has frequently 
felt humiliated by the little influence they have had on many decisions. Rarely has infor-
mation been shared freely between management and staff and therefore deep mistrust 
permeates every layer of decision making within the organisation. Lack of direct access 
to the Planner and other donors has led to a perception among staff members that while 
the donors might have good intentions, they do not understand the project reality and in 
any case do not value staff inputs, further opening their directives to interpretation. Since 
staff are in closer proximity to the Implementer’s beneficiaries, this perception of unjust 
power relations has spread to them too and because the Project has largely bypassed the 
staff altogether it has come to symbolise the frustration staff members have felt over 
being subject to unjust power relations. On the insistence of one of the Planner’s board 
members, a prominent (female) member of staff and former whistleblower with a long 
history of disagreements with the management received a loan for a catering business 
which arguably has been the most successful from both a poverty reduction and em-
ployment generation point of view. However, the (both male) CEO and chairman of the 
Implementer board did not support this loan, despite both having received loans them-
selves, neither of which have had any discernible impact on employment and the latter 
of which has defaulted. Nonetheless, the Project’s star performer has had to duly report 
her business accounts every month to the CEO and have had to rely on him to oversee 
procurement. This was a particularly humiliating affair for her, with suppliers refusing to 
deliver when she was not able to pay herself. Both Planner requirements, in this context 
such instances have been used as justification for acts of everyday resistance from her 
and other borrowers with similar experiences; acts such as late repayments, missing or 
sloppy reporting, attempts to circumvent the CEO in procurement procedures, reluctance 
to fulfil employment promises etc. The intended borrowers from the point of view of the 
Project’s objective, i.e. the ones that did not receive the loans through personal connec-
tions but rather through merit, are ironically the ones that on paper look the worst. Sadly 
they are thus the least likely to having their financing renewed, with further adverse 
effects on job creation. 
The CEO is the central broker is this microcosm within the developmentalist configuration, 
followed by the chairman of the board of trustees. With privileged access to donors, the 
Planner and a wider audience, both have been quite successful in obtaining development 
rents for the Implementer and selected members of the wider community in the form of 
“resources for capacity building” and Project loans to personal connections, respectively. 
Of course, simultaneously both have been trying to better their own position (they too 
are following the logics of seeking safety, and maximising and monopolising aid flows) 
and the easiest way to do so has simply been to refuse to advertise the Project in the local 
11  Another British NGO but with an Anglican Christian motive, whose only aim is to fundraise for the Im-
plementer.
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context, relying instead on personal networks for applications. Furthermore, the CEO has 
extended Project loans as favours to strategic individuals by presenting their applications 
in a favourable light. The format of the application forms is written and contains detailed 
historic and projected cash flows which are difficult for the local business community to 
fill out satisfactorily due to a lack of in-depth knowledge of bookkeeping. Therefore, some 
help with filling out these forms go a long way towards ensuring their approval in the UK. 
Interestingly, the CEO also performs another central function, namely that of being a 
development agent, as defined by Olivier de Sardan (2004), and a struggling one too. As 
such, there is reason to believe that although it is likely he has been implicit in channelling 
funds to other-than-intended borrowers, he might also have had a hard time explain-
ing to business owners who did not fit the social impact criteria (i.e. where investments 
would have limited social impact) why that was the case. The CEO is therefore in the pre-
carious position of being tasked with the job of translating the intentions of the Project 
to the local business community, promoting the view of business as a development part-
ner and mediating between potential and successful borrowers and the Planner. In other 
words, while some loans may have been used as favours to obtain personal enrichment 
or influence in the community, it is likely that the CEO may not have been able to justify 
not extending the Project rents to e.g. the mayor’s son, although it was evident that there 
was serious concerns about the merit of this application. All in all it is a situation where 
the CEO has incentives to channel loans to big, safe borrowers; those whom it may it be 
in his own interest to do so; and those he is unable to refuse to help due to their relative-
ly more powerful position in the local community, regardless of job creation potential. 
The borrowers that did receive their funding due to merit, are likely to see the Project’s 
power relations as unjust and engage in everyday acts of resistance, ironically putting 
themselves in a negative light from the Planner’s point of view. The outcome is therefore 
that far fewer jobs are created than the underlying economic theory would suggest. This 
is not due to a flaw in the technical rationale, but rather to a gross underestimation of 
other factors influencing the behaviours of staff, management and beneficiaries alike. 
In an attempt to minimise administrative burdens by dealing with beneficiaries only in-
directly and putting in place various governance mechanisms, the Planner has set itself 
up for a radically different outcome than the one intended. The output may have been 
reached (loans disbursed and repaid) but the outcome (poverty reduction) has remained 
elusive. The Planner was caught unprepared by the potency of agency embodied in its 
configuration’s brokers, agents and beneficiaries, relying on a simplified cause-effect im-
pact trajectory (loan creates jobs, reduces poverty) and failing to incorporate a systemic 
analysis of the local context.
Conclusion 
The main point of this case study has been to show how, in the context of a transnational 
development projects’ implementation, other logics took precedence over the technical 
rationale of the proposed development solution. As a result, the Project outcome has 
been disappointing and the Planners have largely lost control over the Project itself with 
the majority of loans not being awarded on the basis of merit. Most notably the level of 
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coherence accommodating “real” modes of organisational logic has conflicted with that 
of the technical rationale and the former has proved to be stronger. The discourse of 
poverty reduction was never abandoned, serving, as Mosse would argue, as a post-ration-
alisation of an intervention largely controlled by local political, economic, historical and 
social influences. Simultaneously, the deployment of policy has been useful for mobilis-
ing support in a culture of results-based management in development, justifying heavy 
Planner involvement in governance and implementation. So then the natural question 
follows; what can we learn from this? Since it would appear that local and situational 
logics cannot reasonably be expected to take second place to technical rationales, is it to 
a certain extent inevitable that projects fall short of their promised potential? Not neces-
sarily. I would argue, however, that Project are necessarily distorted or transformed dur-
ing the implementation process and that it is highly likely that such distortion hinders the 
achievement of project objectives. This should not be taken as to mean that project-led 
development is necessarily unable to achieve its aim of poverty reduction, as has been 
more than hinted by Ferguson (1994) and others, but rather that room for improvement 
exists. At the simplest level this analysis suggests that project planners would do well to 
incorporate better human resource management in the form of adequate training for the 
“development agent” who is likely to be in the position of attempting to make the pro-
ject’s logic take precedence over other logics as much as possible. While perhaps neither 
more effective nor willing in preventing many departures from the technical rationale of 
the Project, a more confident and better trained development agent could have prevent-
ed the most egregious loan disbursals such as the one to the mayor’s son. On a more fun-
damental level, this case study analysis implies that planners ought to be very realistic 
about the potential impact of their projects by the virtue of being a planned development 
intervention and allow for inevitable transformation during the implementation process. 
Unfortunately, the current fierce competition for funds between development projects 
does not encourage realistic estimations of impact but rather a strong positive bias lead-
ing to seemingly never ending upwards adjustments of budgets and timeframes. As a 
body of knowledge builds up on distortions occurring as projects experience the “devel-
opment encounter”, it is likely that the model of planned interventions and project-led 
development efforts is found inferior to other approaches featuring heavier state and 
private sector involvement and less micro-management by outside actors. This may not 
be good news for the developmentalist configuration, but its survival should be of sec-
ondary concern to the wellbeing of the world’s deprived. 
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Transitional civil society, Insecurity and Volatile Environment
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Introduction
The collapse of the Somali state in the 1990s led to the total disintegration of state/
national security sector institutions, including the Somali police force, Somali National 
Army, and the correctional services. The disintegration of security, combined with the 
absence of state protection, ushered in violence: human rights abuses including gen-
der-based violence that has largely been perpetuated by armed groups who have been 
turning against unarmed civilians for over two decades. As survivors of militarised vio-
lence, Somali women and men possess relevant information, knowledge that is essential 
in designing and implementing activities that are intended to improve security in their 
communities. This chapter argues that the protracted insecurity faced by both Somali 
men and women is the result of a number of factors that occurred in different periods 
of Somalia’s political processes. The insecurities faced by both genders in Somalia are 
amalgamations of a number of factors that Somalia as a nation has gone through. Some 
of these factors include bad governance, a military regime, and human rights violations 
that occurred in different periods of Somalia’s history and political stages. The period on 
which this chapter is focusses is the period when the Somali state collapsed, following the 
civil war in the 1990s. It will shed more light on how the protracted insecurity in Somalia 
impacts on both women and men and the two group’s overall contribution to security. It 
will also critically examine the security sector’s development efforts which were carried 
out in the transitional period, including the achievements, limitations and challenges that 
were encountered. Members of Somali civil society have pivotal roles to play in not only 
holding these institutions accountable, but also having representation on provincial and 
district-level security committees and being part of the decision-making process.
This chapter examines the disintegration of state institutions, including the national se-
curity sector, followed by the brutal civil war that led to over two decades of stateless-
ness and protracted insecurity in Somalia. It also touches on the effects of the breakdown 
of the rule of law and violence on women and men as well as the two group’s overall con-
tribution to security and peace. In order to fully comprehend the outcomes of collapsed 
state institutions and their effects on the security of people, it is essential to provide a 
brief overview of both internal and external factors that led to the demise of the Somali 
state in 1990s. The Somali civil war emanates from a crisis of a nascent state not gaining 
the necessary internal and external legitimacy to build a nation and create a stable soci-
ety. Both post-colonial regimes, first successive civilian governments (1960-1969) and 
later military-led administrations (1969-1991), failed to fully legitimise their state pow-
er by incorporating the post-independent aspirations of Somali civil society. Soon after 
independence from the colonial powers of the United Kingdom and Italy, Somali civilian 
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governments pursued a diplomatic offensive, mainly targeting the emerging Cold War 
powers and the so-called patron states, the USA and the USSR, to foster external legiti-
macy and support in the 1960s (Menkhaus and Kegley, 1998). However, the civilian re-
gime failed due to the lack of securing meaningful national and international support. The 
Somali military, which was the most powerful and professionalised component of Somali 
society at the time, exploited the state-civil society gap, and took power in a bloodless 
coup welcomed by most Somalis who were tired of the widespread corruption and mis-
management of civilian administration. Though initially succeeding with the revolution-
ary mobilisation of society, combined with military support from the then-Eastern Bloc, 
the military failed to fulfil the dreams of Somali society. After a failed military campaign 
in the Ogaden, a region inhabited by Somalis but ruled by Ethiopia, fragmentation with-
in the military in the form of coup attempts spread to the wider society, leading to the 
establishment of numerous armed and unarmed oppositional military groups within the 
country and also in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere in 1978. A turning point 
came in 1990, when the then-rival Horn of African despots, Siad Barre of Somalia and 
Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, agreed to suspend sponsoring each other’s opposition 
groups (Clark 1992). The deal forced the two main armed groups, the Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Movement, to relocate within Somalia 
proper, especially in the northeast and in the north where the two movements had their 
respective constituencies. Other armed movements such as the United Somali Congress 
and the Somali Patriotic Movement, with support bases in the south and South-Central 
Somalia – including the capital Mogadishu, joined the conflict (Ahmed and Green, 1999).
After a joint effort by armed militia from the countryside, supplemented by a popular 
uprising in and around Mogadishu, Somalia’s once-powerful military regime collapsed 
in 1991. Opposition against the regime had been mounting for decades in the country’s 
interior. Nonetheless, the various factions that ousted the regime failed to overcome their 
internal disagreements on power-sharing, and they embarked on the most-costly and 
tragic civil war Somalia ever experienced. The triumphant part, composed of largely-dis-
organised and undisciplined clan militias, underestimated the imminent fall of the regime 
(Fitzgerald, 2002: 57). Their lack of transitional plans for sharing power and governing 
the city, let alone the country, attested to their expectation of a prolonged vicious urban 
battle to control Mogadishu. Within weeks, in a hastily-arranged reconciliation conference 
in neighbouring Djibouti, a coalition of factions – mainly representing civilian political and 
business elites – announced an entering transitional government (Mohamoud, 2006). 
Worried about the possibility of yet another military takeover, participants rushed to 
exclude powerful rebel groups and their military leaders. Even worse, they instructed the 
army contingents to disband and surrender weapons to respective clan militias.
Although the protracted Somali civil war was long-term guerrilla warfare and rebellion 
originating from the country’s interior and border regions, the conflict lacked the essence 
of a revolutionary transformational character. It was far from the revolutionary rebellions 
the world had seen, for instance the likes of those led by Lenin of Russia, Mao of China, 
Castro of Cuba, and Ayatollah of Iran: with clear ideologies and long-term projects aimed 
at transforming society. Like the Somalis in their time, the Russian Bolsheviks initially 
ordered a form of popular army, in the distribution of weapons to civilians, which they 
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referred to as “the workers and peasants militia” (Shelley, 1996: 20). The difference was 
that the communists had clear ideological goals and plans. Similarly, while the Iranian op-
position appealed to popular militias to implement and consolidate the Islamic revolution, 
the diverse militias remained accountable to the theocratic leadership, many of them in 
exile, who had clear strategies for the prospects of their nation and country (Richards, 
2013). In the first case, communism represented the guiding principle while, in the latter 
case, clergy provided the vision for state mechanism and rule.
In retrospect, for the fragmented Somali rebels, overthrowing the regime was the end 
goal rather than means to provide alternatives. The unpopularity of the military regime 
among the public had increased the intensity of armed rebellion since early1980s. Under 
personal rule, power often concentrates around one ruthless leader during which revo-
lutionary tendencies shift political activities from a nomenklatura to a clan-klatura, in 
which the regime promotes loyalists not through professional or ideological merit, but 
through kinship relations (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Lewis, 1989). Nonetheless, the re-
bels failed to introduce a consistent vision and transformation strategies that the public 
could identify with and eventually join. On the contrary, the combination of an uncompro-
mising authoritarian regime challenged by internally-fragmented opposition eventually 
led to the disintegration of not just the army, but also most national institutions (Kieh, 
2007).
The forcible removal of the military regime by the clan-based armed opposition groups 
did not bring peace and good governance to Somalia. The victorious armed opposition 
groups, instead of protecting the public from violence and establishing order and the rule 
of law after the removal of the military regime, unleashed violence and atrocities against 
unarmed civilians for over two decades. The following section sheds light on the failure of 
armed opposition groups in establishing new political institutions, security and stability, 
and the ramifications of such failures for the Somali people. This might not be relevant 
for the chapter, but as there are big differences within Somalia – especially in relation to 
Somaliland – the geographical focus should be made clear.
 
The Disintegration of State Institutions
In the Somali context, the viciously-divided opposition complicated the potential of 
post-authoritarian peaceful transition. The outcome was a savage civil war and anarchy. 
The main cause of rebel disunity and their lack of ability to overcome internal rivalry 
were linked to the civic-military conflict and the tense relationships within the dissident 
movement, as well as their clannish character (Lewis 2004). The civic components in the 
diverse groups considered themselves as financiers and managers of the long rebellion, 
while the military commanders propagated themselves as the main force behind the re-
gime collapse. The recent Egyptian transition indicates that, while the military consti-
tutes a uniting force in nation-building efforts, it can also act as an obstacle towards 
democratisation and possible civilian rule. The fundamental role of the army is to ensure 
a country’s internal and external security, a task the Somali army failed to live up to, due 
to the embedded ‘deprofessionalisation’ initially orchestrated by the military regime. In 
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response, rebel military leaders did not just recruit from their respective clans in the inte-
rior, but also subordinated themselves under Somalia’s historic rival for regional hegem-
ony, Ethiopia (Lewis, 1989).
While the origin of the decision to disband the army remains controversial, whether it 
came from the rebels or one of the leaders in the caretaker government, the then-Prime 
Minister Omar Arte Qaalib made a radio announcement where he ordered all members 
of security sectors – the army and police – to disband and report to their clan communi-
ties. For decades, the national army had, due to corruption and mismanagement, lost its 
once-credible institutional legitimacy and moral standing. This was the first time that the 
professional Somali army, which traditionally protected the common national interest, 
had to subordinate itself to clan militias. For ordinary citizens, such drastic developments 
represented three main interdependent challenges. First, the regime that was supposed 
to protect them involuntarily retreated from the capital city. Not just that, but they also 
left with armed loyalists to the interior for a possible strategic return, but the regime also 
abandoned citizens on their own. Secondly, the regime did not just leave frightened (and 
many of them defenceless) citizens and failing government institutions behind, but it 
also contributed to the tribalisation of the once-one of Africa’s most professional armies 
through personal rule and nepotism and the subordination of qualifications (Adam in 
Zartman, 1995). Thirdly, the process culminated in the militarisation of society, where 
each clan armed itself. We think that this process started before 1991. The process be-
gan with the military regime when it “militia-ised” society through rhetorical scientific 
socialism in an “illusionary political nation state” under the framework of guulwadayaal 
(Adan, 1994) through public mobilisation. On their part, the rebels combined urban and 
rural clan recruitment to achieve their main goal, which was to conquer the country and 
create a hegemonic state (Adam, 1992).
In this regard, citizens became hostages between an oppressive regime they seriously 
feared and obviously would not shed tears for in its demise, and disorganised and ex-
tremely threatening armed militias. Here the process of monopolisation and de-monop-
olisation of power is important. In traditional authoritarian societies, the monopoly of 
violence rests on the fear of a sovereign authority which, in this context, is symbolised by 
the military and the leader. When such personal authority, as Diamond (2008) suggests, 
with an entrenched conflict between the rule of law and the rule of person disappears, 
eventually the number of factions exercising power for narrow criminal gains proliferates. 
Therefore, societal militarisation impacts mostly on civilians, though differences to devel-
op the country or military state monopolisation to oppress people (Reardon, 1993) exist 
in military states’ monopolisation capabilities.
Such security developments had great impact on Somali society as a whole, not just with 
dangerous weapons ending up in untrained hands, but with the complete absence of 
state monitoring mechanisms. We think there needs to be some consideration of the na-
ture of the Somali state before its collapse, but also the process of unleashing widespread 
robbery, revenge killings, looting properties and rape became routine terrorising commu-
nities. Though powerful militias targeted particular clans, violence had no clear objectives. 
Clearly women, children and minorities constituted the most vulnerable victims. A leading 
expert on Somali society describes such violations as the following:
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In the lawless chaos that characterized Somalia following the 
unravelling of state structures, old prejudices revived their full 
expression. In the case of the Banadiris [a Somali minority 
group] as a trading group they were believed to be wealthy; an 
being unarmed and unwarlike group, they became easy targets 
for militias loyal to the different warlords and armed bandits 
loyal to nobody: homes and businesses were destroyed, wom-
en and girls were raped in front of their relatives and countless 
were slaughtered. Lewis, 2008: 132.
This was not exclusive to a particular minority, but mostly, unarmed civilians, especially 
women and children, paid the heaviest price. This is due to armed militias considering the 
punishment of women and children as strategic to hurting their opponents and those that 
are most displaced and systematically abused by diverse conflicting groups are women 
and children (Hough, 2008). The Somali case might be unique as women in this part of 
the world appear, on the surface, to be better integrated into the clan structure. Normally 
traditional patrilineal societies, women are considered to be secondary members of the 
clan. On one hand, clans do their utmost, for honour purposes, to defend their women. In 
addition, Somali clans often intermarry and, through intermarriages, such clans can then 
gain access to protection from both their kin as well from their in-laws (Garner and El-
Bushra, 2004). However, due to social upheaval, social institutions and actors that once 
provided protection to women were weakened and could no longer provide protection to 
women and men from armed and violent groups. During the militarised violence, Somali 
women and men could neither receive protection from their clans, nor could their clans 
defend their honour. For instance, weak clans in terms of defending the honour of their 
women and children were overrun by other dominant and heavily-armed clans. In other 
societies, such as the Balkans, the situation could be different and women might be treat-
ed differently. In numerous civil wars, for example in Europe and Africa, armed factions 
abused women for reasons of “ideological and racial purity” (Marry, 2010: 166). For in-
stance, in the Balkan Wars, violations against women were part of ethnic cleansing and 
genocide strategies for diverse militias (Koo, 2002). Similar atrocities in which warlords 
considered genocide as an objective took place in Rwanda (Sharlach, 1999).
With the outbreak of civil war in Mogadishu, many urbanites (inhabitants of the capital 
city) managed to flee. In their place, armed nomads and semi-nomads with no knowledge 
of urban city life were recruited from the interior and took control, in the process vandal-
ising their way through the city. The process of the homogenisation of society through 
centralisation and top-down strategies to oppress cultural and ideological diversifica-
tion undermined the diverse social fabric of Somali society. Some of these include the 
urban-nomad distinction, and the militia-civilian distinction. In addition, modernisation 
processes transformed traditional societies. For instance, the thirteenth-century prom-
inent Afro-Arab classic sociologist, Ibn-Khaldun, explained how people from the interior 
first undermine and destroy public structures, gradually building it up, and later leading 
it to decline. Referring to the core arguments of Ibn-Khaldun with regard to the nomad-
ic-urban conflict, Abdullahi proposes the following:
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Savagery has become the character and nature [of the Bedou-
ins]. They enjoy it, because it means freedom from authority 
and no subservience to leadership. Such a natural disposition is 
the negation and antithesis of civilization…the very nature of 
their existence is the negation of building [urbanisation], which 
is the basis of civilization. Furthermore, since they do not see any 
value in labor and craftsman and do not appreciate it, the hope 
for profit vanishes, and no productive work is done. The seden-
tary population disperses and civilization decays… The Bedouins 
are not concerned with laws, or with deterring people from mis-
deeds… they care only for property that they might take away 
from people through looting… Under the rule of Bedouins, their 
subjects live as in a state of anarchy. Anarchy destroys mankind 
and ruins civilizations (Abdullahi cited by Osman, 2006).
The chaotic aggressive forward march impacted remaining civilians in multiple ways. The 
first was the immediate shock of losing state protection combined with the constant 
threat of roaming militia gangs on the streets. Second was the widespread insecurity 
generated by the systematic robbery and looting; uncontrolled gangs going into houses, 
randomly searching and killing people. Up to and during the collapse of the state, there 
was high inflation and a lack of food, where poor people had difficulty in paying for and 
getting food. The state lost support from the international community due to its hu-
man rights violations coupled with Somalia losing its geostrategic Cold War significance 
following the end of East-West rivalry (Souare, 2006). External aid creates not just de-
pendency, but also a sense of not having property rights. Ordinary people also loot, as 
they consider the national property both as theirs but also belonging to the dictator and 
foreigners. External legitimacy and support is vital for these societies.
The remaining international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and diplomatic rep-
resentations that could have comforted people or appealed for international assistance 
left the country due to the security challenges. America and other Western countries air-
lifted their personal and citizens with the help of US marines based at the coast. Secondly, 
in the short term, people found themselves displaced and not able to find their family 
members and relatives. Uncertain migration awaited most of them as they left the capital 
in search of food and security. Many of them left for the south, hoping to find relatives 
and seek protection. Others headed north; hoping the militias on the road would give free 
passage and refrain from harming them. The process represented major decline, as some 
of these people originally migrated away from traditionalism and localism. In general, 
the forced displacement is a strategy employed by different fighting factions, leading to 
“trans-boundary flight by civilians contributing to large scale asylum seekers and sudden 
influx over the span of the conflict” (Caruso, 2011: 2). Thirdly, the most fortunate Soma-
lis left for other countries, following sponsorships and visas commissioned by relatives in 
the diaspora. The majority remained internally displaced in the country, living under the 
threat of starvation and violence. Many others became refugees in large camps in neigh-
bouring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen. Under certain conditions, 
these refugees at least had shelter, but they were still confronted by security challenges.
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For over two decades, the people of Somalia have been living in a violent environment. 
This section explains the ways in which Somali women and men were affected by state 
collapse and the protracted militarised violence. This section also sheds light on the ways 
in which they responded to the violence, and their overall contribution to peace and se-
curity in their communities. Somali women have been affected by state violence and 
collapse in specifically gendered ways that have exacerbated their traditionally-subordi-
nate positions in their society On one hand, like Somali men, women were impacted by 
the political disintegration, the breakdown of the rule of law, and the violence. They lost 
state protection and security, and were made vulnerable to all kinds of insecurities. On 
the other hand, due to the lack of opportunities and the prolonged insecurities, Somali 
women became more vulnerable and lost some of the gains that they made in education. 
It is worth noting that, prior to the civil war, both men and women had some protection 
under their clans. For instance, there is an agreement known as biri-magoydo among 
clans: to protect and not harm women, children and the elderly during clan clashes among 
them. Under this amnesty, there was an agreement that women, children, and the elderly 
were to be spared from all violence that may arise between or among clans. However, 
such amnesty, which all clans had agreed to uphold, had been violated during the civil war 
period. In fact, women, children and the elderly became primary targets of the violence 
waged by clan-based armed militias in South, Central Somalia, Puntland and Somailand. 
It is worth noting that Somali women are not purely victims, but are actors with their 
own agency who have directly and indirectly contributed to the conflict in their country. 
According to Sorensen, “women contribute to the outbreak of violence and hostilities – in 
many cases, they are instrumental in inciting men to defend group interests, honour, and 
collective livelihoods (Sorensen, 1998: ii). For example, some Somali women have their 
poetry (buuraanbur) to incite violence among warring groups, thereby contributing to 
the militarisation of men and society (Bouta et al., 2005). Thus, if we recognise the direct 
and indirect roles that women played in the violence, then we will recognise that they 
have important roles to play in improving and building security in their communities.
 
Engendering State Collapse and Militarisation: Women Resist Violence
Ethnic and civil wars are gendered, and impact women differently than men (Karam, 
2001; McKay, 2000; Mertus, 2000; Tickner, 2001; Zeigler and Gunderson, 2006), and 
this has been the case in Somalia. Militarised conflicts erode women’s and men’s access 
to state protection, social services such as education, health care, livelihoods, and other 
opportunities. As state institutions disintegrated, including those in the security sector, 
the Somali people: men, women and children, were confronted with protracted insecu-
rities. Due to the lack of state authority and the rule of law, unarmed civilians – includ-
ing men and women – ended up without having state protection and were targeted by 
armed groups. It is worth noting that the warlords and their armed militias have violated 
the customary law (xeer), the biri magaydo which forbids any individual or groups from 
harming or targeting women, children and the elderly during clan conflict. Under this 
xeer, all warring factions must exempt this group (women, children and the elderly) from 
their violent acts and revenge killings. As a result of the above-mentioned violation of 
the xeer, due to their gender and clan affiliations, women and young girls were deliber-
137
ately subjected to all kinds of violence, displacement and they lost their properties. With 
no state and social institutions (such as clan elders) to turn to for protection, the people 
of Somalia were all left all alone to endure in such violence perpetrated by warlords and 
their armed militias. The loss of access to state protection, education, healthcare, and em-
ployment opportunities has not only reduced the status of Somali women, but has also 
worsened some of the earlier gender inequalities.
Furthermore, unarmed Somali men and young boys were affected by the violence waged 
by clan-based armed groups. We argue that not all Somali men participated in the clan 
warfare and the militarised violence that ravaged Somalia. Somali men were the primary 
targets of this violence waged by different armed and clan-based groups. They were 
directly targeted due to their gender and clan affiliations. They were forcibly displaced 
to refugee camps in neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen, 
where they have remained in those camps for over two decades. Other men and boys, 
either by choice or by force, joined clan-based militias where they perpetrated violence 
on men and women from other clans. These men who directly and indirectly participated 
in the violence have also faced number of vulnerabilities and violence, including loss of 
protection, and susceptibility to death and displacement during and after violence. War-
lords hailing from different clans exploited unemployed, illiterate, and poor young men. 
We argue, in fact, that the conflict that wreaked havoc in Somalia has been fought on the 
expenses of these vulnerable young men. 
We also argue that militarisation has specific ramifications for women. Rehn and Sirleaf 
(2002: vii) argue that women in several conflict-affected nations become subject to 
“rape, sexual exploitation, mutilation, torture and displacement”. In times of social and 
political upheavals, women are deliberately targeted because “they are perceived as sym-
bolic bearers of the future of their cultural and ethnic identity and are responsible for 
future generations of their community” (Lindsey, 2005:23). While men and boys are 
also victims of violence (Moser and Clark, 2001), women carry both the physical and 
psychological trauma of these particular forms of violence, including rape (Large, 1997). 
Like other women in conflict zones, Somali women and girls have been subjected to rape, 
forced marriages and forced displacement.
In addition, gender roles and relations are also affected by militarised conflicts, particu-
larly when primary income providers (men) are killed and livelihoods are destroyed (Bop, 
2001; El-Bushra, 2000; Karam, 2001). In Somalia, the protracted political crisis and the 
violence has emasculated Somali men. For instance, men who survived the violence could 
no longer provide for their families, and this directly and indirectly affected previous 
gender roles and relations. For instance, women in conflict zones end up shouldering 
numerous roles and responsibilities, including those that were carried out primarily by 
their male counterparts in the pre-war period (El-Bushra, 2000). Women living in conflict 
zones become extremely important to the survival of their families and overall communi-
ties (Pankhurst, 2004). According to Gardner:
Women’s increased economic role in the family implies a change 
in gender relations at household level. With the family no lon-
ger economically supported by a man, and often without a pro-
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ductive man in the household, many women have become the 
household head responsible for decision-making (2004:103-
104).
We argue that, unlike Somali men, women coped with the new roles and relations that 
emerged from the social upheavals. In Somalia, women took up new roles and responsi-
bilities. For example, a large number of women joined different income-generating activ-
ities including selling qat and petrol to maintain the basic survival and security of their 
families. Because of these new roles and responsibilities, women become significant to 
the survival of their families and provided new status in their families and overall commu-
nities. However, women’s new status and roles and responsibilities did not increase their 
representation in formal decision-making processes.
At the height of the clan warfare, women played an essential role in providing protection 
to women, children and men from the marauding militias. There are a number of cases 
where women sheltered and temporarily adopted certain individuals and groups claiming 
that they are their ‘kith and kin’, facilitating their safe passage to their ancestral lands. 
Women’s marginalisation in the clan system, as well as their multiple relations through 
birth and marriages with various clans, provided them some advantages and the space 
to promote security and peace, and to travel distances to conduct community work and 
have businesses. In addition, some men who belonged to the dominant clans were also 
able to protect their friends and neighbours from their own and other clans which were 
involved in clan warfare in Somalia. These men used their positions in their own clans to 
provide amnesty to men and women hailing from other clans.
Women are important actors that resolve conflicts on daily basis. For Anderson, women 
“are frequently the first to take the risks necessary to promote dialogue across divided 
communities and more towards reconciliation” (2000: 34). There have been various ways 
in which women resisted and responded to the militarisation in Somalia (Dini, 2009 and 
2010). Whenever conflict breaks out in and outside of their communities, women serve 
as ergo nabadeed: peace envoys to advocate for peace and push for reconciliation. In ad-
dition, women who are in cross-clan relations and peace envoys study the conflict taking 
place inside or outside their communities, collect information and share it with different 
stakeholders and take immediate action to halt such conflicts. Women use their poetry, 
known as buraanburs to indicate their opposition to the conflict, as well as their support 
for peace. Through their poetry, women highlight ways in which the conflict has impact-
ed their lives and the overall importance of peace. In addition, during conflict, women 
place pressure on warring groups, including their clan leaders, to halt their violence and 
reconcile with opposing groups. To prevent conflicts and promote reconciliation, Somali 
women also organise peace prayers known as Alla Bari, and directly appeal to clan leaders 
and warring groups to immediate halt hostilities. They also pressure their male relatives, 
particularly their spouses, sons, and brothers, not to directly or indirectly participate in 
such conflicts. Through peace prayers, meal-sharing and rallies, women clearly inform 
others that they will not financially or morally support such violence perpetuated by their 
own clans and other clans. Through such initiatives, women have successfully averted 
violence and contributed to peace and security in their respective communities. Wom-
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en’s responses to quell violence have contributed to peace and security in Puntland and 
Somaliland – relatively peaceful regions. In the mid-1990s, when two powerful warlords 
fought in the capital, and which led to establishment of a green line which divided the 
city into two areas – Mogadishu North and South – each controlled one warlord, women 
resisted such division and violence perpetuated by the warlords. Women in Mogadishu 
belonging different clans, including those belonging to those of the warlords, took to 
the streets of Mogadishu to resist forced separation (the green line), and increased in-
teractions with one another. Each time women were stopped at the checkpoints by both 
warlord’s militia groups, women used creative and convincing excuses of why they were 
frequently crossing the checkpoints, such as borrowing sugar, salt, or tea leaves from a 
family member or friend, when they were in fact crossing checkpoints to assess the effect 
of the violence on women, men, and children, and to deliver money to those who were 
affected by the violence. It was women who dismantled this green line and carried out 
numerous protests and rallies condemning such forced and imposed separation of the 
capital city (Dini, 2008). In 1997, women hailing from different sub-clans of Majerteen 
in Bosaso, a booming coastal town with a lucrative port in the Puntland region, were 
affected by violence, and took action to find solutions to their lawless city. Women in 
Bosaso collectively organised and mobilised scarce resources, to respond to the insecurity 
affecting their city. They used their scarce resources to rehabilitate old jails in the city, 
bought uniforms for former police, and explored ways to revive the security apparatus 
in the city, but all of these efforts were not enough to address insecurity in their city. 
They then approached and placed pressure on both their clan elders and the leadership 
of the armed militia – the SSDF – a clan-based armed militia led by General Mohamed 
Said Morgan, which was then controlling the region. However, the violence continued and 
women’s appeals to the different leaderships fell onto deaf ears. The only way that they 
could ensure that they were listened to by both their clan leaders and the SSDF leadership 
(both of whom failed to establish security in their city) was to disrupt the port activities 
and halt the revenues that were generated from the port, and which directly benefitted 
the SSDF. Women thought the only way their demand (to securitise the city) was going 
to be accommodated was to organise and stage sit-ins inside and outside the Bosaso 
port to disrupt the activities of the port in exchange for establishing security, law and 
order in the city. Women’s sit-ins obstructed the flow of goods in and out of the port. 
Some of the slogans that women used were, ‘If no security in Bosaso, no revenues for the 
militia group – SSDF’. In their sit-ins, women recited songs, buraanburs, which captured 
how they were affected by insecurity and the failure of the leadership of the militia to 
maintain security. Other women from other towns and villages of Puntland also joined 
the protests to boycott the economic activities of the port which benefitted the SSDF 
militias. As women’s sit-ins hit the militia’s revenue that was generated from the port 
hard, the SSDF’s leadership were then willing to meet with, respond to the women’s de-
mands, and they promised that they would improve security in the city. The SSDF leaders 
and leaders of women’s groups that carried out the sit-ins signed an agreement to work 
together. The women in Bosaso did end their sit-ins, but continued their contributions to 
the rehabilitation of old jails and the establishment of a police force, providing cars and 
even paid stipends to newly-recruited policemen to do night patrols to prevent crime and 
insecurity in the city, and in which some women themselves took part. This initiative was 
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named after one of the women leaders who participated in the sit-ins, Hufan Artan1, and 
became the Hufan Initiative (Dini, 2008). This case illustrates the power of women and 
their overall contributions to the stabilisation of their communities and the formation of 
security sector institutions, particularly in Puntland.
Similarly, women in various regions of Somalia took action to prevent and halt the vi-
olence which erupted between their clans as well as that of other clans. In Mogadishu, 
women play critical roles in improving and maintaining security in their districts and all 
over their capital city. They work closely with newly-emerging security sectors, including 
the police, and report criminal activities through text messages. Through creative ways, 
women have resisted violence and overall built bridges between hostile groups waging 
violence in their communities. Ordinary Somali women rose to the occasion and formed 
their own organisations to respond to the crises that engulfed their communities. They 
challenged themselves to contribute to the security of their families, extended family 
members, neighbours and other members of their respective communities by delivering 
much-needed services. They initiated lifesaving initiatives in their villages, towns and 
cities all over Somalia. A good example is the efforts of Dr Hawo Abdi, who won numer-
ous global awards for her courage in confronting secular and religious extremists and 
warlords, and delivering lifesaving services to vulnerable people in her hometown, Af-
goye, Mogadishu. In 2010, a magazine named Dr Abdi and her daughters as among their 
“Women of the Year”:
Her lifesaving efforts started in 1983, when she opened a one-
room clinic on her family farm. As the government collapsed, 
refugees flocked to her, seeking food and care. Today she runs 
a camp housing approximately 90,000 people, mostly women 
and children because, as she says, “the men are dead, fighting, 
or have left Somalia to find work.” While Dr. Abdi has gotten 
some help, many charities refuse to enter Somalia. “It’s the most 
dangerous country,” says Kati Marton, a board member of Hu-
man Rights Watch. “Dr. Abdi is just about the only one doing 
anything.” Her greatest support: two of her daughters, Deqo, 35, 
and Amina, 30, also doctors, who often work with her. Despite 
the bleak conditions, Dr. Abdi sees a glimmer of hope. “Women 
can build stability,” she says. “We can make peace” (Glamour 
Magazine, 2010).
Furthermore, there are other heroic women in Somalia, such as Fatima Jibrell, an environ-
mentalist and peace activist, and founder and former Executive Director of Horn Relief 
(now the African Development Solution) who won the Goldman Environmental Prize in 
2002. Another prominent  activist is Hawa Aden Mohamed, an educationist and peace 
activist, founder and Director of Galkacyo Education Centre for Peace, and known as “The 
Queen of Galkacyo”, who won the 2012 Nansen Refugee Award. There is Edna Ismail, 
who built maternity hospital in Hargeisa where she has been delivering much-needed 
1  Hufan was 60 year old mother and a resident of Bosaso who was one of the leaders who organised 
such sit-ins. 
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reproductive healthcare services for women in her community, and who also became the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somaliland. There are many other heroic women who have 
championed for peace and security in their various communities in war-torn Somalia, 
Puntland and Somaliland, and their initiatives have directly and indirectly contributed to 
improving the security of their families and, overall, the nation.
Members of the Somalian diaspora communities have supported such initiatives led by 
ordinary women and men in Somalia, and they have made their financial contributions to 
community projects such as building health clinics, schools, digging wells and so on, from 
a distance. They also assisted their immediate families back home. Though the diaspo-
ra might have contributed to conflicting political mobilisation (Kleist, 2008), they have 
also contributed to social and economic development in numerous positive ways (Leeson, 
2007). Somali women and men living in the diaspora collected funds and mobilised po-
litically and collectively to build roads and hospitals and introduced other humanitarian 
activities to help the vulnerable in the country, and this led to bettering the lives of vul-
nerable people in Somalia.
Somali women have used their marginalisation with their clans into a positive way and 
tapped into the support from other men and women hailing from certain clans. Because 
they are on the margins of the clan system, women were able to build security and peace 
from the bottom up, and promote reconciliation among certain groups within their com-
munities. In times of conflict, women’s loyalties, particularly those that are in cross-clan 
relations, are questioned and they are often portrayed as enemies and disloyal, and this 
has provided women a strategic space to manoeuvre and build alliances among other 
men and women hailing from other clans, and to access information from different stake-
holders. In other words, Somali women have utilised their marginalisation as a tool to 
overcome gender discrimination and build relationships across clans.
Somali women’s responses to insecurity have not only weakened the intentions of war-
ring groups to perpetuate violence, but have also improved the security of the people and 
overall communities. Despite Somali women’s important contributions to the stabilisa-
tion of their communities, they remain absent from the formal decision-making of securi-
ty sector institutions. Women are not seen as important security actors. Somali women’s 
active participation and contribution as security actors is vital if Somalia is to emerge out 
of the ruins and become a stable and peaceful nation. Women are resourceful actors that 
have their own security concerns and their valuable contribution to improving security 
must be recognised and rewarded. As victims and actors of both conflicts and peace, and 
as citizens, Somali women must be included in all stages of security sector development. 
Security sector development efforts must be gender inclusive and sensitive, and women’s 
security needs / concerns must be incorporated. Clearly, the immediate concern for civil-
ians was to save their lives and those of their relatives. Parents, particularly women, did 
whatever they could to save children and other family members. There have been some 
civic groups that have tried to help the suffering people. Some have conducted humani-
tarian activities.
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Somalia’s protracted conflict has a regional dimension. Ethiopia, a neighbouring country, 
has played its role in destabilising Somalia through supporting and arming different war-
lords. The next section examines the roles of regional actors in perpetuating insecurity 
and the overall militarisation of war-torn Somalia.
The Role of the International Community Back and Then
The regional hegemon Ethiopia represents the main political and military actor in the 
Horn of Africa. The country simultaneously instigates and deals with security challenges 
in Somalia. Their technique includes the employment of warlord proxies that the Ethiopi-
ans play against each other to exert overall dominance (Samatar, 2007). The Ethiopians 
played multiple roles. They received and welcomed refugees, but dealt with the political 
and military conditions often in hegemonic terms (Iyob, 1993). Addis Ababa’s involve-
ment in Somalia goes back to the Cold War period and the struggle between the two 
strong military men, Mengistu and Barre. Each regime favourably hosted and funded each 
other’s opposition groups. This led to the establishment of opposition enclaves in the two 
respective capitals. To consolidate their declining power and legitimacy, the two military 
leaders signed an agreement in Djibouti in early 1990, promising “to cease supporting 
each other’s insurgents” (Lefebvre, 1996). Ethiopian-controlled clan-based Somali rebels 
had no option but to resettle and confront the Somali government within the country.
When Somalia was about to collapse, the world, particularly countries that since colo-
nialism poured weaponry into the country, concentrated on repatriating their nationals 
and chose to leave Somalia to its destiny. At the time, other international conflicts in 
such places such as Iraq and Yugoslavia preoccupied the international community and 
might prevented powerful countries from dealing with the Somali issue. Somalia became 
the victim of Cold War geostrategic narrowness in which the international community, 
especially powerful countries, concentrate on immediate regions, confirming the thesis 
of existential realism (Lieber, 1993). One of the main reasons why Somalia was deeply 
militarised with different weaponry from the East and West was its changing alliances 
with the Eastern and Western Blocs (Lefebvre, 1998). Humanitarian organisations, par-
ticularly those that did not repatriate their staff back to their countries, stayed behind 
and tried to relieve the pain of the suffering. Nonetheless, the continuing urban warfare, 
the warring factions, and the conditions on the ground worsened the situation, and made 
humanitarian efforts difficult to carry out. In 1992, after famine broke out in the south 
and the international media reported immense suffering by particularly women, children 
and the elderly, the USA intervened with Operation Restore Hope, to formally ensure 
food reached the suffering. Nonetheless, the initially humanitarian intervention ended in 
failure, and retreat by the Americans leaving the country to its own destiny. It was not 
just the Americans who left but major humanitarian NGOs also recused their presence, 
as active insurgency often prevents such organisations from operating (Lischer, 2007).
Boutros-Ghali, then the UN Secretary General, accused the world of ignoring the Somali 
conflict while paying more attention to the Yugoslav Wars. There was also tension and 
war against Saddam Hussain in the Gulf, but this did not prevent the international com-
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munity from helping Ethiopia overcome its military dictatorship. The rebels there got US 
support to take over the country relatively peacefully. Consequently, there was limited 
and sporadic humanitarian aid. The time was known for its warlordism followed by US 
and international troops’ intervention.
After several failures, first by the Americans and then the United Nations Operation in 
Somalia mission, the international community withdrew, retreated and concentrated in 
Nairobi where they opened satellite offices to manage the troubles in Somalia from a 
safe distance. Complex groups of NGOs and national and supranational agencies took 
part in that process. The diaspora was also included. The question is, what did Nairobi or 
Kenya provide to bring this concentration of NGOs together? Kenya has historically been a 
country with Western links and interests, but the existence of a significant middle class in 
Nairobi, as well as the more or less British oriented political system, might attract people 
and organisations. It is also here where many Somalis, refugees as well as the business 
elite, resettled.
The stated objectives of humanitarian intervention did not comply with the concrete ac-
tions taken, all the while remaining strategic. In terms of a gender perspective, human-
itarian aid was legitimised with gender arguments that women and children suffered 
under the civil strife and there was a need to help them. The suffering of the vulnerable, 
particularly women and children, play a central role in arguments to provide and maintain 
the humanitarian system (Carpenter, 2005). The international discourse of Islam had also 
impacted the situation. It shifted the focus from secular warlordism to religious warlord-
ism, and also changed projecting the extremists rather than the traditional warlords as 
the enemy (Collins, 2007).
One of the positive outcomes of the state collapse and the civil war is that it opened up 
a space for ordinary Somali men and women to form institutions and associations to 
respond to the crises that engulfed their nation. Somali civil society emerged during the 
social upheavals. It has been catering for the needs of vulnerable people in a restricted 
and violent environment. The next section examines the contributions of these actors to 
easing the vulnerabilities of their beneficiaries.
 
Statelessness and Insecurity: The Rise of Somali Civil Society
Obviously the prolonged violence and suffering had a significant impact on the security of 
all Somalis. The systematic violations made Somali victims more resilient in coping with 
tremendous challenges with limited capabilities. In addition, domestic civic groups occa-
sionally received compensation from external diaspora mobilized funding. In this regard, 
civil society provided relevant solutions to the security challenges people confronted in 
their daily activities, for instance, arranging meetings for opposing community members 
to get together and discuss possible solutions to their situation. In other situations, civic 
communities provide free education, food and shelter for vulnerable community mem-
bers.
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The top-down state organised Somali civil society disintegrated with the collapse of the 
military regime. Activists made numerous attempts to gather the fragments of the civil 
society but confronted obstacles emanating from clanism, warlordism and external in-
volvement. Particularly intellectuals, elders, media groups and business people insisted 
on the reorganisation of more-inclusive civic elements. But they have partially failed due 
to oppression from the warlords combined with their attempts to survive and avoid risks. 
In the pursuit of a national civil society frame, despite the risks, committed activists se-
cretly maintained their efforts. During the post-state collapse, Somali civil society mainly 
placed itself in opposition to warlords (Lewis, 2001). Women activists played a signifi-
cant role in this process. Under anarchic societal conditions, civil society has to redefine 
itself. Following excessive violence and displacement, trust among people disappeared. 
Long-term neighbours and colleagues became harsh enemies, leading to the fragmenta-
tion and the exodus of the country by many. Those civic groups who preferred to remain 
in the country fell prey to the warlords and religious extremists. They witnessed the mo-
bilisation and exploitation of the society under the new slogans of clanism and religious 
extremism. Consequently, those who wanted to provide genuine help for people with 
food, shelter, social help, education, and medical care would have to bribe the warlords to 
provide this service.
Eventually, with more international engagement, the civil society, including those who 
were more or less corrupt, played an intermediate role. Critics suggest that a new form 
of NGOi-sation began trying instead of linking to a national state, civil society group 
fragmented and linked to local, clan or warlords as well as international organisations 
consequently increasing the number of foreign funded civic groups. The international 
NGOs have, for instance, cooperated and used remittances through operating across the 
country (Gundel, 2002). In addition, there are cases were the international community, 
through the international NGOs, imagined warlords as peace lords (Menkhaus, 1996). 
Under such circumstances, many claim to fight for gender equality and empowerment. 
The process created increased dependency and intense competition between the differ-
ent groups.
In Somalia, most previous external interventions focussed on the armed groups and not 
the improved the human security of the vulnerable population. Warlords received unde-
served international recognition with the intention of finding lasting political solution. 
The one-sided approach to the War on Terror missed looking at the efforts and the sig-
nificance of other relevant non-armed components in the society – women and civil so-
ciety organisations (CSOs). Such contingents have long provided a bottom-up approach 
to pressing social and economic issues. Inevitably in recent years, strategies seem to shift 
with renewed emphasis on building Somalia from the bottom by, for instance, providing 
opportunities for women and community activists. Consequently, the contribution and 
the inclusion of women, including those from the diaspora, had improved social, political, 
and overall security conditions. Somali women in the diaspora, particularly those in the 
Arabian Gulf, cooperated with the national Somali women organisation before the state’s 
collapse. After the collapse, the Somali diaspora continued to provide support, though 
this was more regional oriented (Farah, 2012). The earlier male-and warlord-dominated 
reconciliation processes undermined the participation of women in projecting and insist-
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ing the notorious 4.5 formula of power sharing. The scheme divided the society into 
four major dominant clans and half for the joint minority clans, and compromised wom-
en’s potential contribution to viable political outcomes. The current federal government 
seems to act differently. For instance, the federal government that came to power in 
Mogadishu in autumn 2012 elevated the position of women by appointing highly quali-
fied and competent female politicians to significant cabinet positions such as the former 
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Fawsia Haji Yusuf and the former minister for 
welfare and social affairs Maryan Qasim. The interesting development is that this was a 
clan and traditionally-negotiated process, partially facilitated, funded, and protected by 
the international community, but made history by appointing the first ever female For-
eign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in Somalia.
Initially, according to the agreed roadmap, Somali women should acquire a minimum of 
thirty percent representation in the new political system, including in Parliament. Though 
the international community asserted substantial pressure through the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AM-
ISOM), the plan did not fully work out. Traditional leaders mostly selected male candi-
dates, and only awarded women twelve percent of seats in the new parliament. Thus, the 
new assembly will be one characterised by “male patronage networks” (Goetz, 2007).
At the civil society level, Somali civil society remains fragmented, dependent on donor 
support and somewhat clan-oriented. Among them, however, it is possible to find active 
associations that have been working for better social, economic and political conditions 
for many years. Similarly, the diaspora is complex and fragmented but had, over the 
years, also participated in the development of the country (Farah, 2012).
The immediate dominant external players, such as AMISOM and UNSOM, receive funds 
from West. The US and EU have officially stated their narrow security and ideological strat-
egies in Somalia. Their aim is to concentrate on national security interests by preventing 
and combatting piracy and extremism. The narrow security priorities might undermine 
gender balance and sensitivity. The international community worries that a traditional 
leader, warlord, or extremist might mobilise resistance. Therefore, what civic mobilised 
women’s groups can do is limited, particularly if the Somalis fail to solve the warlord and 
extremist challenges. Though women might have contributed to the conflict, the main 
source of the Somali conflict emanated from armed men in a vicious non-compromising 
power struggle. AMISOM troops operate on the front line and have partially secured the 
capital city Mogadishu and some other provincial cities. Such security gains, nonetheless, 
remain temporary as there is no clear political solution to bring armed groups into ac-
cepting their total defeat or willingness to join the political process peacefully. In the end, 
externally-imposed gender balance will not work, as Somalis have their own culture which 
considers women as an integrated part of the household and not a separate antagonistic 
individual. Thus, any serious permanent solution to gender challenges will have to come 
from Somalis.
146
Conclusion
Somalia has been a nation that has been haemorrhaging for decades. This chapter high-
lighted some of the ramifications of political and social disintegration for the people of 
Somalia. It also presented the roles of women and members of CSOs in the Somali conflict 
and security complexes.  War-torn Somalia is a special case, a failed state with protract-
ed and brutal militarised violence that negatively-perpetuated people’s security and ac-
cess to basic social services for decades. The people of Somalia, including women, were 
subjected to violence, forced displacement and were denied from having a normal life 
with state protection and security. It is worth noting though that ordinary women and 
men, whether living inside or outside Somalia, heroically responded to the violence that 
wreaked havoc on their people and communities. Those inside Somalia took risks to serve 
the most vulnerable people in their communities. Those living in the diaspora supported 
not only family members that they left behind, but also supported humanitarian and 
development projects all over Somalia. The responses of individual or groups of Somali 
women and men have both local and diaspora dimensions, and thus it is pivotal that any 
efforts at transforming or developing security sector institutions in Somalia must be in-
clusive and gender sensitive. The active participation of women’s groups and members of 
civil society in the process of rebuilding security sector institutions in Somalia is essential 
to promote adequate public trust and confidence among Somalis. We argue that civil 
society and NGOs can make important contributions to the formulation of, and decisions 
relating to, the security sector, and facilitate public engagement with debates on national 
security.
As we write this chapter, there have been a number of positive changes that recently 
took place in Somalia. Over twenty years of stagnant political transition was ended in 
September 2012. There is a new government elected by the new parliamentarians and 
a parliament selected by clan elders representing all clans of Somalia which has received 
international recognition. The new government and the people of Somalia continue to 
face numerous challenges, including security. The new government has been pushing 
the international community to lift the arms embargo so that it can fight against hos-
tile groups, including extremists. In addition, the emphasis on a top-down, state-centric 
approach to securitisation and rebuilding the security sector institutions raises number 
of concerns and may, in fact, lead to the re-militarisation of Somalia or the re-establish-
ment of centralised security apparatuses which may fail to include other stakeholders 
such as women’s groups and members of civil society in playing essential roles in such 
efforts. The security of the state must not be separated from the security of the Somali 
people who have endured two decades of violence and contributed to the securitisation 
of their communities. Somali women inside and outside of Somalia used traditional, civ-
ic and transnational approaches as well as creative methods and resources to provide 
much-needed humanitarian assistance and improve the overall security conditions of a 
vulnerable population. Similarly, ordinary men and women formed institutions and re-
sponded to the immediate needs of members of their communities.
The international community has been contributing to the rebuilding of the security sec-
tor in war-torn Somalia. While such support is essential, it must not marginalise resource-
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ful actors and institutions that have contributed to security and peace in Somalia from 
the efforts of rebuilding security sector institutions. The new government must also tap 
into the input and contributions of all Somalis, including those residing in the diaspora, to 
contribute to the development of security sector institutions.
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Diasporic Women and NGOs in post-conflict Somalia
 
 
Ladan Affi
To be a Somali and a woman fighting for equality and social 
justice in these times requires an even greater deal of courage 
than in times of peace. And yet it is more necessary than ever 
(Nuruddin, Farah, 2000).
 
Introduction
War and its aftermath are often considered negative, particularly for the most vulnerable 
group of society – women, children and the elderly. But conflict, because of its disruptive 
nature, can provide opportunities to restructure social norms and institutions and perhaps 
lead to a society that is more egalitarian and democratic. But these gains can be lost again 
after the conflict ends or as part of the conflict resolution process. Thus, cementing gains 
made during the war is critically important in ensuring that these rights are not lost.
In the case of Somalia, the long civil war, that is yet to conclude, has provided spaces for 
women to inhabit that were previously unavailable to them. It has also created realities 
on the ground that cannot be disputed, namely that Somali women have sought to keep 
their families and communities together in any way that they can. That Somali women 
have taken on this immense responsibility is not new. Whether it was fighting for inde-
pendence from European colonisers or promoting the development of Somalia, Somali 
women have taken a positive and active role in advancing their country. Often, these 
contributions have been ignored, but during the past twenty years, denying women’s 
contributions is no longer possible.
This chapter seeks to explore one aspect of the larger role played by Somali women, spe-
cifically diaspora women’s activities through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In 
examining this, I hope to highlight their role in the provision of social services, and their 
promotion of peace-making and peace-building, and human rights, and state reconstruc-
tion from below. In a way, diaspora women are delivering services that were provided by 
the Somali state.
This is not to suggest that non-diaspora Somali women have done nothing. In fact, Somali 
women who remained at home bore the brunt of the violence that ensued from the civil 
war, while simultaneously taking on the responsibility of caring and providing for their 
families and their communities. In her study of Somali diaspora organizations in Toronto 
and Nairobi, Mohamud (2010) terms this the “feminization of Somali diasporic society”, 
although it is clear that this “feminization” is also evident within the larger Somalia’s civil 
society and can be traced back to the 1995 UN Beijing Conference (Tripp, 2003). Whereas 
Chapter 9
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other diaspora interact with the state, in Somalia, the long and still incomplete attempts 
to resuscitate the central state, mean that these diasporic women have to negotiate with 
a host of entities claiming authority ranging from clan elders to local and regional gov-
ernance structures. But a great deal has been written about the experiences of local So-
mali women, sometimes in their own words. For example, both Hawa Abdi (2013) and 
Asha Geelle Diiriye (2013), who are well known for their humanitarian work in Mogadishu 
and Puntland respectively, have written personal accounts of their experiences living in 
Somalia and their activities during the war. Similarly, Marian Arif Ghassim (1994) wrote 
about her views on the conflict in Somalia during the early part of the civil war.
Somali women who went abroad also shared these violent experiences with local So-
mali women within Somalia, on their journey out of the country and within the refugee 
camps. Recent studies on the Somali diaspora have largely focused on the ways that 
they contributed to the development of home, including through remittances, and the 
construction of schools, universities and hospitals (Ibrahim, 2010; Farah, 2009). Very 
little research has examined the activities of Somali diaspora women, particularly in the 
ways that women contribute to development, broadly defined, and in the ways that they 
transform existing norms at home.
This chapter seeks to address that research gap – by focusing on the role of returned 
diaspora women to Puntland and Somaliland in the social, economic and political spheres, 
and their impact on home. I argue that these returned diaspora women alter and chal-
lenge traditional norms and practices that are harmful to women and that marginalize 
their political, economic and social progress. Often, cultural or religious beliefs and prac-
tices are asserted in refusing women’s entrance into the political space, including their 
involvement in politics.
This chapter focuses on diaspora women for two reasons. First, despite facing hardships 
associated with settling in to their host communities, the contributions of Somali diaspo-
ra women have not been studied.  Also absent from studies on the Somali diaspora are 
the ways that diaspora women are changing traditional norms and their contributions 
to the reconstruction of the state. Secondly, unlike diaspora men who come back alone, 
women often come back with their families and make a long-term commitment to home. 
I argue that returning with their families creates an imperative necessity for these wom-
en to ensure that basic services, such as education and healthcare, are available for their 
children. It also informs their drive to ensure that Somali society becomes egalitarian, 
just, and democratic.
The first part of this paper will provide a brief historical overview of the role of Somali 
women in the pre-war era. This is to create a comparative frame to discern what, if any, 
changes have occurred regarding women’s position within Somali society after 1991. 
This will be followed by an examination of the consequences of the civil war for Somali 
women. Third, a framework for the diasporic experiences of Somali women will be pre-
sented. The fourth section of this chapter will provide concrete examples of the work and 
contribution of diaspora women based on fieldwork carried out in Puntland and Somali-
land. The final section will provide some concluding thoughts.
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Linking NGOs, Civil Society and Diaspora
In most countries, civil society is that space between the family and the state. In the case 
of Somalia, civil society is to be found between a weak, fragile state being challenged by 
multiple and competing authorities in Somalia. Civil society has become a space largely 
inhabited by women and their organizations because their presence was denied in both 
formal and traditional public spaces. Most of these NGOs work in the provision of basic 
services and promotion of human rights. NGOs or more broadly associational networks 
cut across boundaries, connecting people and promoting peace, and these cross-cutting 
links are crucial in minimizing conflict (Varshney, 2001). Traditional authority and the 
state exclude women, but Somali women and their NGOs have created a space for them-
selves between those two institutions. And for the past twenty-four years, civil society 
groups and more specifically NGOs have been relatively free to pursue their own goals. 
In fact, throughout Africa, women’s organizations have become “arenas in which women 
have been able to assert their varied concerns” (Tripp, 2003: 233).
Somali women, particularly those coming from Western countries, are familiar with the 
role and uses of NGOs, although local Somali women also established their own NGOs 
including umbrella associations like the Coalition for Grassroots Women’s Organization 
(COGWO), which had many of the NGOs in Somalia as members (Timmons, 2004). What 
really benefitted women and made these NGOs viable was the funding they received 
from international donors. These donors believed that circumventing African govern-
ments, many of whom were plagued with corruption and inefficiencies, would benefit 
these countries more because NGOs were easier to monitor and easier to ensure their ac-
countability. And, as donors focused on advocacy and the promotion of women’s rights, 
Somali diaspora women were able to take advantage of this (Tripp, 2003). Somali wom-
en’s diasporic organizations often possessed the linguistic and other skills needed to run 
an organization as well as apply for funds. They could also count on other diasporas to 
assist with fundraising efforts, as will be seen below.
• Somali Women Before 1991
Somali society is both patriarchal and patrilineal. Descent is traced through the male line. 
Within this system, women’s loyalties are suspect because women are born into one clan 
and often marry into another. This created conditions for Somali women to assume mul-
tiple roles, responsibilities and links that, historically, made rural women ideal in bridging 
the gap between warring clans that included cementing peace agreements through the 
exchange of women as brides. In times of peace, though, Somali women’s activities were 
valued in how much they enhanced the position of their male relatives. But rather than 
being weak, women created their own networks of support, including informal networks, 
kinship groups, work groups or religious associations to strengthen themselves and bat-
tle against patriarchy (Ahmed, 1994; Affi, 2005). These groups, as well as support from 
close female relatives, permitted Somali women to undermine the negative effects of 
patriarchy on their lives.
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During the colonial era, Somali women were actively involved in the struggle for independ-
ence. Zainab Jama documents the hardships endured by Somali women, including repudi-
ation by their families, injury, imprisonment, and even death at the hands of Somali men 
who had sided with the colonizers (Jama, 1991 and 1994). Somali women were not only 
battling the colonizers, but also the patriarchal and clan-centric nature of Somali society, 
which expected women’s contributions but rejected their demands, such as equality in 
participation and benefits from their sacrifices. So, although Somali men expected that 
women would equally bear the responsibility for opposing the colonizers, they rejected 
their demands for leadership positions in the anti-colonial movement. Nevertheless, So-
mali women continued to fight until independence was won. Rather than receiving their 
due share, the door to political participation was firmly shut to them during the civilian 
democratic governments which ruled Somalia from 1960-1969 (El Bushra, 2004).
This door would partially open during the revolutionary government’s tenure from 1969-
1991. This government introduced various laws meant to benefit women. This included 
compulsory education up to grade eight; free education and health care; overhauling of 
the family law by giving women equal rights to men; and appointing women to political 
positions, including allocating them up to ten per cent of parliamentary seats and as 
deputy ministers. Unfortunately, many of the laws intended to benefit women were not 
effectively implemented, and women were excluded from the Politburo, which was the 
highest governing body in the country (El Bushra, 2004).
• Escaping Through Migration
With the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, it was not only government institutions, which 
collapsed, but the cultural norms of Somali society shattered as well. As the civil war 
spread throughout the country, many Somalis sought safe haven in other countries. Once 
the Somali state disappeared in January 1991, millions of Somalis were on the move with 
at least two million leaving for Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Djibouti, and some continuing 
on to the Middle East, Western Europe, North America, and Australia. State collapse had 
a gender dimension, in that the disappearance of institutions like hospitals and schools 
and other social services disproportionally affects women and girls more dramatically 
than men (Dini, 2008: 94).
Somali women were directly targeted by all factions, and experienced sexual, physical, 
and psychological violence. They also suffered from the destruction of their livelihood 
and essential services such as the collapse of health, education, and law and order. The 
conflict also left women with the responsibility to provide for their families’ needs. As 
such, war threatened “women’s security at the deepest levels and in the broadest ways” 
(El Bushra, 2007:134-135). This does not mean that Somali women were only passive 
victims of the war, but rather their experiences can simultaneously embody “trauma and 
resilience” (El Bushra, 2007:134-135). 
Migration and the subsequent formation of the Somali diaspora took place over several 
decades and spread over many countries and continents. The most recent wave of Somali 
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migration occurred in the late 1980s and continues to the present. This migration was in 
reaction to the deteriorating economic and political conditions at home. Many of those 
who fled were refugees who requested and received refuge in Europe and, increasingly, 
in North America. Initially, many of those were from northwest Somalia, which faced es-
calating repression from the Somali government. As the fighting moved to southern So-
malia, more and more people fled the country (Berns McGown, 1999; Farah, 2009; Waldo, 
2006; Gundel, 2002).
Twenty-four years after the collapse of the state, and a continuous movement of Somalis 
to other countries, the number of Somalis living in the diaspora remains a guess at best, 
with the most-cited number being one million Somalis living abroad, constituting about 
fourteen per cent of the population. Recent reports, including a 2011 United Nations 
Development Programme one, have advanced a figure of one and a half million Somalis 
concentrated in three locations (Hammond et al, 2011). The first group of Somalis are 
those who have remained within the region, living largely as refugees in the neighboring 
countries of Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Yemen. The second group of Somalis 
that fled the conflict are to be found within the Middle East, especially in the Gulf States 
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The final group are those 
who have settled in Europe and North America, including the United Kingdom, the Scan-
dinavian countries, the United States and Canada. Newer movements have created com-
munities in Malaysia, Australia, South Africa, Libya, and Greece.
This spread of the Somali diaspora has merited the description of Somalia as a “globalised 
nation” (Sheikh and Healy, 2009; Menkhaus, 2008; Gundel, 2002). Laguerre, in his writ-
ings on the Haitian diaspora, expounds on this expanding nation when he notes, “the 
nation has outgrown the state because of its diasporic tentacles” (Laguerre 1991:635).
Somalis in the diaspora remit an estimated one billion dollars annually, although some 
studies suggest that remittances have increased to USD 1.5 billion as the number of So-
malis migrating has grown (Sheikh and Healy, 2009; Hammond et al, 2011). Remittances 
now exceed foreign direct investments, development aid, and exports combined (Chalm-
ers and Aden, 2008).
It is important to note that diaspora communities are not monolithic, and include eco-
nomic and social migrants as well as political refugees. However, political refugees fleeing 
from their home and country due to war or other types of violence have a particular set of 
traumatic memories and experiences that define them by a strong emotional attachment 
to home. Unlike other diaspora, many political refugees engage in political activities, seek-
ing to alter the conditions that led to their departure (Basch, et al., 1994). These political 
refugees can be more accurately described as conflict-generated diasporas because of 
their origins in violent displacement, and identities linked to symbolically important terri-
tory (Lyons, 2006). Conflict-generated diasporas more closely correspond to the original 
meaning of a diaspora – a group of people who have been forced to leave their homeland.
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Surviving Migration: The Changing Role of Somali Women
This poem by legendary poetess, Hawa Jibril, who commented on and analyzed the po-
sition of women in Somali society aptly, presents the condition of Somali women in the 
diaspora with her poem Nostalgia:
Once you have no country, you have no esteem
Your degree is as worthless as a worn-out dress
Hungry for daran, camels abandon unfamiliar pastures
Much worse is human longing
In utter rage, some even commit suicide
For, having lost prestige and possessions
They cannot endure any discomfort
My teeth are falling out, and my legs are feeble
As if beaten, my whole body aches
Bedridden most of the time, I go nowhere
I miss my country’s unpolluted green grass
Its cool breeze and soft sand
Sleeping on simple handmade mats
Swimming in the sea, the rivers rolling by
Strolling in the warming sun
Good neighbours and delightful times with friends
My soul is yearning for the place where my people dwell
But alas, my country has collapsed and I cannot visit
Indeed there is no cure for nostalgia (Alim, 2010: 201).
The worldwide dispersal of Somalis is different from that of previous migration in that 
women comprise a significant number and, in some countries, form the greater part of 
the community. Diaspora women are viewed as social capital by their families because 
women are more consistent in helping their families than are men. The explanation given 
for the difference between men and women is that women are kinder and more caring 
than men. This stereotypical portrayal of women excuses men’s unwillingness to meet 
their responsibilities, shifting the burden onto women. As such, now families with female 
relatives – sisters, daughters, mothers – abroad are viewed as luckier and more likely to 
be well-off than others with sons abroad. In one anecdote, an elderly man walks into a 
café in Hargeisa and asks who would take his four sons in exchange for one daughter. 
This changing perception that women are essential to the survival and the wellbeing of 
their families has led to a changing perception of Somali diaspora women. Local Somalis 
view women as more reliable in responding to the daily needs of their families and, as 
one remittance recipient put it, the difference between men and women remitters is that 
women worry about meeting the daily needs of their family (Lindley, 2010). As refugees 
who have experienced trauma through loss of family and living in an alien environment, 
Somalis face difficulties in integrating into their new country. As Africans and as Muslims 
in the post-9/11 world, they face racism and discrimination. Due to their visibly Muslim 
dress, Somali women are exposed to more prejudice and discrimination, both socially and 
in the workforce (Decimo, 2007).
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A significant number of families in the diaspora and at home are headed by women, in-
creasing the responsibilities of Somali women, both to their families in the diaspora and 
at home. Their fragmented families contribute to difficulties in adjusting to life in the 
diaspora, as many adults are mentally and financially torn between home and their newly 
adopted country. The Somalis in the US and elsewhere in the diaspora maintain family 
networks by sending remittances and facilitating family re-unification. Remittances are 
used by families to meet their daily needs, pay for children’s education and to invest in 
construction, telecommunication companies, and other investments (Lindley, 2010).
Due to their level of education, their responsibilities for their families, and the type of 
employment open to them with limited language and educational skills, many women 
struggle to meet their financial responsibilities. Women were thrust into the role of being 
sole breadwinners for their families in the diaspora and at home. Often, they subjugate 
their needs and those of their children to families at home who are living under uncer-
tain conditions. Somali women are so committed to helping their families that some in 
other developing countries even re-remit home a portion of their remittance, even when 
their own situation is precarious and they are receiving support from diaspora relatives 
in the West (Al-Sharmani, 2007). Due to the nature of the civil war, inter-clan relations 
were damaged as many sought protection within their own clans. Inter-marriages be-
tween clans, once promoted as a means of expanding access to resources and networks 
of support, were now discouraged (Timmons, 2004). Supporting one’s clan politically and 
financially, previously the domain of men, now included women. As such, women were ex-
pected to pay into their clan funds without being invited to sit under the proverbial tree 
and participate in the decision-making process, which continues to be the domain of men.
Diaspora and Development
Diasporas take part in the development of their home countries in numerous ways, in-
cluding the transfer of money, goods, knowledge, and skills. Diasporas are also more likely 
to invest in their home countries, regardless of the political and economic conditions, than 
are non-diaspora investors. As such, many developing countries have come to rely on di-
aspora investors. Secondly, aside from investing at home, the diaspora can attract foreign 
investors to their home country, thereby indirectly contributing to development (Davone, 
2007). Finally, the diaspora can formally engage with their home countries through the 
formation of NGOs or through hometown, ethnic, religious, and professional associations. 
All these different types of organizations connect with home in diverse ways to promote 
the development of the country. These diaspora organizations collaborate with local-
ly-based organizations or individuals, who are then responsible for the disbursement of 
funds and project implementation. Sometimes, these organizations can also directly col-
laborate with their home governments, which would provide some of the funding.
Thus, rather than the traditional image of a diaspora that maintains long-distance rela-
tions with home, occasionally returning to visit family, more and more are diaspora circu-
lating between home, host, and other diaspora locations. Michel Laguerre in his research 
on the Haitian diaspora clearly demonstrates these global relationships by showing that 
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the diaspora go through a process of de-diasporasation when they move home and re-di-
asporasation as they return to their host or other diaspora sites once again. For Laguerre, 
this process is not just one of changing location, but may involve acquiring citizenships in 
the case of second-generation diaspora or re-acquiring lost or renounced citizenship. This 
back and forth movement is often linked to business and political opportunities, as well 
as familial obligations. Laguerre categorizes diaspora activities into five groups, includ-
ing as go-betweens or brokers between the homeland and the hostland; as government 
strategists or informal lobbyists; as transnational activists; as influence peddlers; and 
as homeland government officials in the hostland. From these different categories, the 
most relevant in the case of Somali diaspora women are as that of informal lobbyists, as 
a transnational activists, and as influence peddlers (Laguerre, 2006).
The interactions that diasporas, as groups or communities, have with their home coun-
tries are mediated by the conditions at home, in the host society, as well as in interna-
tional relations. Therefore, “in analyzing transnational political subjects, it is important 
to recognize the multiple positionality that diasporas inhabit and that reflects both their 
agency and subjectivity” (Um, 2007: 254). Similar to other activities that take place 
across borders and continents, diaspora activities are shaped by changes in the global 
opportunity structure; by whether the diaspora is state-linked or stateless; and whether 
there are leaders within the diaspora (Smith and Stares, 2007). Somali diaspora women 
are impacted by changes in the international arena. The international community, which 
has prioritized the construction of a viable state for Somalia, often disregards the needs 
of women, including their desire for full political and social participation. For example, in 
the Garowe Principles, that women were allocated thirty per cent of the parliamentary 
seats was ignored by Somali politicians and the international community (UNPOS 2011). 
In this way, women’s struggles are subjugated by the existing structures in place, which 
favor men. Somalis also qualify as a stateless diaspora, which gives them a free hand in 
how they engage with home, whereas a state-linked diaspora often has the state mediat-
ing their activities. Due to their globalized nature, the Somali diaspora has yet to produce 
structured leadership.
IV. Returned Diaspora Women: Transforming Society
Despite the difficulties they have faced with their migration and resettlement, Somali 
women in the diaspora nevertheless play an important part in the development of home. 
Due to their financial clout and their rising demands for political representation, Somali 
women are transforming their political, social and economic roles. Some diaspora women 
have relocated home to build schools, hospitals and lead nongovernmental organizations, 
and promote human rights and environmental concerns. Many of the projects carried out 
by these diasporic women often benefit women, children, and other vulnerable commu-
nities.
In 1996, Hawa Aden returned from Canada and began a school for girls in Kismayo. 
Threatened by the militia there, she closed the school. She restarted her efforts in 
Galkayo, establishing the Galkayo Education Center for Peace and Development. Her ef-
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forts were again met suspicion and hostility by the community, encountering physical 
threats against her and the school.  Demonstrating the resilience and strength of Somali 
women, Hawa secured the building for the first school from the government of Puntland 
(Interview with author, 2006).
When Aden applied for, and was denied, funding from the UN and other international 
organizations, the center’s founders reached out to the Somali diaspora and received 
support from thirteen Somali diaspora communities in various countries to fund the first 
school. Even though the GECPD now receives international funding, the support from the 
diaspora continues. To demonstrate both the widespread support received by the center 
as well as their gratitude to their donors, Aden lists all their funders by name and place of 
residence on their office wall. GECPD supporters include individuals who send their contri-
butions directly to the center as well as groups who hold annual fundraisers. For example, 
a group of Somali-American women in Virginia send donations of about USD 1500 a year 
(Interview with author, 2008).
Tapping into her knowledge of the diaspora, the Executive Director of the center, Hawa 
Aden, uses trips abroad to raise funds. On a trip to Columbus, Ohio, a fundraiser was held 
for the center when Aden visited in 2002. Now, the center receives support from dias-
poras in Canada, the US, Sweden, Switzerland, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Australia, and 
Kenya. Signalling its growing importance to the larger Somali community, the center also 
receives funding from individual Somalis and companies across the country (Interview 
with author, 2006).
Today, the GECPD operates over a dozen schools for girls, minorities and women, and thou-
sands have graduated from its schools. To encourage nomadic and internally displaced 
parents to send their daughters, the center owns and runs several boarding schools. It 
also offers an afternoon school program, called Second Chance, for young girls who are 
either working outside the home to support their families or are busy with household 
chores in the mornings that prevent them from attending the day school. Other programs 
that the center offers include vocational training and adult literacy programs for women. 
Today, more than four thousand girls, women and minority students benefit from the 
programs offered by the GECPD, while thousands more have graduated (Interview with 
author, 2006).
Aden’s activities are not limited to the educational sector; she also tackles a variety of 
topics, some of which are taboo within Somali culture, but which are detrimental to the 
health and wellbeing of girls and women in Puntland. This is in line with the view that 
the diaspora bring with them social remittances including ideas, beliefs, and ways of do-
ing things from their host countries to their home countries (Levitt, 1998). These social 
remittances are intended to transform home by concerning themselves with issues that 
the diaspora sees as infringing on the human rights of some groups or those that hamper 
good governance, such as corruption or promoting free and fair elections.
Two of the issues that Aden undertook and that she continues to fight against are female 
genital cutting and forced prostitution, along with the accompanying rape of young girls. 
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In the first case, Aden was uncompromising on outlawing the practice of female genital 
cutting on girls. For example, rather than calling it female circumcision, which is the name 
preferred by Somalis as well as a direct translation of what it is called in Somali, or using 
the more neutral and descriptive term female genital cutting, Aden uses the much more 
controversial name of female genital mutilation. Aden organizes workshops and even 
made posters and T-shirts condemning this practice, and teaches classes on the detri-
mental effects of this practice in all her schools (Interview with author, 2006).
The much more divisive, issue that Aden confronted was the issue of forced prostitution 
along with the rape of young girls. This issue most affected internally displaced people 
(IDP), particularly women and girls who fled the conflict in southern Somalia. Often these 
women lacked protection and, because they lived in areas that were not part of their 
clans’ territory, they did not receive the same level of protection that the women of Punt-
land could call upon (Hill, 2010). If a woman who is from Puntland claimed rape, theoret-
ically, her male relatives and her clan would come to her aid in asking for justice. But, due 
to their IDP status, many of these women who were forced to engage in prostitution used 
the money to meet their family’s basic needs. Their IDP status and their clan membership 
meant that these women were unable to protect their young daughters from being raped 
and they received no assistance from the dominant clan or the Puntland state in seeking 
justice (Hill, 2010). Hawa Aden tried “to get the religious scholars to address this issue 
by condemning it in the Friday sermons but without much success.” According to Aden, 
the “religious scholars preferred to ignore the problem” especially since she had linked it 
to the widely available pornographic films that are openly sold in the city’s main market 
(Interview with author, 2006).
Another important contribution of the center is its peace promotion activities. Galkayo is 
split into north and south, and between the two clans that live there and which have hos-
tile relations with one another. Except for the city center, which is open to everyone, each 
clan mostly keeps to its side of the city. But the GECPD runs schools in all neighborhoods 
of the city and the staff of the freely move within the city (Interview with author, 2006). 
For her commitment to changing the lives of girls and women in Somalia, Hawa Aden was 
awarded the “Women of Courage” award by the United Nations.
Diaspora contributions to education, whether in the form of remittances, or sending ma-
terials, or returning home to build these institutions is in line with migration literature 
which shows that diasporas engage in activities that not only contribute to its develop-
ment but which transform home. The activities carried out by Hawa Aden and the GECPD 
are in line with the latter in that the organization does not stop at only educating girls 
and women but also seeks to transform the position of women within that society by 
directly addressing barriers to women’s rights and their advancement.
Other diaspora women have been active in the area of human rights much more directly, 
such as Zamzam Abdi Adan, a returned diaspora woman from the United Kingdom and 
former Executive Director of the development NGO the Committee of Concerned Somalis 
(CCS), as well as the former Chair of the Somaliland Human Rights Organizations Network, 
also known as Shuro-Net – an umbrella group of human rights organizations in Somali-
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land. Zamzam Abdi Adan has been an active and visible force in promoting and speaking 
out against human rights violations in Somaliland. Whether speaking out for the freedom 
of the press or against the detention of political opposition leaders, or for the rights of 
prisoners, she has been a critical force in pressuring the Somaliland government to re-
spect human rights (Interview with author, 2007). For example, when sixteen-year-old 
Zamzam Ahmed Dualeh from Puntland was charged with espionage, imprisoned, and 
claimed rape, torture and physical beating by the guards, it was Zamzam Abdi Adan who 
spoke out. Another Somali diaspora woman from the United Kingdom, a lawyer and the 
Director of African Rights, Raakiya Omaar, also got involved and hired four lawyers to 
represent Zamzam Ahmed Dualeh. Both Adan and Omaar were criticized for publicizing 
the case, particularly by some members of the Somaliland diaspora who considered it 
as negative publicity and harming the image of Somaliland, and potentially its quest for 
recognition (Interview with author, 2004).
In addition to her tireless work in the field of human rights, Zamzam Abdi Adan, as head 
of the CCS, advanced the economic, health and social wellbeing of Somalis, particularly 
that of women, through programs in micro-credit, skills development, and healthcare. In 
the political sphere, she was an activist who called for increasing the number of women in 
positions of political leadership and, through her network campaigns, Zamzam and other 
(mostly diaspora) women living in Hargeisa were able to increase the level of female par-
ticipation in running for electoral office and in voting (Interview with author, 2007). As 
the current Somaliland Minister of Higher Education, Zamzam continues to contribute to 
the development of home.
Other diaspora women are to be found in all sectors of Somali society. For example, Fa-
tima Jibrell, a long-time diasporic from the US and the head of the nongovernmental or-
ganization Horn Relief, now renamed African Development Solutions (ADESO), is a recog-
nized activist for her work in environmental conservation and education. Some diaspora 
women are to be found in the business sector, establishing businesses and employing 
locals. Often, these diaspora women utilize the resources available at home. One returned 
diaspora woman from Canada established a frankincense business and was exporting it 
to various countries in the Middle East. Another, who had returned from the US, estab-
lished a network for those in the fishing, frankincense, and livestock sectors so that small 
businesses, which are mostly owned by women, could work collaboratively and collective-
ly advance their business interests (Interview with author, 2010).
Diaspora Women and Politics
As Somali women in the diaspora begin to realize their power, more are getting involved 
in politics. Their work with NGOs has served as a platform for many of these women 
to catapult them onto the national stage. At many community meetings, demonstra-
tions and other events related to home, women in the diaspora in collaboration with 
local women are at the forefront, organizing and attending in large numbers. Politically, 
their participation has dramatically increased. In the last two reconciliation conferences 
in Djibouti and Kenya, a sizeable number of diaspora women attended, pushing for wom-
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en’s participation in politics at home. Because participation was based on clan affiliation, 
women were separated along clan lines, but they often managed to work across clan 
lines in support of issues of concern to all women. At the 2002 reconciliation conference, 
Somali women delegates, a large number of whom came from the diaspora, formed the 
so-called Sixth Clan to counter the patriarchal effects of the clan which was pulling the 
women away from each other and undermining their ability to promote their agenda, 
including increasing the number of female parliamentarians and ensuring the representa-
tion of women at all levels of decision-making. The Sixth Clan was intended to designate 
the women participants as their own clan, with their own set of issues and concerns (In-
terview with author, 2008; Timmons 2004).
The women were successful in reserving twelve per cent of the parliamentary seats for 
women at the Kenya Conference and having it enshrined in the Transitional Federal Char-
ter, although they were less successful in having women occupy all the seats, as some 
clans refused to allow women to represent them (Timmons 2004). Some of the women 
delegates were elected to the parliament and one woman from Columbus, Ohio unsuc-
cessfully ran for the 2004 presidential election. In regional elections, Fowsiyo Haji Aden 
from the UK attempted to run for the presidency of Somaliland in 2003, but was disqual-
ified from participating for a variety of reasons, leaving the field open for the three male 
candidates. During 2012-2013, the Somali Federal Government had two women minis-
ters, both from the United Kingdom, appointed to powerful positions. Fowsiyo Yusuf Haji 
Aden, a long-time activist, became the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Prime 
Minister, the first time that a woman has held this position. While the other, Marian Qa-
sim, became the minister of the enlarged ministry of social services, which is responsible 
for education and healthcare. Somaliland also has two women ministers from the United 
Kingdom and the United States responsible for Education and Rural Development and 
Environment, similarly Puntland has two female ministers responsible for Women and 
Social Affairs and Constitutional and Federal Affairs.
Conclusion
As “the lives of Somali women continue to be besieged by unending material deprivation, 
violence, insecurity, chaos and anarchy” (Dini 2008:94), Somali women in the diaspora 
have stepped in to provide various services needed by women but which benefit the 
entire society. This is not to suggest that Somali women in Somalia cannot do or provide 
these services for themselves. They do and they are, and some have received interna-
tional recognition and awards for their work. For example, Dr. Hawa Abdi in Afgoye has 
hosted thousands of the internally displaced fleeing from Mogadisho and runs the largest 
internally-displaced camp. And Edna Adan in Hargeisa, who has built a maternity hospital 
and a nursing school which has saved the lives of thousands of women and children, are 
examples of what locally-based Somali women can achieve; yet both rely on support from 
the diaspora. But this paper primarily seeks to highlight the sacrifices and commitments 
made by Somali women in the diaspora who are torn between two lives – that at home 
and in host societies.
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Somalis at home and in the refugee camps are grateful for the economic support they 
receive from their mothers, daughters, nieces, aunts, and grandmothers. This gratitude 
is translating into a growing acknowledgement of women’s vital role within society. But 
demands for social justice, equality and political participation have led to resistance both 
within the diasporic communities and at home. Promotion of social and political rights 
among diaspora women is viewed suspiciously by the men, and as an indication of grow-
ing Western influences over women who have forgotten their place.
While men are bogged down in the politics of clannishness, violence and destruction, 
diaspora Somali women have sought to take advantage of their new environment in a 
variety of ways. Living in the diaspora has allowed them to create spaces that allow for 
their economic independence, while pursuing equal participation in all aspects of society.
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Understanding Transnational Islamic NGOs in Somalia
 
 
Afyare A. Elmi
Introduction
In general, Islamic nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are “voluntary (national, re-
gional or transnational, as well as community-based) entities for which Islam is an impor-
tant inspiration to do good and an identity marker that distinguishes them from NGOs 
with similar orientations and objectives” (Salih, 2002: 3). More narrowly, transnational 
Islamic NGOs are not-for-profit entities; they collect donations, and work in several coun-
tries outside of their headquarters (Kaag, 2008). Taken together, transnational Islamic 
NGOs, like others in this business, are established to work in areas of relief and devel-
opment in poor countries (Salih, 2002; Kaag, 2008). The sources of funding for Islamic 
NGOs (local, national, regional or transnational) include various types of donations that 
Muslims give – some of which are mandatory, such as zakat (Islamic alms), while others 
are voluntary, such as sadaqat (charity) (Salih, 2002; Saggiomo, 2011).
Saggiomo (2011) identifies private donations, public donations, and user fees as the 
three main sources of funding for most Islamic NGOs that work in Somalia. In addition, 
Islamic NGOs raise funds from Muslims in their respective countries. As mentioned above, 
philanthropy is a religious duty for every Muslim: those who can afford it must give man-
datory alms from their wealth. However, it would be misleading to claim that only the rich 
contribute to charity. Islam encourages Muslims to pay charity (a small amount or large 
amount) regardless of their status. As such, this is perhaps the most important source of 
funding for Islamic NGOs coming from majority-Muslim or Western countries. In addition, 
as Saggiomo (2011) rightly argues, Islamic NGOs may access public funding from their 
home governments. In fact, some even apply for and receive American and British aid 
money (through the United States Agency for International Development and the UK’s 
Department for International Development). However, since 9/11, governments have 
been restricted in providing grants to NGOs (Saggiomo, 2011). Moreover, Islamic NGOs 
charge affordable user fees for the educational and health services they provide. Where 
someone cannot pay, the NGOs try to find sponsorships that might pay for the schooling 
of orphans or the poor (Saggiomo, 2011).
In this chapter, I examine the origins, activities and scope of transnational Islamic NGOs 
in Somalia. I then discuss and analyse their contributions, arguing that these NGOs, like 
many Western NGOs and inter-governmental organisations, largely focus on education, 
health, relief (mostly for the poor, and internally-displaced peoples (IDPs)), and water, 
sanitation and hygiene (WASH). Moreover, by classifying these NGOs according to their 
countries of origin, I analyse the features they share and those that are unique to a par-
ticular group of NGOs, such as those from Turkey. Finally, I discuss the impact of these or-
Chapter 10
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ganisations and the challenges they face in delivering humanitarian charity aid to needy 
Somalis.
 
Nature, Activities and Scope of Transnational Islamic NGOs
Somalia’s state collapsed in 1991. Since then, civil war and drought have killed hundreds 
of thousands of Somalis. The suffering of the Somali people continues to this day. Ac-
cording to Laura Hammond, there are currently around 1.2 million refugees in Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti and Uganda. Moreover, there are about one and a half million 
internally-displaced Somalis within the country (Hammond, 2013). Many NGOs, from all 
corners of the world, provide assistance to the Somali people, and Islamic NGOs also play 
a critical role in this rescue effort (Saggiomo, 2012).
The exact number of Islamic NGOs is not known. For this study, I have identified twen-
ty-three transnational NGOs from Turkey, the Middle Eastern region and Western coun-
tries that work in Somalia – there could be more charities in the country. Besides the 
Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), which is a government agency, 
there are eight major NGOs from Turkey that work in Somalia. In addition, there are ten 
agencies from the Middle Eastern region: three from Saudi Arabia, two from Qatar, one 
from the United Arab Emirates, one from Egypt, one from Sudan, one from Kuwait, and 
one from Iran. Interestingly, Islamic NGOs are not only based in Muslim countries. In So-
malia, there are at least five transnational NGOs that are based in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and other Western countries. These organisations are usually estab-
lished by Muslim communities in the West.
In Somalia, the areas in which the transnational Islamic NGOs work often differ: some focus 
on education and health; others work in a number of areas, including providing relief to the 
IDPs, and sponsoring and implementing development projects. In February 2013, I visited 
the Rajo camp in Mogadishu, which was set up for internally-displaced people. Turkish Red 
Crescent has been managing the camp since 2011. At the time, there were about twen-
ty-nine thousand individuals in the camp. The Turkish Red Crescent built tents, provided 
food aid, and built a mosque, bathrooms, and a play area for the children in the camp. 
Turkish relief workers were present at the time I visited the camp. The Rajo camp was con-
sidered to be a model camp, and it was well-run compared to other camps in Mogadishu.
While there, I met the IDPs in the camp and some of the officials of the Turkish Red Cres-
cent. Those managing the camp told me that they were thinking of finding a way to help 
rehabilitate the IDPs to their home villages. The Turkish Red Crescent also distributes 
food aid to different parts of Somalia. According to officials on the ground, as recently 
as November 2013, the agency sent emergency food aid to the areas of Puntland that 
had been affected by cyclones. In addition, the Crescent manages a consortium with the 
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, providing basic services for Mogadishu – garbage col-
lection, incineration, production of sewage infrastructure, and debris removal. Eventually, 
once trained, Somali authorities are expected to take over these duties. I also met the 
IDPs who appreciated the assistance that the agency was providing to them.
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The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), a Turkish 
Islamic NGO, is also active in Somalia. While in Mogadishu, I visited a new orphanage that 
the Zamzam Foundation, a local partner, and the IHH built together. The new orphanage 
houses about four hundred young orphans. More than a thousand Somali children from 
the neighbouring areas would also join the school there, but would not live in the com-
pound (Personal Communication, 2013). In addition, according to the IHH reports, the 
organisation provided relief and sponsored a number of recovery projects. A case in point 
is drilling water wells; the IHH says it has drilled many shallow and deep wells in order to 
provide safe drinking water.
Moreover, Milli Gorus (Hasene), Yeryuzu Doktorlari (Doctors Worldwide – a UK-based 
Turkish NGO), Yardimeli and the Besir Trust assist Somalis in various ways. Milli Gorus 
(Hasene) is not new to Somalia. It used to come to Somalia in the past at least once a 
year in order to provide charity during Eid al-Adha (an Islamic holiday). However, after 
the famine, the organisation expanded its operations in Somalia and started to work 
on the ground, mostly in helping the IDPs. The organisation has rebuilt the marine and 
fisheries school in Mogadishu and partnered with the City University in Mogadishu in the 
operation of the educataion institution. On the other hand, Yeryuzu Doktorlari specialis-
es in providing medical assistance to Somalis, and has established the Shifa Hospital in 
Mogadishu. Moreover, Yardimeli, an Istanbul-based NGO, is building a specialised hospital 
with a hundred-bed capacity in the capital. It provides some food aid for IDPs and organ-
ises Qurban during Eid. The Besir Trust also manages an orphanage in Mogadishu. Finally, 
the Diyanet Trust, a governmental agency, provides religious education scholarships to 
Somali students in Turkey, and also manages the imam (preacher) school in Mogadishu. 
They have also renovated some mosques in Somalia.
Furthermore, another Turkish organisation, Al-Nile, is active in the area of education in 
Somalia. The Somali government allowed the Nile Organization to renovate and then op-
erate two famous secondary schools in Mogadishu: the former Banadir Secondary School 
and the former polytechnic secondary school. Since renovating the latter, hundreds of 
students now study there. The organisation charges fees to students. In other words, 
this is not free education, even though it is heavily subsidised. In addition, other Turkish 
NGOs – associations and charitable trusts – deliver aid projects for Somalia on a tempo-
rary basis, such as Qurban organisations during Eid al-Adha, food aid during Ramadan, 
temporary medical missions, and so on. These depend on the donations earmarked for 
Somalia that these charities receive in Turkey and which change each year.
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Table 10.1 Turkish-based NGOs
 
NGO Country of origin Duration Sector
Turkish Red Crescent Turkey Since 2011 WASH and IDPs
IHH Turkey Since 2011 Education
Milli Gorus (Hasene) Turkey Since 2011 Education
Doctors Worldwide Turkey Since 2011 Health
Yardimeli Turkey Since 2011 Education and WASH
Besir Trust Turkey Since 2011 Education (orphanage)
International Blue Crescent Turkey Since 2011 WASH
Diyanat Trust Turkey Since 2011 Education
 
Besides the Turkish NGOs, other transnational Islamic NGOs from different Muslim coun-
tries are present in Somalia. The Qatar Red Crescent and Qatar Charity have offices in 
Mogadishu and provide assistance to the Somali people. The Qatar Red Crescent runs 
some hospitals and provides medical help to the sick. In fact, the Qatar Red Crescent has 
left positive impressions with the projects it has been managing while working in Soma-
lia. The Qatar Charity has had an office in the capital since 2004 and it has supported 
basic services in education and health. In addition, the Arab Medical Union, an Egypt-
based organisation, largely focuses on the area of health. Doctors from the organisation 
run a hospital in Mogadishu. They also travel to other cities in order to provide medical 
services to the needy of Somalia. Similarly, a Saudi-Arabia-based organisation, Patricians 
across the Continent (PAC), provides health services; while the World Assembly of Muslim 
Youth (WAMY) focuses on education. On the other hand, the International Islamic Relief 
Organization (IIRO) is active in a number of areas, including giving general relief and 
supporting the rehabilitation of IDPs. Moreover, the Saudi National Campaign (Saudi gov-
ernment donor) now funds sixty-five projects in education, health and livelihood which 
aim to reconstruct thirty-three schools, ten health facilities, a technical school, an orphan 
collage, and twenty socio-economic projects in ten regions. The Saudi National Campaign 
also funds the drilling of one hundred and fifty boreholes in Somalia (Interview, 2014, 
Mogadishu). The Organization of Islamic Conference’s Mogadishu office manages these 
projects. Furthermore, the Iran Red Crescent is also active in the health sector, and runs a 
medical centre in Mogadishu.
Direct Aid (formerly Africa Muslims Agency International), which is based in Kuwait, has 
been working in Somalia since the collapse of the state in 1991. The agency provides ed-
ucational assistance in Somalia. It runs eight schools throughout the country, and it also 
supports one of Mogadishu’s higher education institutions – SIMAD University. The or-
ganisation has educated thousands of Somalis over the course of the last decade. More-
over, the Crescent Welfare Society International of the United Arab Emirates has been 
present in Somalia for the last twenty years. Like Direct Aid, the organisation works in the 
area of education. Finally, the Munazzamat Dawa Islamiya (Islamic Dawa Organization) 
of Sudan has also been active in Somalia for a long time. It has many schools throughout 
Somalia and has educated thousands of Somalis. Many graduates from Somali schools 
went to Sudan and other Arab destinations to complete their higher education.
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Table 10.2: Middle Eastern-based NGOs
NGO Country of origin Duration Sector
World Assembly of Muslim 
Youth (WAMY) 
Saudi Arabia Over 20 years Education and health
International Islamic Relief 
Organization (IIRO)
Saudi Arabia Over 20 years Education, WASH and 
livelihood 
Patricians across the Conti-
nent (PAC) 
Saudi Arabia Since 2011 Health
Qatar Red Crescent Society Qatar Since 2011 Health, WASH and live-
lihood
Qatar Charity Qatar Since 2011 Education, WASH and 
livelihood
Dawa Organization Sudan Over 20 years Education, health and 
livelihood
Direct Aid (Former Africa 
Muslim Agency)
Kuwait Over 20 years Education and liveli-
hood 
Iran Red Crescent Society Iran Since 2011 Health
Red Crescent Society United Arab Emirates Over 20 years Education and health
Humanitarian Coordination 
Office
Organization of Is-
lamic Cooperation 
(OIC) 57 Muslim 
States based in Jed-
dah, Saudi Arabia
Since 2011 Advocacy, funding ap-
peals and coordination 
of all humanitarian 
sectors
 
Outside the Muslim countries, there are about five major NGOs based in Western coun-
tries that have offices in Mogadishu. While this list is not exhaustive, the biggest are Is-
lamic Relief (UK), Mercy International (USA) and the Amoud Foundation. These NGOs are 
active in all areas of relief and development throughout the country. According to its re-
ports, the Amoud Foundation runs the Al-Hayat Hospital, supports a number of education 
projects, and distributes food aid to the needy. Moreover, the Amoud Foundation dedi-
cates parts of its funding to orphans throughout the Somali region. Mercy International 
has established a number of tuberculosis clinics in most regions. Moreover, it also assists 
malnourished children with food and nutrition support, and works in the field of malaria 
prevention (Personal Communication, 2013). In addition, Muslim Aid (UK) and Muslim 
Hands (UK) support health, education and emergency relief. They also help the IDPs.
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Table 10.3: NGOs based in Non-Muslim countries
NGO Country of origin Duration Sector
Mercy International USA Over 20 years Health, education and WASH
Amoud Foundation USA Over 20 years Health, education and WASH
Islamic Relief UK over 20 years WASH, education and livelihood
Muslim Aid UK Since 2011 WASH and health
Muslim Hands UK Since 2011 WASH and livelihood
Besides delivering aid and implementing development projects, the OIC’s Humanitarian 
Coordination Office has been actively working with local and international partner NGOs 
since 2011; most transnational Islamic NGOs are members of this collaboration effort. The 
office coordinates the works of forty-two organisations based in Somalia. Taking its cue 
from an earlier organisational model used by Nairobi-based NGOs that worked in Somalia, 
the office has organised its partners according to the functions they focus on. The Hu-
manitarian Coordination Office of the OIC identified five functional areas in which most of 
its partner organisations work: food, education, health, non-food items, and WASH. Food 
distribution has been a major part of the work of all NGOs since Somalia’s state collapsed 
in 1991. Unfortunately, because of the prolonged conflict and cyclical droughts, those 
who live in the most-fertile areas of Somalia have depended on such aid for a long time.
In addition, since Somalia’s authorities cannot deliver basic services, the NGOs filled this 
vacuum and, since 1991, have been providing education and health services. The lucky 
ones (not all people, of course) that have access to education and health services have 
depended on NGOs. While Islamic NGOs are not the only group providing these vital ser-
vices, their leadership role in these two sectors cannot be ignored. Finally, most Islamic or-
ganisations have also provided water and sanitation-related services and assisted many 
IDPs and needy Somalis with non-food items.
Findings, Analyses and Implications
Based on the above data, a number of observations can be made. First, it is clear that 
there are more Turkish NGOs than from any other Muslim country in the world. With the 
exception of one, almost all of the Turkish NGOs arrived after the 2011 famine. Obvi-
ously, the relationship between the Turkish and Somali peoples is not new. Somalia was 
part of the Islamic empire, and Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa dates back to the 
sixteenth century. However, in this case, the dominance of Turkish NGOs is part of the 
Turkish government’s decision to assist Somalia.
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Turkey’s recent, unique, and successful humanitarian assistance to Somalia began with 
the writings and speeches of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, at the height of the 
2011 famine in Somalia (Erdogan, 2011; BBC News, 2011). Prime Minister Erdogan crit-
icised the international community for its poorly-coordinated relief effort. Standing on 
the side-lines while thousands of people starve is morally unacceptable, he argued. This 
was not mere rhetoric. On 19 August 2011, Erdogan visited Somalia’s capital city, Mog-
adishu. In the delegation he led were ministers of his government and members of his 
family. While in Mogadishu, the Prime Minister and his delegation visited the victims of 
the famine and witnessed first-hand the magnitude of the disaster. Erdogan was moved 
to state, “This crisis tests the notion of civilisation and our modern values” (Erdogan, 
2011). Promptly, the Turkish government installed Dr. Kani Turan as an ambassador in 
Mogadishu. Dr. Turan is a medical doctor and a humanitarian worker. He quickly devel-
oped an advanced understanding of the country, and as a result has done an excellent job 
in coordinating the Turkish effort in Somalia.
Substantive support aside, Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit has had two positive implica-
tions. First, it has helped further mobilise the Turkish population, aid agencies and busi-
ness sector. I was in Istanbul in July 2011, which coincided with the month of Ramadan 
(the month in which Muslims fast during the day). The level of mobilisation among the 
Turkish population for the Somalia cause was tangible everywhere. The media, mosques 
and average people on the street all knew about the Somalia catastrophe, and I heard 
many stories of how people wanted to do something about it. In essence, the Turkish 
commitment was societal, not just a government reaction to a crisis. NGOs were part of 
this mobilisation, and it is therefore not surprising to see eight Turkish NGOs in Somalia. 
In fact, diplomatic sources told me that Turkey raised more than USD 300 million in 2011, 
surpassing the funds raised for the tsunami in Indonesia and floods in Pakistan.
Erdogan’s visit has also raised the morale of the Somali people. In fact, through the sym-
bolic importance of the visit and subsequent substantive assistance, Turkey has captured 
the imagination of the Somali people. Abandoned and neglected for a long time, Somalis 
feel that Turkey is a serious brotherly country that is determined to assist the Somali peo-
ple. This has restored hope for many. Although traditional aid workers did not like this, 
Turkish agencies have benefited from Somali society’s more-positive perceptions of Tur-
key. In fact, the broad public support that the Turkish approach secured from the Somali 
population initially forced opposition groups to retract their violence from rescue efforts.
Second, all of the transnational Islamic NGOs listed above are on the ground. Somalia is 
a country that has not seen law and order for two decades. There are criminals, business 
warlords and corrupt politicians who are determined to exploit the misery of the millions 
affected by the famine. Some even opened their own camps and forced the famine vic-
tims to stay there. The problem was compounded by a lack of credible partnership at the 
Somali governmental level. With all these complications, and despite threats, delays and 
robbery, Islamic NGOs maintained offices in Somalia. Being on the ground in Somalia has 
actually reduced the administrative and delivery costs of these agencies. Compared to 
many Western NGOs that chose to operate from Nairobi or partner with local agencies, 
these organisations spend less on administration. Arguably, the most important factor 
that helped the transnational Islamic NGOs was the fact that they are on the ground.
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Third, most Arab-based NGOs have been in Somalia for more than two decades: the WAMY 
and the IIRO (Saudi Arabia), Direct Aid, the Red Crescent Society (UAE), and Munazzamat 
Dawa Islamiya have been working in Somalia since 1991. The fact that these organisa-
tions kept their offices open against all odds is surprising. A second factor related to Ar-
ab-based NGOs is that most of them are managed by Somali professionals. Perhaps this is 
the main reason that has permitted these transnational organisations to stay in a lawless 
country for more than two decades. In contrast, Turkish NGOs are managed by Turkish 
citizens that are on the ground.
Fourth, although they work in various sectors, most transnational Islamic NGOs specialise 
in the education and health sectors. It is very clear from the above table that many Is-
lamic NGOs work in areas of education. For instance, Direct Aid has at least eight schools 
throughout the country. Thousands of Somali students benefited from the schools that 
the Red Crescent Society of the UAE, WAMY and Munazzamat Dawa Islamiya have man-
aged for the last two decades. In addition, Islamic NGOs have supported higher education 
institutions; Turkish NGOs are also active in the education sector. Besides hundreds of 
scholarship to Somali students, several Turkish NGOs, including IHH and Al-Nile renovated 
abandoned schools and now educate many Somali children. Besides education, Islamic 
NGOs focus on the health sector. For example, Doctors Worldwide runs the Shifa Hospital 
in Mogadishu. An Egyptian NGO, the Arab Medical Union, also has a hospital in Somalia; 
meanwhile the Qatar Red Crescent, the Turkish Red Crescent, the International Blue Cres-
cent, Yardimeli and the Iran Red Crescent also specialise in the area of health.
There are two rationales given for the Islamic NGOs’ focus on education. One important 
reason is the vacuum left by the statelessness situation created in the 1990s. In fact, 
Somali students did not get the opportunity to go to school for the first few years of the 
civil war (1991–93). For many teachers and activists, this was a situation that could not 
be ignored. Some Somali educators convinced Islamic NGOs that came to help during the 
1992 famine to support education sector. Related to this rationale is the fact that there 
were many unemployed teachers and educators available in the country. This became 
a job-creation opportunity for many in Somalia. In effect, this combination of negative 
circumstances worked for the benefit of society.
Fifth, since Arab-based NGOs have been in Somalia for the longest duration, they have 
developed a unique system that has made their efforts sustainable. Interestingly, a good 
number of the schools and health centres that these Islamic organisations have created 
are so far self-sustained. Most of these schools charge tuition fees. Those schools that 
are in urban centres attract many students that have families that can pay the tuition 
fees, which are generally affordable. For those that cannot afford the fees, agencies try to 
assist them through sponsorships. Back in 2000, I visited one school in Mogadishu. Coin-
cidently, I met a parent who came to talk to the principal to negotiate the fees. The father 
told the principal that he had a number of children, and he could not pay the required 
fee for each of them. After a lengthy discussion, the principal gave a discount, which the 
parent accepted. I was told that this was a normal practice: administrators often use their 
discretion on the issue of how much they charge. According to one interviewee, Somali 
educators who led these organisations came up with the idea of cost-sharing because 
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they believed that the assistance from overseas could stop at any time.
 
Impact of Islamic NGOs in Somalia
It is difficult to measure the impact of Islamic NGOs in a precise manner. However, what 
is clear is that these organisations have had a significant economic, social and political 
impact on Somalia. Economically, whatever funding that these organisations spend in 
Somalia contributes to the economy of the entire country. In addition, many educators 
and administrators work for these organisations as well. More importantly, as a result of 
the services these organisations provide, tens of thousands of Somalis have received an 
education in the last twenty years. In fact, one can safely argue that the educated elite in 
Somalia are largely those that have been educated in Somalia and who then went on to 
Arab countries for further studies.
 When it comes to university graduates, Sudan leads the way, with thousands of young 
men and women graduating from universities in the country every year. In addition, other 
Muslim countries, such as Turkey, Egypt, Uganda, Yemen, Malaysia, and Pakistan, have 
also educated Somali graduates. This fact has had a significant impact on the politics of 
the language used for educational instruction in Somalia: today, the Arabic language has 
become the de facto language of the educated elite.
In addition, various Somali Islamic movements have played a significant role in the suc-
cess of the Islamic NGOs. There are cases where Islamist leaders lobbied these organisa-
tions and convinced them to open an office in Somalia. Even in those organisations where 
this is not the case, Islamist organisations were the natural candidates for partnering 
with NGOs from the Muslim world. Many of the Islamists spoke Arabic and understood 
the context well. Moreover, Islamic movements are diverse in terms of regions, and they 
are also well-organised, so can therefore deliver on their promises. As a result, many of 
the workers and leaders of Islamic NGOs have roots in one or more Islamic movements in 
Somalia.
Politically and socially, Islamist movements in Somalia have also benefited from this re-
lationship. By the mid-1990s, many Islamist-led civil society organisations had emerged. 
They also helped to create umbrella organisations in education and health. In addition, 
the fact that they led organisations that provided basic services helped the Islamists raise 
their profile. In other words, working for or leading the Islamic NGOs became a training 
ground for many of them – and this later helped them in their political success. In fact, 
some of Somalia’s current prominent politicians have worked for one or more Islamic 
NGOs in Somalia.
Besides their positive impact on society, Islamic NGOs, like others, have a negative impact 
on state-building. These NGOs are the only providers of basic services to the people of the 
country. The Somali state is absent from health, education, food aid, and WASH, and this 
affects the legitimacy of the state in numerous ways (Wiktorowicz and Farouki, 2000). In 
addition, as a result of the civil war, many Somali professionals have left the country. The 
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NGOs employ and provide better salaries to those people who stayed behind. This is dev-
astating for the uncompetitive Somali state, because few professionals are interested in 
joining the bureaucracy of the government. More importantly, the umbrella organisations, 
for instance, the Formal Private Education Network in Somalia and School Association for 
Formal Education (SAFE) that the Islamic NGOs created in order to fill the vacuum have 
now become permanent institutions that, at times, undermine the government’s minis-
tries (Elmi, 2010). In fact, the Somali government realised that it could not do anything 
without the umbrella groups and therefore it reached an agreement with them in April 
2014 (the Agreement between Umbrella Groups and the Somali Government). Overall, de-
spite helping many needy Somalis, the growth of Islamic NGOs will challenge the growth of 
the Somali state in the future. However, this is not limited to the Islamic NGOs. In Somalia, 
one can say that all kinds of NGOs are undermining the state in multiple ways.
 
Challenges Facing Islamic NGOs
Generally, there are many security hazards when it comes to working in Somalia. There 
are multiple authorities that claim they rule parts of the country. Opportunistic politi-
cians, militia leaders, gangs, and business warlords regularly threaten and harass NGOs 
as a whole. Besides this common security problem, Western governments’ suspicion of 
anything “Muslim” or “Islamic” is another challenge. For instance, some Western govern-
ments questioned the rescue efforts of Turkey and the positive reception it received from 
the public.
Western governments raise many questions relating to accountability and transparency. 
Accountability here does not only mean that which corresponds to their funders – Islamic 
NGOs are good at this, otherwise they would have lost their funding a long time ago: 
it means accountability to the public as a whole. A good number of Islamic NGOs (local 
or transnational) do not produce and publicise their annual reports or audited financial 
statements. For those that maintain websites, there is little information available on the 
projects they carry out in different countries. Islam does not encourage a person or even 
a group to boast about a charity payment. Normatively, it is better for one not to brag 
about what he or she has done, particularly when assisting a needy person. Perhaps some 
of the NGOs have poorly understood this normative duty, and they think it prevents them 
from presenting their work publicly.
Islamic NGOs face difficulties in accessing funding from overseas. Somalia’s financial in-
stitutions and banks are non-existent. Moreover, the country’s instability prevents in-
ternational banks from opening branches in Somalia. As Saggiomo (2011) notes, some 
Arab governments stopped providing grants to their own agencies in Somalia because of 
accessibility. For the first time, a project which is funded by the Saudi government was 
delivered through OIC’s offices in Mogadishu, which are about to complete renovating 
thirty-three schools in ten regions, and deliver other thirty-two projects. Furthermore, it 
will hire teachers and administrators and support it for one year, before it transfers the 
schools to the Somali government. If this works, it might open channels where some oth-
er Muslim countries can undertake major projects.
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In addition, Islamic NGOs from different countries face diverse challenges. For instance, 
Turkish NGOs have been in Somalia since 2011; for them, one major challenge is the sus-
tainability of their work in the country. For now, they benefit from the heavy presence 
of the Turkish government in Somalia and the positive perception that comes with that. 
But, Turkish NGOs need to learn from the experience of the other Islamic NGOs. Schools 
and hospitals must be designed in a self-sustainable way if funding ever dries up. Ob-
viously, some of them have already adopted the user-fee structure. But this might not 
be sufficient. Therefore, for all Islamic NGOs, endowments and other means of ensuring 
long-term success is in order.
Conclusion
Islamic NGOs provide assistance to many needy Somalis. Most of them have been working 
in the country for more than two decades. In this chapter, I explained the nature, activities 
and scope of these organisations. Based on the originating country, even though the list 
is not exhaustive, I found that there are twenty-three transnational Islamic NGOs that are 
from Turkey, Middle Eastern and Western countries. In addition, I found that the Islamic 
NGOs largely focus on education and health. I argued that these agencies lead in these 
two sectors. I analysed the reasons behind the decision for focusing on these areas, con-
tending that the vacuum created by Somalia’s statelessness forced these organisations 
to focus education and health. In addition, I identified the economic, social and political 
impacts that these organisations had on the society and the state. Finally, I discussed 
the economic, security, accountability, and political challenges that Islamic NGOs face in 
Somalia. Overall, transnational Islamic NGOs have played crucial role in helping the Somali 
people. Like others, Islamic NGOs, although they fared better in some areas, have a long 
way to go to systematise and sustain themselves in Somalia.
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Re-Anchoring Ethiopianism to Galvanise the 
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Mammo Muchie and Hailemichael Teshome Demissie 
 
 
To rake among the embers of Ethiopianism is to find a few 
sparks which may throw some light on the obscure roads into 
the African future (George Shepperson, 1953).
And thus would our contemporary intelligentsia draw inspira-
tion from the African intellectuals of the 19th century to give 
birth to a new Ethiopianism that would enable Africa to claim 
the 21st century (Thabo Mbeki, 2010).
Introduction
In the wake of the centenary of the African National Congress (ANC) and at these mo-
ments of the celebration of the jubilee of the OAU-AU (Organization of African Unity-Af-
rican Union), it is timely to revisit the “Ethiopianism” movement that was the ideological 
front of the struggle against Apartheid and colonialism in Southern Africa and beyond. 
Ethiopianism started as a movement to countervail and challenge the racist theology of 
the white mission churches. The movement was inherently transnational, as it was ef-
fective in exploiting the deliberate ambiguity of the reference to “Ethiopia”, sometimes 
in its biblical Graeco-Roman usage, sometimes in its modern usage to refer to the East 
African Kingdom, and sometimes to both at the same time. This ambiguity was used 
as the strategy to conceal the political objectives of the movement as well as to flag it. 
While the Graeco-Roman usage of the mythical ”Ethiopia” was invoked for the universal 
claim of the movement, Ethiopia as a reference to the free sovereign Abyssinian kingdom 
that was successful in fending off continual foreign aggression and was used to provide 
a concrete and immediate example of the beacon of freedom for the then-liberation and 
Pan-African movements. The spread of the anti-racist theology to emerge in the form of 
Ethiopianism across South Africa, “the pernicious Ethiopian propaganda” as the white 
authorities characterised it then, so deeply threatened the white supremacists that they 
legislated to ban it.
After a brief narrative of the Ethiopianism movement in Southern Africa, its highs and 
lows in the scholarship on anti-Apartheid and anti-colonial struggles, the chapter exam-
ines what lessons are to be drawn from Ethiopianism for the current endeavours to real-
ise African Renaissance and unity. How Ethiopianism is understood and interpreted is of 
Chapter 11
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vital significance to the current discourse on Pan-Africanism, the African Renaissance and 
African unity. It is a crucial legacy of the African liberation movement that will galvanise 
the transnational movements of today in their bid to stand up to the challenges of new 
modalities of exploitation currently, and in the times ahead.
“Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance” was the slogan adopted as the theme of the 
twentieth ordinary session of the AU Assembly held in Ethiopia in January 2013. The idea 
of an “African Renaissance” has now been in consistent currency for the last two decades. 
While this is not the first time that the idea of an African Renaissance has been floated, 
the particular reference here is to the Mbeki-Mandela idea of African renewal with the 
newly-liberated South Africa joining the continental community of nations. The idea has 
given rise to a flurry of activities including the establishment of research institutes (in 
Gaborone and Pretoria, for example), the publication of books and articles, not to men-
tion the vibrant debate on various fora. The idea even seems to have its own symbol in 
the controversial gigantic monument built by the former Senegalese President Abduo-
laye Wade named “African Renaissance”.
As much as it was able to garner support, it was also a subject of controversy and critique. 
Among the critiques of the initiative is the one that questions its originality and au-
thenticity. The idea of African Renaissance has been slapped down as deeply Eurocentric. 
Thus, argues cultural historian Owen Alik Shahadah:
The most profound problem with the specific usage of the Re-
naissance is shows[sic] the framework of Africa as nothing 
more than a cultural orphan of Europe. Africa must exist and 
define itself in its own terms of reference and not be boxed into 
European concepts and constructs (Shahadah, 2012).
The bias in this critique is evident, as it fails to see the initiative as an African initiative or 
lend it the benefit of the doubt to that effect. The critique chose to see the initiative from 
a European perspective, revealing the commonplace obsession of gauging African initia-
tives using European standards and tools. As such, the critique of the African Renaissance 
as a “cultural orphan” of European history cannot escape the very charge that it is itself 
levelling against the Mbeki-Mandela idea of African Renaissance – the critique itself is a 
Eurocentric critique. Its failure to probe into the African roots of the idea and how much 
the authors of the idea were inspired by the African, rather than the European, origins of 
the concept is indicative of the fixation with European ideas.
The critique overlooks and completely ignores the history of “outbursts of Afrocentrism” 
from the Harlem Renaissance to the Mbeki-Mandela African Renaissance (Masolo,1994: 
41). Unlike the critique above, some African scholars speak of a different point of view: 
“It is Europe which has arrogantly and illegitimately identified itself with what was origi-
nally not its own” (Ibid). Mbeki was indeed echoing the call of Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, who 
was the first secretary of the ANC, and then its future president (Bongmba, 2004: 295) 
Seme is famous for his 1906 medal-winning speech at Columbia, The Regeneration of 
Africa, in which he referred to Africa’s own history and not European history as the basis 
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for Africa’s regeneration. As he poignantly put it, “the ancestral greatness, the unim-
paired genius, and the recuperative power of the race, its irrepressibility, which assures its 
permanence, constitute the African’s greatest source of inspiration” (Seme, 1906). The 
critiques eschewing the African contribution simply add to the self-denigration fodder 
that jams the production of African initiatives in general.
Any critique of the African Renaissance initiative could not claim credence without ad-
dressing the issue of the roots of the idea. Bringing together the concepts of Pan-African-
ism and Renaissance as AU’s chosen theme was not a thoughtless amalgamation of ide-
as. It was, rather, a recognition of the link between the two ideas and their African roots 
and authorship. The idea of an African Renaissance was aired long before its twenty-first 
century reincarnations. It featured in the Pan-African ideals of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, when it was known by various aliases of which Ethiopianism was among 
the most prominent. The powerful narratives that were developed around Ethiopianism 
are of such significance that they continue to inform the debates on the current quest 
for African unity and Renaissance. Africa should look back and bring back the ideals and 
ethos of Ethiopianism to meet the challenges of the unfinished business of African unity, 
and to stand up to the new and emerging challenges that are more subtle and insidious 
than the challenges that were faced during slavery, colonialism, and Apartheid. Africa 
is now in a situation reminiscent of the olden days. It is caught between old and new 
powers vying for their own spheres of influence in yet another edition of the “scramble 
for Africa”. There cannot be any better time than these trying times to bring back the 
discursive arsenals from the early struggles under the rubric of Ethiopianism.
The Rise and Spread of Ethiopianism
The early flashes of Ethiopianism date back to the sixteenth century, when African-Amer-
ican blacks as slaves in America found solace in the promise of a homeland in the empire 
of the Ethiopia of the Nile region. The references to Ethiopia in the Bible provided them 
with an ideology that they could use for their spiritual, political, and cultural uplifting. The 
blacks in America, the West Indies, Europe, and in Africa itself derived enormous inspira-
tion from the Scriptures, where the word ‘Ethiopia’ occurs more than ninety times. By far 
the most widely-quoted verse, “probably the most widely quoted verse in Afro-American 
religious history”, is Psalm 68:31 – “Ethiopia shall stretch her hands unto God” (Haywood, 
2000: 368). The verse was interpreted as pointing to the end of the curse on the black 
race – an end to the alienation of Africa from God. This was a European belief that was, to 
some extent, shared by blacks (Nelson, 1994: 68; Van Dijk, 2004: 176). Thus came into 
being the movement of Ethiopianism as a “method of winning Africa for Christ” and as a 
“forerunner of the subsequent African philosophies that aimed at black unity to confront 
White power” (Barrios, 2008: 33).
Some saw the beginning of the fulfilment of this prophetic verse on the political level. 
After the 1792-1800 successful slave insurrection in Haiti, it was declared: “Thus doth 
Ethiopia begin to stretch forth her hand, from the sink of slavery, to freedom and equali-
ty” (Dread History, undated). The verse gave rise to “a biblically-rooted pan-African her-
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meneutic” that later became a widely used source of inspiration and legitimisation of 
Pan-Africanism (Nathan, 2012: 277). Garvey extensively used the Ethiopian discourse in 
the thinking that was later known as Garveyism. It was this same verse that was recited 
in the speeches for the motion to establish the South African Native National Congress, 
the precursor of the ANC (Hughes, 2011).
The main site of the Ethiopianism movement in Africa was Southern Africa, and some 
writers even define Ethiopianism by confining it to Southern Africa only (Shepperson, 
1953). While it was a Pan-African transnational movement straddling the continent and 
the Atlantic, it was certainly more intense in Southern Africa. Chronologically, the South-
ern Africa experience was predated by the Ethiopianism movement in the New World, 
where black clergymen were excluded from full participation in church life. The black 
clergymen were debarred form occupying higher positions in church administration, ir-
respective of their qualifications or fitness for the relevant office. In 1787, an Ethiopian 
church, the African Episcopal Methodist church, was established under the leadership of 
a freed slave, Bishop Richard Allen, withdrawing from St George’s church in Philadelphia. 
Followers of this new church who took part in the American War of Independence wore a 
badge displaying the words “Allen’s Ethiopians”. Since then, the Ethiopianism movement 
has spread, as one author put it, “like the proverbial mustard seed” (Campbell, 1998: 63).
In both America and Southern Africa, the Ethiopianism movement was first a reaction 
to the discrimination in ecclesiastical administration and the outright marginalisation 
of black clergymen. The black clergymen underwent demeaning acts of de-selection for 
ordination and promotion to the clerical echelons. They were denied their deserved pro-
motion to the higher ranks of the clergy for no other reason than the colour of their skin. 
The white mission churches had it as their unwritten bylaws that the ordination of blacks 
was to be avoided. Even where a black clergyman was ordained, he was stripped of the 
authority and privilege that he was supposed to have had by virtue of his ordination. The 
fact that this act of discrimination took place in locations as far apart as America and 
South Africa over a long period of time is proof that it was rather a systemic practice than 
a symptom of sporadic racism.
The reasons for the discontent of the black clergy that gave rise to the Ethiopianism 
movement, especially in Africa, range from the personal ambitions of individual black 
clergymen to doctrinal differences. The following summarises the principal causes of the 
movement:
The frustrated desire of many Africans to become church lead-
ers; colour prejudice practiced by missionaries and their failure 
to live by the Christian brotherhood they proclaimed; disputes 
over church discipline rooted in differing moral standards; the 
precedent of schism and denominationalism in Western Chris-
tianity; personal ambition among Ethiopian founders and their 
conviction of a divine calling; the denial to black women Chris-
tians of adequate means of self-expression in church; and the 
availability of Scriptures as the basis for a critique of mission 
Christianity (Pretorius and Jafta, 1997: 213).
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The black clergy came to realise that the attempt to rectify the wrongdoings of the white 
clergy within the existing church structure would come to no avail. The Reverend Man-
gena Mokone, founder of the Ethiopian Church of South Africa, concluded that “this sep-
aration shows that we cannot be brothers” (Chirenje, 1987: 43). He further questioned, 
“If all this is so, where is justice? Where is brotherly love? Where is Christian sympathy?” 
(ibid). The option they resorted to was setting up their own independent churches, with-
drawing from the white churches.
The first notable withdrawal from the white churches in Southern Africa took place when 
Nehemiah Tile, a minister who rose to prominence as an accomplished preacher in Them-
buland, seceded from the Wesleyan Methodist church in 1884 – a hundred years after 
the first black church was established by Richard Allen in America. Tile’s move was the 
first salvo heralding a long history of the Ethiopianism movement in Africa. It was such 
a significant milestone in the history of the anti-Apartheid struggle in South Africa that 
Nelson Mandela himself paid tribute to the Thembu Church a century later:
African clergymen sought to free themselves from the fetters of 
white missionaries by establishing African Independent Church-
es. One of the most celebrated breakaways was that of Nehemi-
ah Tile who founded the Tembu Church in the Transkei in 1884.... 
That political movement was to culminate in the formation of the 
ANC in 1912. It is in this sense that the ANC we trace the seeds 
of the formation of our organisation to the Ethiopian movement 
of the 1890s (Address by Nelson Mandela to the Free Ethiopian 
Church of Southern Africa, 14 December 1992).
The next major event in the history of Ethiopianism was the establishment of Rever-
end Mangena Mokone’s church. After resigning from the Wesleyan Methodist church in 
Pretoria, he set up his own church and called it the Ethiopian Church of South Africa. 
Mokone quickly established alliances with the American black churches that shared a 
similar history of discrimination and had passed through a similar route to independence. 
The number of Ethiopian churches was growing at an alarming rate for the white author-
ities. “Ethiopia” became the label for independent African churches that seceded from 
the white mission churches. As Shepperson recounts, by 1912 in South Africa, the Ethio-
pianism movement has resulted in seventy-six independent churches, and three decades 
later the number had jumped to over eight hundred (Shepperson, 1953). With their own 
specific history and denomination, Ethiopian churches are now believed to number more 
than six thousand (Pretorius and Jafta, 1997).
Ethiopianism was a truly transnational movement; it was not a phenomenon confined 
only to the Southern African region or the African diaspora in America. It was a movement 
that fuelled the anti-colonial struggle in Eastern and Western Africa too. Jomo Kenyatta, 
certainly inspired by the movement, is quoted as saying that Ethiopianism was the most 
popular religious sect (Shepperson, 1953). In the then-Nyasaland, the 1915 uprising led 
by John Chilembwe, a Baptist minister who. like other Ethiopianists, broke away from the 
mission church, espoused Ethiopianism to finally become a national hero of independent 
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Malawi (Shepperson, 2003). As late as the dying years of colonialism, Ethiopianism was 
fully in operation, as is evidenced by the establishment of the Kenyan Church of Christ in 
Africa in 1957 withdrawing from the Anglican sect in the same fashion as the rest of the 
Ethiopian churches (BlackPast.org, undated).
Ethiopianism continued to animate the anti-colonial and anti-Apartheid struggles, even 
in the 1970s and 1980s. The significance of its philosophy continues to inspire historians 
and scholars to this day. Writing in the 1980s about the revolutionary movements of the 
1970s and 1980s, Mutero Chirenje (1987: 168) warns against any attempt at pitting the 
Ethiopianism movement against the African revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s: “If the 
activities of the Ethiopian movement and allied organisations...are viewed in the context 
of their time, they will be seen to be no less acts of self-determination than are the armed 
struggles for national liberation now taking place throughout the southern Africa”. Ethi-
opianism is not a spent force, as is implied by the fact that less and less of it is invoked 
in the post-colonial and post-Apartheid discourse. The essence of Ethiopianism was ar-
ticulated by one of the founders of the Ethiopian churches as being a movement aimed:
To plant a self-supporting, self-governing and self-propagat-
ing African Church which would produce a truly African type of 
Christianity suited to the genius and needs of the race and not a 
black copy of any European Church (Mzimba quoted in Pretorius 
and Jafta, 1997: 212).
These ideals, in their political dimensions, are the ideals that Africa has not yet realised 
and are still struggling to achieve. It is to be reckoned that Ethiopianism has become 
even more relevant in the current context of twenty-first century exigencies and Africa’s 
place in the twenty-first century. “Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance”, the theme 
of the jubilee of the OAU-AU, strongly resonates with the ethos of Ethiopianism. The sig-
nificance that the movement acquired over the centuries and the multiple meanings in 
which it was understood have enriched the idea and augmented its potency as a source 
of inspiration for all freedom-seeking people around the globe. The multiplicity of its 
meaning is such an important feature of the concept of Ethiopianism that it deserves to 
be treated on its own.
The Double Duality of Ethiopianism
Ethiopia of the Bible and Ethiopia the East African Kingdom
The Ethiopia in Ethiopianism is mainly the Ethiopia in the Graeco-Roman and biblical ref-
erence. How much overlap there is between the Ethiopia of the Graeco-Roman reference 
and the Kingdom of Ethiopia is still a matter of debate for historians. The concept of 
Ethiopianism reflects to some extent this debate, vacillating between the biblical Grae-
co-Roman reference and the Kingdom of Ethiopia. More often than not, the two referenc-
es reinforced each other, owing to the endurance of the independence of the kingdom 
fending off European colonisation and encroachment, especially the victory at Adwa and 
the many other events from the coronation of Ras Tafari as Hailesellassie and his deifica-
tion in Rastafarianism, to the foundation of the OAU in Addis Ababa.
187
In the latter days of the movement, reference to the Kingdom of Ethiopia within the con-
text of the movement was more explicit. The Ethiopian movement acquired more political 
content as an anti-colonial movement, especially after the battle of Adwa that bolstered 
“the mythic status and redemptive symbolism of Ethiopia in the eyes of Africans at home 
and abroad” (Dread History, undated). For the opponents of the movement and for those 
threatened by its expansion, the ambiguity compounded their anxiety. The convergence 
of the two senses of Ethiopia created a powerful synergy.
Ethiopianism that began mainly as a reaction to the discontent with church administra-
tion was now turning increasingly political, buoyed by the story of the beacon of a free 
African Kingdom that brought a European power to its knees. The movement’s identifica-
tion with the Kingdom of Ethiopia reached a new height with the coronation of Hailesel-
lassie and the rise of Rastafarianism. Rastafarianism arose as a sequel of the Ethiopian-
ism that was prevalent before it in Jamaica. With Hailesellasie claiming a biblically-royal 
pedigree and taking the title of the King of Kings, Lord of Lords, and Conquering Lion of 
the Tribe of Judah, descending from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, the Kingdom 
of Ethiopia was literally taken in its biblical understanding as the “black Zion” or the Af-
rican “promised land” (Iyob, 1997). After the news of the coronation, there was a mobili-
sation among the blacks in the New World for a mass exodus back to Africa.
When Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, Africans on the continent and in the diaspora saw 
it as an attack on their revered symbolism of black history – Ethiopia as the “centre of 
the African world” (Pampallis, 1997: 147). Ruth Iyob quotes Nnamdi Azikwe’s homage 
to Ethiopia as a good example of how Ethiopia, “the last vestige of black autocracy”, was 
looked on by blacks around the world:
It represents the type of government which the forefathers of 
Africans established in this continent. [T]hat country will go 
down as one of the few survivors of the great powers of histo-
ry... [T]he continued existence of Ethiopia after its contemporar-
ies and their descendants had vanished from political history, is 
and should be an object of admiration (Iyob, 1997: 50).
The admiration was not without its practical implications as it led to a worldwide protest 
against Italy. The mobilisation against Italian aggression ranged from blacks enlisting in 
Harlem, New York to fight for Ethiopia, and South African dock workers protesting against 
the aggression by refusing to handle Italian cargo in Cape Town and Durban (Pampallis, 
1997). After the eviction of Italy from Ethiopia, the restoration of Hailesellasie was cel-
ebrated as a victory for Africa. Ethiopianism at this historical moment was invariably 
identified with the Ethiopian kingdom.
Ethiopia’s several contributions to the Pan-African cause further crystallised the identi-
fication of the Ethiopian Kingdom with the movement of Ethiopianism. The concept re-
mains polysemous, especially as to whether the Ethiopia in Ethiopianism is the Kingdom 
of Ethiopia or the Ethiopia of ancient Greeks and the Bible. However, since the two senses 
in which ‘Ethiopia’ was used were complementary and reinforced each other, no historian 
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agonises over the issue to delink the two ideas.1 Mandela and Mbeki speak of both Ethi-
opia and Ethiopianism. The symbolism Ethiopia conveyed for Mandela is on many levels: 
from the logistics he was provided by the kingdom; his first passport and his military 
training; to the observation at a ceremony where white military advisers were bowing 
to a black monarch, Hailesellassie, were all significant moments for Mandela and the an-
ti-Apartheid struggle that had its roots in the Ethiopianism movement (Mandela, 2010). 
His impression of Ethiopia was articulated in his autobiography where he said:
Ethiopia always has a special place in my imagination and the 
prospect of visiting Ethiopia attracted me more strongly than a 
trip to France, England and America combined. I felt I would be 
visiting my own genesis, unearthing the roots of what made me 
an African (Mandela, 1994:362).
For Thabo Mbeki, the link between Ethiopia and Ethiopianism is organic. He unifies the 
two ideas while referring to Ethiopia as providing “the central organising idea for all Af-
ricans”. By evoking the battle of Adwa, King Menelik, and the geopolitical role of Ethiopia 
and pulling the thread to link it with Pixley Seme’s famous Columbia speech and the ac-
tivities of Ethiopianists like the first president of the ANC, John Dube, who was identified 
by the white authorities as “a pronounced Ethiopian who ought to be watched”, Mbeki 
establishes that one cannot draw a line between Ethiopia the East African nation and the 
Ethiopia of Ethiopianism (Mbeki, 2010).
The link between the history of Ethiopianism and the history of the Ethiopian Kingdom 
is at its strongest on the ideals that the movement was seeking to achieve, and the ideal 
the Kingdom of Ethiopia represented – freedom. The concept has transcended the geo-
graphical connotations, developing into an abstract universal philosophy underlying the 
struggle against discrimination, racism and European white supremacy. It is a concept ap-
pealing to all freedom-seeking people, irrespective of their background – racial, religious 
or otherwise.
The duality of Ethiopianism playing between the Ethiopia of the Bible and the East Afri-
can Kingdom was an expression of yet another fundamental duality – the religious and 
political dimensions of Ethiopianism. The ecclesiastical beginnings of Ethiopianism have 
1 There are researchers who try to dissociate the two senses of Ethiopianism. Such researchers are obvi-
ously in the minority running against the widely-held stances on the interpretation of Ethiopianism. The 
analyses by Assafa Jalata  and Ruth Iyob are examples here. Their take on Ethiopianism does not seem 
to be balanced. There is no denial that Adwa was an enormous inspiration not only for blacks but to all 
freedom-loving people all over the world. The movement of Ethiopianism was reinvigorated by Adwa 
and this is acknowledged by several writers. Assafa Jalata’s aim is to undo this by obscuring Adwa’s 
significance by magnifying the then rulers’ conduct towards their own people internally. Assafa Jalata 
and Ruth Iyob are glossing over the fact that Africans in slavery were beseeching a return home to the 
very chief who sold them for a ‘barrel of rum’. It is in no way reasonable to pit Ethiopianism against 
the internal struggle for democracy and as   Ruth Iyob recalls, the attempt by some African groups to 
pressurise Hailesellassie to carry out reforms did not succeed as the symbolic significance of Ethiopia 
for the whole of Africa was beyond question. The two issues – Ethiopia’s Pan-African role and Ethiopia’s 
democratic governance – should be considered on different levels and should be evaluated as such on 
their own.
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not in any way limited the concept from taking on purely political and even military and 
insurgent action as its mode of operation. Right at the start, the choice of the very name 
“Ethiopia” was deeply political and profoundly subversive, as church historian Adrian 
Hastings recounts:
“Ethiopian” is an oddly misleading name for what has been 
characterised as ecclesiastical “Ethiopianism”, because it is not 
a Protestant name at all, but in itself is already evocative of 
quite other things. It is both symbolically African (proto-African, 
pan-African, one might say) and it can actually be found in the 
Bible. “Where can you find the name of Dutch reformed in the 
Bible?” or “Methodist”. This was no idle question but a very se-
rious one. You have given us the Bible, and then to the Bible we 
shall go. The names of Zion and Ethiopia are most undoubtedly 
there (Hastings, 1979:74).
The seditious nature of the movement was well realised by the white regime that identi-
fied it as “its most dangerous opponent” (Etherington, 2012:55). Ethiopianism was the 
harbinger of the latter day “church and violence” debate of the sixties and seventies that 
demonstrated the political involvement of churches in the starkest of its manifestations 
(Tingle, 1992). The ANC moved to armed struggle, while Albert Luthuli, a devout Christian 
who was opposed to violence, was its president – a paradox that can be explained by the 
polysemous concept of Ethiopianism (Erlank, 2012: 89).
 
From the Canon to the Cannon - Ethiopianism as a Transnational Politico-ecclesias-
tical Movement
During the early flashes of Ethiopianism, it was thought to be non-threatening by the 
white colonial authorities. Before it soon came to be labelled as the “Ethiopian menace”, 
it was thought to be a church affair with no or limited political implications. The clergy-
men who seceded from the white-governed churches were modest in their demand for 
independence. As Mangena Mokone, the founder of the Ethiopian Church of South Africa 
put it in his resignation letter, the motive for leaving the church was “to serve God in his 
own way” (Chirenje,1987: 42).The true reason behind Mokone’s resignation request was 
not lost on his superior to whom the resignation letter was tendered. Pretending to be 
unfazed by Mokone’s move the superior too downplayed the resignation treating it as an 
event of no real significance . The injustice that Mokone was made to endure, the racial 
discrimination against black clergymen, in particular the de-selection of black clergymen 
for higher office, was not mentioned in either Mokone’s resignation letter, or in his supe-
rior’s report to the higher church authorities.
Initially, the movement appeared to be a religious movement with no qualms about colo-
nial rule. This was an important tack to get licence and recognition from the government. 
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“It was as important for the Ethiopians to have a political thrust as it was for them to 
conceal it” (Davenport, 1987: 231). With the passage of time, “a dialectical relationship 
between nationalism and Ethiopianism gradually appeared” (Lahouel, 1986: 686). Ethi-
opianism fuelled African nationalism, while African nationalism led to the proliferation of 
the independent churches.
It was, however, clear that the Ethiopianism movement was as much, if not more, political 
than it was religious. The revolting clergymen were expressing their protest at the dis-
crimination that the church was practising against blacks – discrimination that was the 
order of the day with white settler rule, but was evidently against the Christian teaching 
of justice and the Christian brotherhood. The constitution of the Boer Republic of the 
Transvaal stipulated that there was “no equality in church or state between white and 
black people” (Pampallis, 1997: 3). It was, on the other hand, a shared position among 
the black nationalists that such racism is not what Christianity taught and that Christian-
ity was indeed against it. The secessionist clergymen were unambiguous in their protest 
against discrimination, irrespective of the setting where it was taking place – church or 
government.
While it started as a religious movement, it was “apparent that spiritual matters were not 
primary issues” (Pretorius and Jafta, 1997: 213). Ethiopianism was a direct anti-racist 
and anti-colonial movement. Writing on the rise of one of the earliest Ethiopian churches, 
the Cape Times, in 1893, lamented in its editorial that “it would be the height of folly to 
ignore the [Thembu church]”. It characterised the church as “patriotic”, “political” and 
“ecclesiastical”. As historian Mutero Chireje (1987:24) observed, the Cape Times was 
able to foresee the duality of the concept of Ethiopianism – both the religious and politi-
cal aspects of Ethiopianism which he thought was not sufficiently stressed in the studies 
of Ethiopianism. Recent literature also points out that the view that Ethiopianism was 
apolitical had negatively impacted the research on the Christianity and politics relation-
ship in Africa – a relationship that has yet to be defined to this day (Erlank, 2012).
Ethiopianism Today
Ethiopianism today seems to have been shelved to the archives section of the anti-racial, 
anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle. It was declared “finished” when the focus was 
away from transnational Pan-African struggles of liberation, turning towards narrower 
regional and national liberation struggles. George Shepperson, a writer on Ethiopianism 
thus concluded:
It seems that Ethiopianism is finished as a basis for political ac-
tion and that it is now no more than a sentimental, nebulous 
symbol around which the bitter memories of intentions of both 
races may on occasion group themselves.(Shepperson, 1953: 
p.17). 
191
In its ecclesiastical sense, Ethiopianism has passed its sell by date. In the era of talk of the 
possibility of a black Pope, and with powerful churches led by black pastors, bishops and 
cardinals, the question of justice and fairness within churches might have been addressed 
to a great level of satisfaction as far as debarring black clergymen from church hierarchy 
is concerned.
However, churches are not institutions merely preoccupied with their own internal af-
fairs. The social mission that they have assumed harks back to the precepts of the Ethi-
opianism movement, more in the political than in the ecclesiastical sense. In its political 
sense, Ethiopianism is alive and kicking, with a variegated purpose responsive to the 
demands of the day. African theology is called upon to confront corrupt leaders, to ques-
tion the neoliberal ideology wreaking havoc on the African populace, and to be the voice 
for the voiceless. It is argued that African theology should interrogate concepts such as 
the African Renaissance in light of “black theology, which takes socio-economic realities 
seriously”(Bongmba, 2004: 307). Ethiopianism has been a prominent facet of black the-
ology that remains operational, despite the push by mainstream politics to relegate it 
into irrelevance on the juridical basis of the separation of state and church. Churches are 
often prodded not to recoil from politics. As a South African clergyman put it, “if politics 
is that art of the actual, Christian hope seeks its transformation” (De Gruchy quoted in 
Bongmba, 2004: 308).
The social activism of churches is well documented in its various forms. Among the church 
movements espousing social activism, is the liberation theology movement that had a 
wide base in South America. This transnational movement advocates active church in-
volvement in the struggle for social justice, radical economic structural change, and the 
rights of the poor. Liberation theology is overtly political and is even said to marry Marx-
ism with Christian theology, with its followers mainly identified as “the Catholic and Prot-
estant left” who are deeply critical of the dominant neoliberal ideology our time (Turn-
er,1994: 12). The liberation theology movement and the Ethiopianist movement share 
a common purpose, as both movements seek to “[do] theology from the perspective of 
the oppressed” (Turner, 1994: 16). In its African and Protestant chapter, the liberation 
theology movement finds expression in the works of Ghanaian pastor Dr. Mensah Otabil. 
Otabil sought to revive Ethiopianism as a “Christianised sequel to Pan-Africanism”, em-
phasising its transnational features – in effect completing the circle going back to the 
beginnings of Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism, as shown in the discussion above, had its 
origins in the independent black churches that were the seedbed of Pan-African strug-
gles. Ethiopianism was the moniker of the Pan-African movement until the beginnings of 
the twentieth century.
Otabil’s teaching was openly political with incisive criticism of African governments, the 
neoliberal world economic system, the structural adjustment programme (SAP) pre-
scribed for Africa, neo-colonialism, the African mentality of “slavery”, and the “begging 
attitude”. His book, Beyond the Rivers of Ethiopia: A Biblical Revelation on God’s Purpose 
for the Black Race, is thought to have laid the basis for what has been called an “Evangel-
ical Pentecostal Liberation Theology” (Van Dijk, 2004: 165). Otabil’s liberation theology 
is fundamentally political in the same way that Ethiopianism was. He is quoted saying 
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Christians cannot say “let’s leave politics to the politicians”. In language that is starkly 
reminiscent of the Ethiopianism of the nineteenth century, Otabil attacks the twenty-first 
century global economic structure:
The economy is controlled by multinationals. We worked for 
them to create wealth for them to take it out of the country. We 
were hewers of wood and drawers of water. I prayed to God to 
prosper, but we have to change economic structures and social 
structures (Van Dijk, 2004: 178-179)
Otabil’s work, certainly inspired by Ethiopianism and Pan-Africanism, is testament to the 
relevance of Ethiopianism to present-day Africa and its quest for a dignified role in the 
global economic and political sphere. The relevance of Ethiopianism has been poignantly 
articulated in Mbeki’s appeal to the African intelligentsia:
And thus would our contemporary intelligentsia draw inspira-
tion from the African intellectuals of the 19th century to give 
birth to a new Ethiopianism that would enable Africa to claim 
the 21st century (Mbeki, 2010).
The Significance of Ethiopianism for Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance
Current civic movements on the continent can learn a great deal from Ethiopianism. The 
history of Ethiopianism still animates the struggle for Pan-Africanism and African Renais-
sance. It would be an inexcusable omission if the chapter on Ethiopianism is missing in 
any history book on the anti-colonialism and anti-Apartheid struggles, and moreso if it 
is overlooked in the search for inspiration and guidance for contemporary transnational 
movements aspiring to consummate the genuine liberation of Africa.
As we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the OAU, it is imperative 
that we look back to the early history of Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance. 
The value of Ethiopianism could not be any higher than at the jubilee celebration of the 
Pan-African organisation – a time for reflection and action. The Pan-African movement 
for which Ethiopianism served as its alias until the early years of the twentieth century 
is indispensable in informing the trajectories that current Pan-Africanism should take. 
As Shepperson put it, “to rake among the embers of Ethiopianism is to find a few sparks 
which may throw some light on the obscure roads into the African future” (1953: 18). 
And, of late, this argument has been updated: “We cannot understand the history and 
substance of the Pan-African Movement without drawing heavily upon sources now clas-
sified as Afro-American Studies on the one hand, and Carribean Studies on the other” 
(Cummings quoted in Prah in Muchie, 2003: 21). It is hardly contested that Ethiopianism 
occupies a critical place in the Afro-American and Carribean Studies.
The ethos of Ethiopianism lives on, despite the liberation of the continent from colonial-
ism and Apartheid. The post-colonial condition failed to bring about the liberation that 
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would see Africa stand on its own. In the wake of independence, Africa found itself under 
the tutelage of former colonial powers still dictating Africa’s terms of engagement. This 
state of affairs underwent several christenings from neo-colonialism to empire, from glo-
balisation to coloniality. The net effect has been that Africa is denied the right to decide 
for itself, let alone decide for the world. Fifty years on from independence, the quest for 
genuine liberation stands unanswered. It is back to square one for Africa, and by choos-
ing the theme of Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance, the AU is, in effect, calling 
for movements like Ethiopianism to be brought back to inform today’s efforts at Africa’s 
genuine liberation.
No one is under any illusion with what independence has brought to Africa. With the 
newly-independent states of Africa came “slavery by consent” supplanting “slavery by 
coercion” under colonialism. This predicament is now captured by a neologism – “coloni-
ality”. Ramón Grosfoguel (2009) expounds the state of coloniality under which post-in-
dependence Africa found itself:
One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the 
notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amount-
ed to the decolonisation of the world. The heterogeneous and 
multi global structures put in place over a period of 450 years 
did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonisation of 
the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live un-
der the colonial matrix. “With juridical political colonisation we 
moved from a period of global colonialism to the current period 
of global coloniality”. Although colonial administrations have al-
most entirely been eradicated and the majority of the periphery 
is politically organised into independent states, non-European 
people are still leaving under crude European/Euro-American 
exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of Eu-
ropean versus non-European remain in place and are entangled 
with the international division of labour and accumulation of 
capital at a world scale (.pp.21-22). 
Living under the state of coloniality, as described above, is set to introduce the worst 
forms of exploitation that humanity has seen in terms of its sophistication, subtlety and 
brutality. The encounters with the international financial institutions (IFIs), from SAPs to 
Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers, have abundantly shown that it is the Euro-Americans 
who call the shots. In cases where countries are formally said to be free not to follow the 
prescriptions of the IFIs presenting a semblance of formal political independence, Afri-
can countries could not act otherwise than according to the prescription. The declaration 
that they are free ignores what Chimni calls “the factor of structural coercion”, whereby 
the countries are rendered powerless to challenge IFI prescriptions. (Chimni, 2004: 13). 
Compliance with the IFI prescription is achieved “by the formulation of a compelling and 
authoritative vision of society, of progress, and of the individual” (Anghie, 2000: 284). 
This kind of domination is a new form of colonialism rightly dubbed as “postmodern colo-
nialism”, where “control of land or political organisation or nation-states is less important 
than power over consciousness and consumption” (Silbey, 1997: 219).
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‘Postmodern colonialism’ or coloniality is what describes the state of African agency to-
day. The Evaluation by Chris Lansberg (undated) clearly depicts the scene:
At present, African states are not taking ownership of the inter-
national and partnership agenda, instead allowing it to drift and 
hover, thereby playing into the hands of Western powers that 
by nature and tradition show little interest in African issues be-
yond ensuring the continent can yield up its limitless resources. 
Any concerns Africa itself may have are pushed to the margins, 
where they will stay unless given clearly voiced. (p.9).
Africa, by choosing its own path of development and by reclaiming its agency, could shun 
the new modalities of exploitation. The philosophy of Ethiopianism as reflected in the 
African Renaissance concept of self-worth, self-reliance and freedom to decide Africa’s 
destiny, offers the much-needed guidance to navigate the turbulent waters of globalisa-
tion. Africa has the power not to be restrained by what some pop-globalisation theorists 
have called “the golden straitjacket” (Friedman, 2000). It has the discursive power and 
the historical justifications to claim the right to redefine globalisation on its own terms.
Ethiopianism and African Renaissance
The African Renaissance discourse leaves much to be desired in terms of clarity and the 
adequacy of content. One of the reasons for this is the close association of the idea with 
Thabo Mbeki. Some commentators have even detected it as a danger, and rightly so. As 
Chris Landsberg (undated) observed, there has been a consistent tendency among Afri-
can leaders to undo ideas and initiatives having to do with their predecessors. The idea of 
an African Renaissance is no exception, and this is evident from President Jacob Zuma’s 
criticism of the African Renaissance idea that his predecessor popularised. Zuma said of 
the African Renaissance, “the call for an African Renaissance is threatening to become a 
fashionable concept while remaining largely a mystery to the majority of Africans” (Prit-
vorov and Shubin, 2000: 83).
Zuma’s criticism of the African Renaissance concept is also shared by scholarly writ-
ers who underscore that the idea largely remains an “empty vessel” with a high senti-
ment-low substance matrix. Ethiopianism serves to address this problematisation of the 
African Renaissance concept. The identification of the concept with Thabo Mbeki, while 
acknowledging the credit that is due to him, has made the concept vulnerable to all sorts 
of criticism. Even criticisms of Mbeki’s other policies sneak in as criticisms of the African 
Renaissance by mere association; that turns the debate rather hazy and compounds what 
Zuma has said of the concept above. Ethiopianism offers the requisite explanation that 
would put flesh on the bare bones of the African Renaissance concept. What Mbeki has 
defined as African Renaissance is very much what Ethiopianists were demanding. The 
essence of Ethiopianism was crisply put by the Zimbabwean historian, Mutero Chirenje, 
as follows: “Ethiopianism became a generic term to describe a whole range of the black 
man’s efforts to improve his religious, educational and political status in society (Chirenje, 
1987:2).
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Mbeki was indeed heavily drawing from the philosophy of the Ethiopianist movement 
when he defined African Renaissance:
We have a duty to define ourselves. We speak about the need 
for African Renaissance in part so that we, ourselves and not 
another, determine who we are, what we stand for, what our 
vision and hopes are, how we do things, what programmes we 
adopt to make our lives worth living, who we relate to and how 
(Mbeki, 2004).
It was in strikingly similar terms that Ethiopianism was defined during its heyday. The 
Ethiopianist position was summarised by the editor of the Rand Daily Mail as follows: 
“This is our country; these are our farms, and our mines, why are we not working them 
for the white people and giving them all the benefit?” (Pampallis, 1997: 58; Chirenje, 
1987:106).
Mbeki’s use of the term “African Renaissance” is at best open for interpretation, and no 
wonder the charge of a “Northbound gaze” and the pitting of Afrocentric against Eu-
rocentric ideas is raised (Ramose, 2000: 47). While his definition quoted above makes 
it abundantly clear that a Eurocentric agenda is in no way to corrupt the concept, the 
very use of the term and the ambiguity that surrounds it has drawn several criticisms. 
Mbeki’s critics have taken issue with the European Renaissance, arguing that the Europe-
an Renaissance led to colonialism and slavery, as the inventions and instruments that it 
produced were deployed to carry out these projects. European Renaissance is therefore 
considered as “the negation of [the colonised and enslaved people’s] achievement”(Van 
Grasdorff, 2005: 17). On a different score, if Africa is to emulate the European Renais-
sance, it is missing the plot as the European Renaissance was long passé and Europe has 
moved on and relished the Enlightenment transcending the legacies of the Renaissance 
(Ramose, 2000: 56). Still others pose questions on whether Africa has the prerequisites 
for a European-type Renaissance (Van Grasdorff, 2005: 46). On the latter question, it 
is asked whether Africa is investing in the technologies of the century and whether it 
is ready to appropriate these technologies in “its own way” to use the refrain from the 
founder of the Ethiopian church – Mangena Mokone.
While modern technologies have served as vectors of globalisation and Western domi-
nance, this should not obscure the emancipatory power of technologies. The internet still 
remains an instrument of the Western cultural and epistemological hegemony. However, 
it has the enormous power to resist such hegemony and to project African culture and 
knowledge on the world stage. Africa needs to appropriate the technology in its own 
terms, just as the Ethiopianists did while appropriating Christianity. Ethiopianism did not 
reject Christianity in its entirety, and is certainly short of “the unapologetic distancing 
from the Christianity of the white man” expressed through defection to Islam for exam-
ple (Tilleraas, 2012: 27). Ethiopianism deployed Christianity’s own arsenals to fight the 
racism of the missionaries and their role as proxies and promoters of colonial masters.
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The white mission churches were agents of an earlier phase of globalisation. It was clear 
that the mission churches had the objective of producing “Africans who would be ser-
viceable for the project of colonialism” (Prah, 2011: 161). The Ethiopianist movement 
took upon itself the duty to tease out the chaff from the wheat while embracing the glo-
balisation of that era with a firm assertion that it should be in Africa’s terms. The estab-
lishment of independent Ethiopian churches across Africa was a counter-homogenising 
move against European-led globalisation. Ethiopianism teaches that resistance against 
globalisation and the struggle to preserve African identity, culture, and knowledge does 
not entail a wholesale rejection of what globalisation is all about.
This lesson could not be more relevant than in the context of the ongoing globalisation 
process and the dominance of the neoliberal ideology that is driving it. Africa needs to 
play its part in this process and should avoid being cornered in the ghetto of the “global 
village” that technology and globalisation are instituting. Africa should not be left on 
the margins of this process, but should be influencing and shaping its future not only for 
Africa’s benefit, but for the benefit of all humanity. This is exactly what Ethiopianism did 
by way of re-inventing Christian theology for the world in a non-racial and truly universal 
way. The contemporary equivalent of Ethiopianism in the globalisation discourse finds 
expression in the various proposals to do away with the discontents of globalisation and 
neoliberalism, and the calls for humane globalisation. In view of the handling of the issues 
of its days by the Ethiopianist movement, present-day anti-or alternative-globalisation 
discourses cannot be taken as the first of their kind.
 
Conclusion
The relevance of Ethiopianism to contemporary socio-political discourse can be ques-
tioned on the basis of the aggressive secularism that is backed up by the constitutional 
order that sanctions the separation of church and state. However, as is shown in this 
contribution, the ideals of Ethiopianism are beyond the ecclesiastical, and directly ad-
dress socio-political issues that could be categorised as purely secular matters. Ethiopia-
nism informs the way of how Africa and the Pan-African transnational civic movements 
in particular should approach globalisation issues, Western technological and ideological 
dominance, and the dominance in knowledge production as a whole. As Ethiopianism 
overcame the temptation to totally reject the Christianity of the white man, Africa should 
also resist the unnecessary vigilance at rejecting the globalisation tide or ideas coming 
from the developed world. In the encounter with Eurocentric ideas, what Africa should do 
is exactly what the Ethiopianists did: process the new ideas but “in their own way”. Afri-
can Renaissance should not necessarily emulate the European Renaissance;however,  that 
should not lead to the conclusion that Africa cannot learn from the European Renaissance 
– not only from its achievements but also from its failures.
Ethiopianism successfully demonstrated that racial separation was not what Christianity 
taught. It took secessionist Ethiopian churches to establish this truth for the whole world. 
The Ethiopian churches excelled in their understanding of the Scriptures. The same ex-
cellence is what Du Bois was after when he encouraged Negro churches, Negro colleges, 
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Negro public schools, Negro businesses, and so on. It was not the objective of entrenching 
of racial separation that Du Bois was suggesting. His objective was that of showing Negro 
efficiency and ingenuity, and proving to the world how pointless racial segregation is. The 
resonance of this appeal cannot be lost on the transnational civic movements of today.
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